


THE
RELIGIOUS MIND

MAHONEY

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
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THE RELIGIOUS MIND

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE



BY
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PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
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TO MY FRIEND AND TEACHER,
PROFESSOR WILLIAM J. THOMPSON,
WHOSE ABILITIES AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN THIS FIELD
OF STUDY DESERVE A MORE WORTHY TRIBUTE.

PREFACE

"OF the making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh." The former half of this utterance of an ancient sage has seemed altogether true with respect to works of psychological science during the past few years, and perhaps the latter half of the utterance has been only too true of the study of the subject. The development of the subject and the shifts of emphasis have been swift indeed. Such rapid progress is almost a discouragement to a writer. He is faced with the possibility of the fact that his book may be out of date by the time he gets it finished.

The effort of the following pages to study the religious mind in its functioning, rather than merely phases of religious experience, may not always be apparent, but that is the purpose of the author. The book aims at being a study of psychology in the field of religion rather than a study of religion with reference to psychology. It is a study of the religious person in his psychological functioning, a study of the mental processes of the religious person.

Acknowledgment is due Professor Norman E. Richardson, of Northwestern University, for suggestive material furnished the author, and to Professor William McDougall for a reading and criticism of the manuscript. Professor W. J. Thompson of Drew Theological Seminary has also made some very valuable suggestions.

C. K. M.

MITCHELL, SOUTH DAKOTA,
September, 1926.

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INTRODUCTION

MENTAL LIFE AND RELIGION.—The religious mind is the subject of individual experience as affecting religion or as affected by religion. Religion may be thought of as the relating of life to those values regarded as belonging to that phase of reality which is basic and ultimate in the universe. But in this discussion the term will be used as applied to the usual forms and manifestations of religion as we know them in what bears the name of Christian civilization. This is not a study of the philosophy of religion, but a study of religious experience in familiar fields.

THE YOUTH OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE.—The science of the mental life is a comparatively new science. Man has thought vastly more about the material world than he has thought about himself. His science has hitherto been largely a science of things. As a consequence, material civilization has undergone vastly greater development and improvement than human personality. Man's moral, social and religious development is still in the rudimentary stages, to say nothing of his understanding of his own life. The study of man himself is now a subject entered into with great enthusiasm. When reduced to a more exact science, or system of sciences, it promises to work a revolution in human life that will be incomparably more wonderful than the achievements of the physical sciences. Just now, however, the sciences of human life bear the marks of immaturity. Nowhere is this imma-

turity more manifest than in the field of human psychology, the study of individual experience or of individuals in the connections and relations of social experience.

SHIFTING POINTS OF VIEW.—This immaturity is indicated in one way by the rapid shifts of points of view from one dominant set of psychological explanations to another. This rapid change of emphasis in psychological theory has led someone to remark facetiously that psychology some time ago lost its soul, then lost its mind, then lost consciousness, and is now about to lose its instincts. This shift is due to the tendency in all developing sciences to seize upon particular hypotheses and make them the complete explanation of all appearing phenomena.

The older faculty psychology seized upon the dominant aspects of mental activity and put forth the hypothesis of a soul with faculties, these faculties being regarded as the divisions of mental life which account for the different kinds of mental activity. But further development of psychological science brought forth the fact that the mind is a unit and that the whole is involved in any phase of its activity. Intellect, feeling and willing, for example, are only ways in which the whole mind functions in adapting the life to its environment. This gave rise to what has been known as the functional psychology. Another school of the older psychology, called the sensational psychology, treated the mind as receptive and regarded knowledge as a matter of receiving impressions through the five senses. Further study and debate brought the general opinion that the mind acquires knowledge through its own activity rather than by a passive receiving of impressions. Unpleasant experiences with the soul

and its faculties and with sensationalism and its ultimate absurdities brought a positivistic tendency into psychological investigation and study, a tendency that is not wholly defensible as a proper scientific way of doing things. Psychologists, especially the experimentalists, announced a limitation for psychology, confining the studies of this science to behavior. And any accurate estimate of behaviorism must recognize it as an arbitrary fixing of lines and limitations in scientific investigation. Psychology, under the influence of the theory of evolution, became a specialization in biology. From a study of states of consciousness it turned to a study of instincts and resultant activities. This led to two other pronounced developments. One of these was the psychology of the unconscious, which grew out of the efforts to trace life tendencies to their sources. The lines of impulse seemed to flow out of a mental background behind consciousness. The logical outcome was the hypothesis of an unconscious mentality. The other development, I think, came out of the same line of investigation, the tracing of lines of impulse in the direction of their sources. Professor Dewey, himself a radical behaviorist, reaches the conclusion that instinct is an uncorrelated, meaningless outrush that takes shape, direction and meaning from interaction with environment. He argues that there are no specific instincts which account for prevailing tendencies in human conduct. These various types of psychological theory are seen largely to represent shifts of emphasis in study and explanation.

THE PRACTICALLY SIGNIFICANT RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.—The science of psychology in the field of religion should concern itself mainly with the religious mind as it now exists in a general way. We need to

know, as far as we can know, how the religious consciousness arises in the ordinary mind, when it usually begins to appear, the contemporary and antecedent forces giving rise to it, and how it operates normally in the various stages and periods of development.

It will be profitable to study the working of religious experience in the various types of normal mind. I am aware that it is possible to throw dust by raising the question of what is the normal mind; but in spite of all sophistry on the subject, there is a pretty definite idea in psychology as to what is meant by the normal mind. The study of the primitive religious consciousness has a value only in tracing origins and in finding clues to later manifestations. It is the study of the normal mind in our own time that will probably yield the most profitable results. The religious phenomena of ungeared minds constitutes a special field of study in the range of pathology rather than in a proper study of the psychology of religion.

If we decide that the normal type of religious experience is the most important for study, that the unusual type of experience is of secondary value, our method of study must be influenced by such a conclusion. It seems to me that a great many psychologists in this special field have put the cart before the horse in their method of approach to the subject, both as to the primitive experience and the phenomenal experience. Perhaps the science would have made greater progress and been more fruitful in results if it had started with the ordinary religious experience, say, of the investigator, and worked backward and forward to the primitive and exceptional.

It is true that this method is much more difficult than the other; but if it has held good in general

psychology, giving more accurate and permanent results, it bids fair to do the same in a special branch of the science. You will recall that the older psychologist, in the pioneer days of "Mental Science," began with his own mental states, analyzing and describing them the best he could by introspection, and then passing by inference from his own mental states to those of others. This study was reënforced by a study of the behavior of others and also the study of the underlying physiological phenomena of his own mental processes. After much inference, conjecture, experimentation and theorizing, the testimonies of others were brought in for comparative study. The study did not begin with the mental processes of animals or savages. It began at home and worked its way out to a study of all kinds of mind.

A QUESTION OF QUALIFICATION.—In relation to the above time-tried method, a question of qualification naturally arises. An investigator in the field of religious psychology, starting out along the lines of the example set by general psychology, would begin with the study of his own religious experience and proceed to a consideration of that of others. This would be a perilous proceeding for some investigators. If the investigator had little or no religious experience of his own with which to start, he would be under a distinct handicap. It is quite impossible to study mental phenomena as an outside spectator. You must at least be introduced to the subject by your own experience. Does it seem reasonable that the man most qualified to pursue investigations along this line is the man whose whole life has been aloof from the scenes and conditions of religious activity? How can he be qualified to pass judgments and announce results unless

he is in intimate contact with the living of the religious life under the usual conditions that affect it? Until I can reason differently, I shall remain unwilling to concede the last word to the aloof examiner of the habits, customs and behavior of primitive peoples or to the pathological specialist in ungeared minds. And the man who forms his judgments back in the quiet seclusion of scholarly solitude may be thoroughly qualified for a study of the records of the past, but I am inclined to some doubt of his capacity to deal in a vital way with the questions of the present.

ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE.—On the assumption that man is descended from the brute plane, or ascended (a very well-supported assumption), a wide study has been made of the behavior of brutes as a preliminary to the study of human behavior. The idea has been that behavior was to be found there in its most primitive and simplest form, and this would offer a key to the more complicated behavior of humans. But the mental processes of animals are still behind the curtain of doubt. Can one describe the consciousness of a dog or have any sure idea of its mental content? All we get is by inference, and there is wide chance for wild inference. This study of animal psychology for the explanation of facts of human behavior is an illustration of the predominance of the biological approach to the human sciences, an approach that has much to commend it but which is also open to innumerable fallacies.

WEAKNESS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE METHOD.¹—A favorite device of psychologists in religion has been

¹ Dr. George A. Coe has catalogued the weaknesses of the questionnaire method in his *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 44, *et seq.*

the sending out of questionnaires concerning the various phases of religious experience. The response of the average man to a questionnaire is to dump the set of questions into the wastebasket and forget it. The average healthy-minded individual is prone to avoid almost entirely the examination of his own experience. But the psychopath who receives a questionnaire is almost certain to reply immediately and in detail. He is inordinately interested in the study of his own states of consciousness, not because of a scientific interest in them, but because his mental condition has given him an unusual and phenomenal religious experience and made him eager to relate it. That is the rule of all forms of questionnaire results, straw-vote results, and results from other forms of broadcasting requests for information. It is the exceptional response that comes in. The average citizen, peaceful and sober, goes on his way unmindful of the straw vote or questionnaire. Therefore any general investigation of this character will return a mass of data concerning the exceptional, specialized or unusual types of experience or opinion. It will fail to give data except upon the mental pathology of religion. It will certainly tend to give us the unusual and grotesque in religious experience. I am of the opinion that many psychologists in the field of religion, because of the fallacious character of this method, have come to take it for granted that the genuinely religious person is a psychopath. It has not been very long since I heard a psychologist intimate as much. The empirical method is without question the most scientific method of study, provided we are guided by scientific principles, but it is possible for empiricism to run as wild as dialectic.

The Varieties of Religious Experience, by Professor

James, is a psychological study of religion based upon unusual cases. It was his great general knowledge of psychology and remarkable insight into religious experience that enabled him to give the subject a treatment that made the book a valuable contribution to this field of study. The book would be merely a psychopathic treatise were it not for the wise generalizations of the author that lift it out of this particular field.

THE LIMITATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY.—The psychologists are prone to run beyond the limits of their province. They are inclined to assume that they are the masters of all knowledge. As an example of what I mean I shall take Professor Leuba's statement in which he includes philosophy and theology within the domain of psychological science. He says:

The hope to lift a theology based on experience out of the sphere of science is preposterous, since whatever appears in consciousness is material for psychology.²

This statement sounds plausible, but it is fallacious. It is true that whatever appears in consciousness is material for psychology, but psychology is limited by definition in the use of that material. Psychology is concerned with that material as experience material, having a bearing on human behavior. It has nothing to do with the reasoning that may follow it in the wider philosophical interpretation of the data of experience. Psychology may seek to find out, and may furnish theories, of how belief in human immortality came to arise. But psychology has nothing to do with determining the validity of the belief in

² *A Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 242.

immortality. When psychology is through with theories of how things arose in experience, philosophy and theology may step in with theories of the ultimate causes of the phenomena of experience and of their final significance. Whether there are any external realities corresponding to religious ideas in the mind is a question to be referred to theology, philosophy and history. It lies without the province of psychological inquiry.

THE OUTER LIFE INTERPRETED BY THE INNER LIFE.
—While I must criticize Professor Leuba's statement of his view, I am of the opinion that he was driving in the direction of something fine and true. The inner life does hold the key to the outer life. In the deepest sense of the terms, we do proceed from the inner source of interpretation to the outside data. We do this in all knowing. We may study behavior for the knowledge of inner psychical processes behind it, but we must study it with our internal equipment for interpreting life, relating what we observe externally to what we feel internally. The supreme ground of all religious experience, therefore, is within. All external evidence must ultimately come for examination to the bar of judgment within. External authority is worthless without internal corroboration. Suppose you regard the Bible as containing the essential truths of religion. You say, "I am not forced to depend upon subjective data, but will take the Bible as my guide." But what is the Bible but a record of religious experience? It is the outpouring of the thought and feeling and imagination of men in the experience of religion. You say, "It is more; it is the work of the Holy Spirit." But where do you discover the Holy Spirit? There is no way that you can evade or avoid bringing the

facts of any external authority to the mental life within for interpretation and criticism; and if it finds nothing within your inner soul to which it is related, it is utterly unintelligible and useless to you.

And how has man's doctrine of God been evolved? It is a reasonable proposition that God could manifest Himself to man's intelligence no faster than man was able to conceive Him, and that man must necessarily revise his conception of God as he learns more about Him. That is what the mind does with all its other objects of thought. However widely man may search for God in the world outside, he will always gather evidence from inner sources for endowing the Divine Being with properties and characteristics. He will constantly come back to his inner life to perfect the divine concept.

THE TEMPTATION TO WANDER.—It is possible for thinkers in the field of the subjective study of religion to lose sight of the basic condition of their study and unconsciously wander far afield. They can forget the fact that the psychology of religion is all the while psychology. There are many temptations to do this. We may become absorbed in a phase of religious experience, such as prayer, mysticism or conversion, and follow it out of the realm of psychology into philosophy, theology, history or comparative religion. It is not religion as a science that the religious psychologist is to study but those phases of human experience having to do with religion. Therefore it would seem wise to study all the psychological phenomena of religious experience as phases of the life of a religious subject of the experience rather than in the abstract. Hence the title and method of this book.

THE RELIGIOUS MIND

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CHAPTER I

MIND IN THE MAKING

THE IMPORTANCE OF TERMINOLOGY.—Definition lies at the basis of all clear and fruitful discussion. Thought is dependent upon language and language is both an indisputable equipment and a handicap. Without language there could be no coherent thought and no accumulated stores of learning, to say nothing of thought expression and intercommunication between individuals. Yet we all realize how inadequate at times is language for the expression of our thoughts and feelings, and it often blocks the way to the conveyance of thought from one mind to another. We are dependent upon signs and signals in our communication one with another. If these are misunderstood, we are to that extent cut off from our fellows. Misunderstanding and controversy are largely due to a varying use of terms. Hence the importance of making clear at the outset the terms of a discussion.

THE MEANING OF MIND.—What do we mean by mind? The use of the term varies. Mind may stand for consciousness; mind may stand for a body of accumulated knowledge; mind may stand for intellect or reason; mind may stand for that phase of reality which is contrasted with matter; mind may stand for the

whole course of individual experience; mind may stand for any sort of organized and directed life. Behaviorism seeks to avoid the use of the word "mind," but gives the name "mental processes" to those activities of the organism relating itself to its environment on the basis of past experience in such a way as to promote its well-being. I propose to use the word "mind" in all the discussion that shall follow to refer to the abiding subject of experience, whether that experience is thought of as a doing or an undergoing. Where there is wide variety in the use of a word a writer may choose his own meaning, if he will clearly state his meaning and consistently follow his original use of terms. If I may do violence to someone's sense of fitness by the use I make of the word "mind," I am comforted by the fact that I have support in the opinion of at least one distinguished thinker. Professor Hobhouse thus states his view: "It will suffice us for the moment that we give the name of Mind to the permanent unity of which we conceive any given act of consciousness to be the temporary condition, act or state."¹

It is necessary in any science to start with some assumptions. Why not start with the one which so persistently offers itself, which is so difficult to discard? I have observed that when the self, or soul, or mind, or whatever we may choose to call it, has been theoretically done away with, it has been dragged in later under another name, or under no name whatever but with all the characteristics that an entity so named might have. An idea that is hard to down is a pretty good idea to keep until you are absolutely sure that it has no validity. There are both unity and con-

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*, p. 20.

tinuity in experience. There is a living being who feels and thinks and acts. I am not greatly interested in where mind leaves off and where body begins. The two are conjoined in one life and are distinct in kind. States of mind are utterly different from physical states: acts of mind are different from physical motions. There is a side to our nature that is more than matter in motion and consists of a different set of qualities. Let us agree to call it mind and let it go at that. The subject of experience is mind. The mind's activity, whether waking or sleeping, whether conscious or unconscious, may be covered by the term "experience."

THE GENETIC CHARACTER OF MIND.—Modern scientific opinion views mind as a growth. The mind is not something handed down from heaven a perfect and complete thing, an entity that is to find adjustment in an imperfect world. The mind begins in embryo. It is a growing, living fact, changing and developing with a changing universe. Mind as well as body comes by evolution. Dr. James Harvey Robinson, the title of whose brilliant book so closely resembles the title of this chapter, has shown how the animal mind has flowed into the savage mind and the savage mind by stages into civilization. The process of mental development has been cumulative as well as changing, and we carry in our systems the mind of the animal, the mind of the child, the mind of the savage, and the mind of civilization. All these coexist in the life of the individual.

The development of the mental life proceeds under governing conditions. These help to determine the character of the development, the direction of the development, the rapidity of the development, the

extent of the development, and the final product. These are not the sole determiners of mental development. There is a causative agent working in the living mind. But they are modifying factors that have their place and power in the process.

MIND AND BODY.—Perhaps the most evident of those factors is the physical conjunct of the mind that makes up the other aspect of the psycho-physical whole that we call a living organism. I refer to the body, especially to the nervous system. There are no mental processes without corresponding brain changes. I have seen the statement “that the notion of a brain, or some kind of kindred organ, as the only possible thinking apparatus has no scientific standing.”² That interesting statement is true, but in actual experience the thinking which we humans do has not been observed as taking place without a brain. And if the cortex and other sufficiently important nervous centers are thrown out of gear, the mind is thrown out of gear. Mind functions with reference to body and in conjunction with body. Mental development and mental functioning are dependent upon the health of the brain and nervous system, upon the amount of gray matter available for use, the modifiability of the material of the nervous system, the strength and delicacy of the nervous organization, the peculiarities of that organization, and the functioning of the organs of the body in supplying nourishment to the brain.

There has been a deplorable misplacing of emphasis in the study of the whole question of the relation of mind and body. The materialistically inclined have so emphasized the functioning of physical organs that the mind has been treated as almost negligible. With

² W. R. Halstead, *A Cosmic View of Religion*, p. 76.

such thinkers as Huxley it was an incumbrance, an epiphenomenon that had no business intruding itself into the smooth working of a mechanical system. The subjectivists, on the other hand, have minimized the importance of the physical side of man's nature and made it appear that it might be easily dispensed with. A straight facing of the facts brings us inevitably to the conclusion that mind exerts force on body and body exerts force on mind. They interact naturally, and only prejudice in favor of an espoused theory will make anyone think otherwise.

Mind has power over body, but within limits. There are some physical disorders that may be affected by the mental force of suggestion, but there are other physical disorders that are not so affected. On the other hand, mind is not completely at the mercy of bodily conditions. Men may rise to intellectual and spiritual triumphs out of the infirmities of the flesh. In a sense all intellectual and spiritual achievement is a triumph over the flesh, but it is not independent of the flesh.

HEREDITY AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.—Since the development of the new evolutionary biology began, the very great importance of heredity for mental development has been recognized. Heredity is the transmission of a stream of life through the processes of generation from living organisms to their offspring. The medium of transmission is called *plasm*, a shortened form of protoplasm. It is thought of as having two phases, *germ-plasm* and *somato-plasm*, the germ-plasm carrying the essential determiners of the native characteristics in the ensuing organism and the *somato-plasm* carrying the supporting basis, or over-head initial life, for the organism.

In this way heredity becomes a sort of handed-down direction for the development of the mind and body. Not all those who emphasize the importance of heredity deny that the mind has a sort of development of its own, that is to say that it is not absolutely controlled by its hereditary determiners, even in its lunges into life. It has its individuality, but that individuality is largely provided for in those determiners. To be thoroughly consistent, one who holds a theory of biological determinism must contend that every fact and every step of life are entirely under the control of the processes of heredity.

Those who have been largely influenced by a study of heredity in the formation of their theories of mental development have given instinct a primary place in the mental life. Professor Dewey makes habit a primary fact in all conduct. It would then for him have a place of primacy in mental development. As previously noted, he regards instinct as the forward drive of life with which we come into the world and which grows and takes shape and meaning from experience. He declares that there are no specific instincts. I wonder if his view is not just a little extreme. However, it is a very great improvement upon that type of theory which searches for an appropriate instinct for every act of conduct. It would seem that the truth might be discovered midway between the two positions. Life is begun with an initial equipment that helps to determine its future character and course of development. The exact extent and definite character of these hereditary factors are subjects of investigation and debate from which a variety of theories result. But certain facts seem reasonably certain. We do come into the world with a heritage that produces

peculiarities in our mental constitutions. But just how far those hereditary factors go toward producing peculiarities and shaping courses of conduct is uncertain. It is beyond dispute that there is a difference between innateness and latency, and, for the determination of a course of conduct or development, there is a world of difference. If all our inborn tendencies were seen to be unmodified by environing conditions, mental development might be treated with the utmost confidence. But with the impact of environmental forces coming in and swerving hereditary tendencies from their original courses, it is quite another matter. Tracing all the factors in mental development and adequately describing the process becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Mental development is then driven by an uncertain resultant of forces. Also the number, variety and conflict in operation of the original tendencies and the state of their organization when they get going must come in for consideration and serve to complicate the problem. Below the human plane there are a few well-organized, definite and apparently permanent instincts which determine and limit pretty rigidly the responses of animals, tending to make them uniform for given conditions. On the human plane the living being is born with almost an infinity of capacities and possibilities and a minimum of organization and definite tendencies. We might say that we are born with scarcely any definite tendencies. But there is a difference somehow in the latencies of human beings and there are definite potentialities that inevitably appear as tendencies to certain lines of thought and action when human development has reached a certain degree of complexity. Just how much of the inborn equipment acts as a determining

factor in the organization of the life, it is impossible to say. It is very probable that very little conduct can be traced directly to its operation. But it seems equally certain that it does have a constitutional bearing in our lives and does have some influence in shaping conduct.

ENVIRONMENT AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.—We are affected by our surroundings. The country in which we live, the climate, physical conditions, times and circumstances, all enter into the development of our mental life. One who is born and brought up in the city has a different mind from one who is born and brought up in the country. One who lives among the mountains has a different type of mind from one who lives on the plains. One who grows up in the tropics will have different mental characteristics from one who grows up in the Temperate Zone. And we are affected by the people who surround us, our parents, our neighbors, our teachers, the people we meet incidentally, even by all the people who live in the world. Our lives are all launched into an environment of highly developed and well-established social customs which tend at once to shape us into conformity. We are born with an almost complete dependence upon this established system of social life. Our lives could not even get started without it. And we never arrive, however free we may get from conventional trammels, at a complete independence of this social background of personal life. Even the language which we speak and in which we deposit our thought results is determined by it. A vast portion of our working ideas and our necessary activities have been worked out for us in advance. Indeed, we could not get far with the business of living were this not so. Human

progress is cumulative, and we enter when we are born into the labors of preceding generations.

INDIVIDUALITY.—It is a fact of common observation that people are different. In so far as we have information, in all the history of the world there never have been two persons exactly alike. All facts of evidence that come to our knowledge tend to support this proposition. The fact of the division of animal life into unitary, distinct and separately organized living beings and the fact of variation, which gives to each living being a distinctive set of characteristics are the two essentials of what has been named individuality.

PERSONAL MIND.—We are not born personal. We are born potentially personal, candidates for personality. Personality must be developed within us. This development represents a high and complex life attainment. Some living beings never reach it. They are born without the potentialities of personal mind. All life proceeds in harmony with nature. Under no circumstances will the sprouts of potatoes ever develop into anything but potatoes, and the development will not get on at all without soil and other appropriate conditions of growth. Potatoes develop according to the laws of potato development. And so personal development proceeds out of the initial beginnings in the infant life and by the contributions of environment according to the laws of personal development. But personality could not come from the infant candidate if possibilities of personality were not inherent in the infant life, nor could it take place apart from appropriate conditions.

A very fine description of the growth of personality, whether one agrees with his educational theory or not,

is given by Bishop William Temple, in his brilliant little book, *The Nature of Personality*. He says:

Let us consider our practice in early education. As soon as the child's physical life is fairly well established, we begin to say that for a half an hour or an hour every day the child shall attend to some one thing. For at first the child is a mass of chaotic impulses and interests whose notice is attracted and filled altogether by external occurrences; but we insist that for a period every day he shall not allow himself to be distracted by anything. That period is called lessons. It scarcely matters what subject is taught: the vital matter is that he should learn attention in general. Gradually that period is extended, and the whole system of regulations, called discipline, is developed, till lessons and discipline together cover nearly the whole of life; then the external pressure is relaxed again, and the individual is set free in the sense that he is left to the guidance of habits which discipline has created in him; and the educator may say—"I have created a will in you; at first you were a mass of impulses; I have coördinated and systematized those impulses so that you now have a real will and purpose of your own; I have forced you into freedom; now go and exercise that freedom."³

It is not difficult after reading this description of the development of personality to see that personality is organized individuality. The life has attained self-consciousness and self-direction. It has gained possession of ideals to which it relates the facts of experi-

³ William Temple, *The Nature of Personality*, p. 28.

ence. It has a definite drive which gives meaning to its impulses.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE.—The development which follows the attainment of personality may be called personal development. It consists in the enlargement of personal experience. Experience is not merely what is felt or thought. Experience may be a doing or an undergoing. In whatever form it may appear it represents interaction of life with environment. Experience in the personal form is the only experience of which we have a genuine knowledge, for it was at the point where we attained personality that we began to take account of experience. With personal development, we continue the organization of each fresh experience into our system of life, relating it to accepted principles and ideals.

THE GROUP MIND.—There has been a great deal of debate over the existence of a group mind, or social mind, and a great deal more discussion of the meaning of the term. Not a little confusion has resulted. The group mind is a fact or a fiction, depending upon the content given the term. Professor MacDougall uses the term to refer to that combination and organization of individual minds in such a way that they think, feel and act together. The group mind is a coöperative mentality. If this meaning is held in all our thinking concerning psychological and social phenomena, I cannot see how anyone can find objection to it. But if the group mind is thought of as a super-consciousness of society, that somehow rises above individual mentality and takes its place, it is a fiction, a myth, a pure creation of the imagination. The only group consciousness that ever has existed is the consciousness of the individual mind of social connection and sym-

pathetic action. States of feeling or opinions may be conveyed swiftly or gradually from mind to mind; but as mental states they are resident always in individual minds. Moods may be duplicated and multiplied, but they are still the moods of individual mentalities, bound together by conditioning relations. That which has seemed to be the personality of a city or a people, when it is psychologically cornered, is seen to be a matter of commonly accepted standards, tastes and opinions that are shared by means of the power of the individual to take over into his own mental realm the mental states and tendencies of his fellows. The idea of a personalized society, a brand-new order of mentality, has given rise to a number of fallacies, one of which is a religious consciousness of a purely social character.

Any working conception of a group mind is dependent upon a recognition of the social nature of the individual. He has social dispositions, social aptitudes, social capacities, social affinities. His life is developed under social conditions and with reference to social relationships. And the individual life makes its contributions to social development. Social progress would otherwise depend solely upon accident. Social movements, customs, philosophies, religions, systems of thought and organizations have their rootage somewhere in creative, originating personality. And all the outstanding modifications in the development of social movements have been the results of the influence of personal agents.

There is no such thing as thorough homogeneity in human society. The variety in individuality would preclude that. And we cannot work out social theories by making up a human composite of common-to-alls

in experience. The group is not a generalization of the individual. There is no chance of working socially upon the basis of uniformity in human nature. Society must be interpreted as composed of human beings in the variety and irregularity with which we are commonly familiar. They must be considered with all their differences and peculiarities. Individuals are concrete facts, not parts of a whole. In so far as there is a social whole, it is a whole in the sense of an aggregation with a certain degree of organization.

But while the concept of society is not to be built up by a generalization of the individual, there are contributions from social life to individual life, as well as contributions from individual life to social life. Social forces have a great deal to do with the formation of personal character. We cannot even imagine an individual life that is unconnected with society. The story of Romulus and Remus suckled by the wolf is the best story that the imagination has produced concerning getting on in life without human help. But as a matter of fact, we realize that we could not attain even personal life without parental care, the mode and conditions of which are determined largely by custom and tradition, even if we accept the notion of a parental instinct.

THE TWO-SIDED CHARACTER OF THE RELIGIOUS MIND.—Two serious fallacies have vitiated the study of religion from the standpoint of psychology. One of these fallacies, as I have already suggested, is the assumption that religion is primarily, or entirely, a social fact, that it was social in its origin and all its meanings are social meanings. The other assumption is that religion is primarily, or entirely, personal in its nature, that it was generated in the inner life and is

wholly a matter of personal experience. Religion is no more completely social than man himself is completely social and no more independent of social relationships than man himself is independent of social relationships. Religion is both personal and social, in origin and development, and neither aspect is more important than the other. Any account of religious experience which leaves out or minimizes one or the other is a one-sided account.

The Inner Chamber.—Every life has an inner sanctuary, sequestered and exclusive. Into that inner realm of personal life no other human being may intrude. There is where we keep our secrets. There is where we keep tryst with God. All the contact that another human has with us is by means of signals, passing from an inner, invisible realm of life to another, and read with varying degrees of proficiency. That inner realm is the realm of subjective experience; yet, by the mystery of self-consciousness, the living person may become his own object. He may study himself. To a limited degree, he may observe his own experience; and, in a limited way, he may render an account of it.

It is within the inner world of subjective personal experience that the religious consciousness has its being, where feelings well up and where ideas are generated. A religion that does not have deep rootage here cannot be other than superficial. The sense of the presence of God, the convictions concerning religious realities, the experiences of personal transformation, the promptings of duty, the intuitions of truth, the experience of personal peace, all lie within this province. The seat of spiritual values is here. The fountain of spiritual life is here, springing up like

living water. This is the inner realm of both spiritual light and spiritual mystery. This is the source of spiritual energy. A religion, to be genuine and powerful, must be securely grounded in personal experience.

The Outward Life.—The inner life must work itself outward, must manifest itself in conduct, must find expression in interaction with other lives, must give form to that invisible, formless experience within by outward acts and in outward facts. It must become a creative, modifying force in the world all about it. Unless it can find expression in the outer world of physical and social relations, the religious life will turn upon itself with destructive effects. Just as in machinery an overplus of power will shake to pieces the machine to which it is geared, so in the religious life the energies that fail to find adequate resistance in the objective world will work paralysis for the life within. Outward expression, especially of a social character, tends to enrich and invigorate the inner spiritual life. From the outer exercise comes the glow of spiritual health and the deepening of spiritual satisfaction.

CHAPTER II

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MIND

ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MIND.—In the previous chapter we considered mind as a growth. We undertook to make a study of mental development, in the sense of the evolution of mind out of its primordial constituents. There are other approaches to the study of mind. One of these is the study of mind as matured and functioning. Mental development, in certain respects, may be considered as going on indefinitely. In other respects there is a definite maturity, and the human mind may be observed as thus matured and functioning in normal ways. It may be studied both through introspection and by the observation of forms of behavior. In fact, a well-balanced study of the mental life must make use of both methods.

In the older psychology and mental philosophy, mind was identified with consciousness and mental activity with conscious processes, but in the newer psychology consciousness is regarded as only one of the phases of mental life. Mind is thought of as both conscious and unconscious. It is the purpose of this chapter, as a preliminary to the study of religious experience, to enter somewhat into a consideration of these two sides of mentality, conscious and unconscious mind. Does the mind in its normal activities, as an organ of life, function in this double fashion? If it does, it will be

interesting and profitable to take some account of how these processes go on.

I. CONSCIOUS MIND

THE PRIMARY IMPORTANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—Whatever psychological theories one may hold or however he may approach a discussion of mind, he cannot escape the conclusion that the outstanding fact of psychological science is consciousness. Psychology has even been defined as the science of consciousness. The elaboration of the science has shown its larger scope, but it has not taken away the supreme importance of consciousness in the life of the mind or in the study of that life. Consciousness is the instrument of the mind's study of itself. Without the fact of consciousness, there could be no science of the mind, nor any other science. You may view behavior as the true field of psychological investigation, but the fact remains that you could get no knowledge concerning behavior except through consciousness. And consciousness is also required for the discovery of the evidences of unconscious mentality. Further than that, consciousness becomes its own object and goes in pursuit of itself.

THE MEANING OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—What do we mean by being conscious? We mean that we are aware of things going on within and without us. We are aware of ourselves and others. We are aware of our own behavior and that of others. We are aware of many of our mental processes and of our own awareness.

Professor McDougall argues that consciousness is a very bad word, and that it is unfortunate that it ever came to large usage in psychological science. But I wonder if we could have done much better with other

words. It is the meaning that is difficult to handle, difficult because it is completely and all the time involved in any study of itself. It is elemental in experience. Dr. Bowne once asserted that all definitions of consciousness were tautological. That is true. Consciousness is an elemental fact of experience, and the idea enters into all the terms of definitions that may be framed concerning it, enters into them so completely that all the terms of the definition stand out in such a clear equation of meanings that the effect is humorous. An ordinary definition of consciousness is about as ridiculous as that old explanation of anæsthesia as due to certain "dormitive" properties of the drugs used in producing it. The meaning of consciousness, as far as we can understand it at all, is to be gained rather from a study of its processes than by the elaboration of definitions.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND IMPULSE.—Impulse is the forward drive of life. It begins as an uncertain movement and takes character as it goes forward, the stream breaking up into many particular lines of force. There comes to mind a rather crude illustration, but useful if not overworked, of how impulse arises and ramifies into the many directions of life. It is the discharge of molten metal from a blast furnace, say an iron furnace. The metal plunges out in one main gush as it leaves the furnace and then breaks up into many finer streams as it strikes the furrows in the sand which have been prepared for it. Its flow takes direction and meaning from the paths and patterns which it meets in its onrush. Any obstruction, or the introduction of an element of force of an incidental character, as it meets the stream of metal will operate as a factor in determining results, sometimes of disorder and confusion.

In much the same way the stream of life energy flows out in uncertain candidacy to take shape and direction and meaning from social convention, personal influences, physical conditions and all the other forces and conditions which constitute environment.

The analogy must be given up at a certain point in the illustration. The metal changes its shape and direction, but its flow does not grow stronger with its progress and more complex in its inner character. The iron changes, but not in a way comparable to the unfolding meaning of life. As the drive of life goes forward, it becomes a felt pressure. Then we say that it has become conscious. At certain levels of life the impulses are all unconscious, and at all levels of life some of them are unconscious. These we call reflexes. There are certain other tendencies that we feel. We may even be aware of a conflict between or among them. They have become facts of consciousness. There may come a time when consciousness makes contributions to impulse, acting as a factor in the direction of life's energies. This is at the point when choices are to be made, when problems are presented, when resistance is encountered. I do not mean to say that all consciousness so arises. I do not mean to say that this is the point at which impulse becomes conscious.

Whatever of latency or potentiality or capacity that inheres within us because of our heritage of qualities from our forebears we give the name of instinct. We are not conscious that impulses are instinctive, but we may be conscious of impulses that are instinctive in character. We may not be able to identify them as instinctive, but we may be aware of their functioning as impulses.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND IMAGINATION.—Consciousness is the activity by which the mind constructs mental pictures out of the materials of past experience, the impressions and sensations of the past. As a proof that the mind cannot operate independently of this material of past experience, it is sufficient to note that men born blind do not have visual images and men born deaf cannot have any notion of sound. The imagination that constructs copies of the objects of past experience is called reproductive imagination. The activity that combines sense material in new ways to produce new mental objects is called productive imagination, or invention.

Consciousness is to a great extent a matter of imagination. It is more than imagination, passing beyond the limits of mere picture making; but if it were not for the mental images that give consciousness substance, it would become so vague and attenuated that it would just about vanish altogether. The bulk of our consciousness is in terms of mental images and their relations.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND FEELING. — Consciousness always has a feeling tone, a reference to pain and pleasure. It may be active or agitated, stirred up, as to its feeling aspect. This is what is called emotion. Professor Woodworth says concerning feeling consciousness: "Feeling is subjective and unanalyzed. It is conscious, and an unconscious feeling would be a contradiction in terms. But, while conscious, it is not cognitive; it is not knowing something, even about your subjective condition; it is simply the way you feel. As soon as you begin to analyze it, and say, 'I feel badly here or there, in this way or that,' you *know* something about your subjective condition, but the

feeling has evaporated for the instant. In passing over into definite knowledge of facts, it has ceased to be feeling.”¹ Perhaps it would be truer to say that the feeling fades into the background of consciousness while knowledge takes the foreground. But the contention that a distinction is to be made between feeling and cognition is certainly sound. It may be objected that one may have unconscious feeling, say unconscious anger. But the fact that one might be angry for the moment without realizing it does not prove that he has an unconscious emotion. It simply means that he is angry without introspectively observing himself and analyzing his mental states.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND VOLITION.—The mind is conscious of its volitional activity. In the first place, it is conscious of the possession of energy which is seeking an outlet. It is that consciousness which the youth has when he says he is full of “pep.” Then the mind is conscious of objectives, of ends to be realized or attained. It is further conscious of desires in connection to those ends, sometimes of a conflict between desires with respect to different ends. In process it is conscious of making a choice of ends and of steps to be taken for their attainment. It is conscious of effort toward the attainment of its ends, and, finally, it is conscious of success or failure.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTELLIGENCE. — Intelligence may be defined as discriminative mental activity. It has already received partial treatment in the discussion of volition. When we meet a situation of uncertainty, a situation that presents a problem, that interferes with the smooth working of our habit systems and impulses, throwing them into conflict, we suspend

¹ R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, p. 178.

action. We deliberate. In imagination we try out courses of action and test the results. Ultimately we cease deliberating, because we have made our choice of a way of procedure, and we go forward to whatever result may follow. This deliberative, discriminative activity of the mind, when face to face with the situations of life, this activity which we call intelligence, brings consciousness to a white heat of intensity which it never attains in its freer, floating states of reverie or dream.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION.—Intelligence in its discrimination brings mind face to face with new facts and gives it knowledge of situations and conditions. This attainment of knowledge we give the name of cognition. Cognition means reflective consciousness. It is an intensive, penetrating, analytical consciousness. At the same time, it is creative and synthetic. It is not merely a consciousness of things but a consciousness of the relations of things, a consciousness that gives meaning to experience.

An account of intelligence is properly descriptive of a process. An account of cognition is a description of a process, but it is more analytical in its method. It attempts to separate cognition into its several elements, or rather to distinguish its several aspects, and it cannot do much more than make an attempt in this direction. Primary in the process of cognition is sensation. Mind gets qualitative impressions through the sense organs. Out of this sense material, according to its own organization and constitution, its habit systems and impulses, it constructs objects of a mental character. But no sensation, as such, has ever appeared in consciousness. Sensations are hypothetical facts used in building up a description of cognitive activity. The

mind is aware only of objects that have certain properties which we have given the name of sense qualities, on the theory that they come by sensation. I am taking a great deal for granted when I assume the reality of a sensation, but it offers the best explanation that I have seen as to how the mind gets started in getting possession of objects. It is a *working* hypothesis. However, a system of psychology built upon it as a foundation is a feeble and uncertain structure. Such a system has been erected and has just about crumbled into ruins. It is possible, however, that this is because the structure was not rightly built.

The mind must select from objects of its world, or from a set of possibilities in the range of its own images, those to which it will give attention. Without selective attention, nothing could ever appear in consciousness. The mind interprets and gives meaning to the objects in the field of attention. It distinguishes characteristics and relations. We call this *perception*. Finally, it generalizes, classifies its objects and ties them in bundles. This we call *conception*, or *conceptualizing*.

DREAM CONSCIOUSNESS.—A field of psychological investigation that lies considerably within the realm of the mysterious, but which offers material that promises results, is the study of dream consciousness. Perhaps the fact that progress in this region has been comparatively slow is due to the fact that both psychologists and physiologists have hitherto failed to offer a satisfactory explanation of sleep. The theory that is best supported by evidence seems to me to be the fatigue theory, which regards sleep as the result of the depletion of the energy of the nerve centers of the body. But the theory has hardly been sufficiently

elaborated to account entirely for the facts in the sleep experience and for all cases of sleep production.

We may say for certain that dream consciousness is limited and fragmentary. Some people have only short and fitful snatches of dream consciousness that have no definite direction or relation to other fragments of the same kind of experience. They are almost meaningless pictures that arise and vanish. I once knew a young woman who had never had a dream that she could recall, and who was very curious to know what dreaming was like. Others have had dreams that represented a fairly continuous and orderly dream experience, which was not subsequently taken for reality but which was recognized as being like reality. However, reflection on dream consciousness will bring the discovery that ordinarily it is limited and fragmentary, and frequently fantastic and illogical.

RIGNANO'S THEORY.—Professor Rignano, of the University of Milan, advances the theory that dream consciousness is *non-affective*. By non-affective consciousness he means a consciousness without a drive, consciousness that is not directed toward the attainment of an end. He makes the affective tendency the basis of reasoning. The non-affective consciousness, according to Rignano, is the simple evocation of sensory images.²

If this psychologist meant by non-affective consciousness a consciousness quite free from the effects of selective attention, I could whole-heartedly agree with his thesis. But he evidently means, unless I have been utterly unable to understand his use of language, a consciousness that contains no affective elements anywhere in its unfolding, not even the incidental and

² Rignano, *The Psychology of Reasoning*, p. 293.

momentary appearance of such an element. With this I cannot agree, although I do agree that consciousness in dreams seems to be directed by no logical oversight, that most of the circumstances of dreams seem to arise as by chance. But here and there in dreams that I have experienced there have been short stretches of a sense of effort toward desired ends.

Let us examine some of his empirical data. He quotes De Sanctis to the effect that we rarely ever dream of matters of very great concern to us. I am not convinced, however, that we never dream of such matters. He argues that, while we are in the dream experience, we have an utterly changed attitude from our normal attitude. He refers to one's indifference to being found undressed by strangers. In waking consciousness one would be driven into a panic. But in dream consciousness I am sure that I have found distress very real. I have had dreams in which I found myself in the pulpit before a crowd with shoes off, and my suffering was acute. I found myself devising ways of escape and laboring to keep my feet hidden. I am perfectly willing to concede that in some dreams there may be a different emotional attitude from that of the waking consciousness, and it is probably due to the fragmentary character of the dream consciousness. But it must be kept in mind that one affective element discovered in dream consciousness precludes the use of the adjective non-affective.

WOODWORTH'S THEORY.—Let us turn for a moment to the theory of another psychologist who, in my judgment, states the facts much more clearly and satisfactorily. I refer to Professor R. S. Woodworth. He says that dream consciousness is particularly short on criticism. The simpler and more practiced functions

go on in the limited dream consciousness. The associations are exceedingly free and easy. Scenery may be shifted in the middle of a speech, and one character may forthwith change into another without causing surprise. There is a seeming reality to the whole dream experience and no recognition of mental images as mere images while the experience is going on. Dreams may be influenced in process by outside stimuli and may result from inner organic disturbances. They may be caused by the failure of the fulfillment of desire during the waking experience or by the self-assertive tendency, which is really a form of wish fulfillment. Then a mastery of things is accomplished with a glorious ease that is impossible in waking hours. There are other dreams motivated by an unsatisfied curiosity. There are fear dreams, and dreams from various causes.

FREUD'S THEORY OF DREAMS.—Freud treats the dream as the uncontrolled expression of unconscious wishes. He regards the unconscious as the repository of wishes that have been repressed by the censor. Sometimes these unfulfilled wishes get by the censor, even in dreams, by being disguised. The censor is the group or system of moral and social standards which repress the desires of the individual. These unconscious wishes are, of course, in the last analysis, the result of sex tendencies, Freud's fundamental source of motivation. They can be discovered only by the probing questions of the psychoanalyst.

In criticism, I dare say that an unconscious wish is a contradiction in terms. If it were not, how could we know that we had discovered the hidden wish? It seems to me far more probable that the wish that seems finally to come clear by an analysis of the mental con-

dition of the patient is an idea that has been put there by suggestion in the process of the probing by the psychoanalyst. If dreams can all be traced to an unfulfilled wish motivation, the wish will be found to have been present in consciousness in some previous experience. Otherwise there would be no way of identifying it. The disguise idea is merely a subterfuge to save a theory. Great minds can advance thin notions when hard pressed.

THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDEA.—In a consideration of consciousness such as this, perhaps we ought not to pass over "the stream of consciousness" idea, made famous by Professor James. At the time the idea was first given expression, it served a useful purpose. It impressed the idea of continuity in mental operations. But the continuity is not in consciousness, with its interruptions and abrupt transitions, but in the life of the conscious subject. What we have is not a stream of consciousness but a course of experience. That course of experience covers both the conscious and unconscious life of the living subject. Whether waking or sleeping, whether in normal function or under an anæsthetic, that living subject abides and acts upon its world or receives action from its world.

DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.—As suggested in the previous discussion, there is a theory of knowledge that regards consciousness as an organ of adaptation to environment. This is Professor Dewey's theory. I have heard him say that consciousness is the result of resistance in the path of ongoing life. The object of consciousness, according to Dewey, is that which objects. As long as the organism moves along with a perfect adjustment to its environment, no consciousness arises. There is no need

for consciousness. Consciousness is the result of the necessity for struggle and is the dominant fact of the struggle. The instrumental theory of consciousness is the adaptation of the theory of evolution, with its struggle for survival, to the problem of knowledge. Dewey regards the goal of finished accomplishment set by many thinkers as the final achievement of life as a condition of mindless action:

gle and all dependencies. It is neither practical nor social. Nothing is left but a self-revolving, self-sufficient thought engaged in contemplating its own sufficiency. Some forms of Oriental morals

In Aristotle this conception of an end which exhausts all realization and excludes all potentiality appears as a definition of the highest excellence. It of necessity excludes all want and struggle united this logic with a profounder psychology, and have seen that the final terminus on this road is Nirvana, an obliteration of all thought and desire. In medieval science, the ideal reappeared as a definition of heavenly bliss accessible only to a redeemed immortal soul. Herbert Spencer is far enough away from Aristotle, medieval Christianity and Buddhism; but the idea reëmerges in his conception of a goal of evolution in which adaptation of organism to environment is complete and final. In popular thought, the conception lives in the vague thought of a remote state of attainment in which we shall be beyond "temptation" and in which virtue by its own inertia will persist as a triumphant consummation. Even Kant who begins with a complete scorn for happiness ends with an "ideal" of the eternal and undis-

turbed union of virtue and joy, though in his case nothing but a symbolic approximation is admitted to be feasible.³

The only fault I have to find with Professor Dewey's theory of consciousness is with its seeming incompleteness.⁴ It offers an adequate description of the rise of consciousness in the active processes of life struggle. But not all consciousness is of that kind. Some of it seems to arise as a sort of non-functional, spontaneous mental exuberation, a free evocation of images. Dewey has performed a great service in showing that mind is not a factor to be set over against the actual process of thought as something to be studied by itself. The mind is to be known only through its working. There is no such thing as a mind that is "exempt from bodily processes, animal impulses, savage traditions, infantile impressions, and traditional knowledge." But it seems to me that he fails to give sufficient place to the consciousness which is a free, over-bubbling activity of life that keeps going on while action is going on and often in an exceedingly detached fashion. "When uninterrupted by some practical issue," says James Harvey Robinson, "we are engaged in what is now known as *reverie*."⁵ This is our spontaneous and favorite kind of thinking."

Professor James took account of this kind of consciousness, which he called "irresponsible thinking." Jung says concerning it: "We no longer compel our thoughts along a definite track, but let them float, sink

³ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 174.

⁴ Professor Warren in his *Human Psychology* treats consciousness as the inner aspect of adaptive behavior (p. 415). This still does not seem to me to give a complete account of consciousness.

⁵ *The Mind in the Making*, p. 38.

and mount according to their own gravity.”⁶ Professor Woodworth offers a good description of it. He says:

Revery affords the best example of free association. I see my neighbor's dog out of my window, and am reminded of one time when I took charge of that dog while my neighbor was away, and then of my neighbor's coming back and taking the dog from the cellar, where I had left him shut up: next of my neighbor's advice with respect to an automobile collision with which I was concerned; next of the stranger with whom I had collided, and of the stranger's business address on the card which he gave me; next comes a query as to this stranger's line of business and whether he was well-to-do; and from there my thoughts switch naturally to the high cost of living.⁷

The point is that not all consciousness arises out of the struggle and strain of life. In fact, the bulk of it seems to arise with an easy spontaneity that in no way tires us, or seems to tire us. The bulk of our consciousness does not arise directly out of practical situations. It may come from them indirectly. It may be that consciousness did arise originally out of the struggle of life and that the habit systems evolved out of experience keep it going. But I am inclined to agree with Dr. J. A. Leighton, who says:

The function of consciousness and reason are not exhausted in meeting novel situations and controlling behavior with reference to the future.

⁶ *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 21.

⁷ *Psychology*, p. 376.

When I am engaged in æsthetic contemplation of nature or art, when I am enjoying the companionship of a friend, when I am contemplating the logical symmetry, beauty and impersonal grandeur of some scientific or mathematical construction, when I am living in some significant period of the past, for example Elizabethan England or the Athens of Pericles, when I am following the career and feeling myself into the life of one of the race's worldly or spiritual heroes, my consciousness, keen, vivid and expanding, may have no reference to my own future behavior or that of anyone else. The human spirit lives not by deeds of adjustment to external and future situations alone. It lives deeply in pure contemplation and free imagination. The instrumentalist errs by taking one important function of conscious intelligence and making it the sole function. Disinterested contemplation and enjoyment of the beauty, grandeur, meaning and order of things for their own sakes are for some human beings inherently worthwhile functions of consciousness.⁸

CONSCIOUSNESS AS A VALUE.—The instrumentalist gives consciousness an incidental, or secondary, value. Consciousness arises to enable the living being to meet and control situations that it could not deal with automatically. But it seems to me, as Dr. Leighton has suggested, that consciousness has a still higher value than that. It exists not alone for carrying on life, but for giving life meaning and making it interesting. Why carry on an adjustment with the world at all unless the process has meaning? In seeking to avoid the

⁸ *The Field of Philosophy*, p. 360.

extremes and absurdities of subjectivism, the philosophy that the experiencing of things is sufficient justification of their existence, that the world exists to be known, we do not wish to go so far into utilitarianism that life will lose all its subjective value. We do not live just to be aware of things, but being aware of things certainly does make life significant and worthful. Consciousness has a high and important function in making life worth living. Life would have little value to an automaton.

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.—We come now to the consideration of a value consciousness. By a value we mean whatever is desired, needed, enjoyed, approved or preferred. A value consciousness, then, is a consciousness of desires, needs, purposes, aspirations, ideals, objects of satisfaction, ways of satisfaction, conflicting desires and ends, the effort to attain satisfaction, the struggle in the direction of ends, together with all the accompanying emotions. The religious consciousness is the consciousness of the highest values, the ideal values. "When the person begins to look for a deeper reality than that in his immediate, everyday world, when he comes to think of another order of life than that with which he is familiar, the religious consciousness is born." *

But the religious consciousness is not merely the consciousness of certain values that the mind conceives as ultimate, but it is the consciousness of the need of relating all other values to those values conceived as ultimate. As Professor Coe has stated the case, religion is "a movement toward completeness, unity

* C. K. Mahoney, *Social Evolution and the Development of Religion*, p. 72.

and permanence of the value experience as a whole.”¹⁰ Matthew Arnold said of Sophocles that he saw life steadily and saw it whole. Dr. Patrick suggests that philosophy is an attempt to see life steadily and see it whole. If this is true of philosophy, I think it may be said of religion that it is the attempt, not only to *see* life steadily and whole, but to achieve the largest possible completeness for life.

II. UNCONSCIOUS MIND

AN IMPORTANT DISCOVERY.—We now pass to that aspect of mental life sometimes referred to as “sub-conscious” or “subliminal,” but more recently spoken of as “unconscious.” Some years ago Professor James gave expression to an utterance that was almost prophetically significant. He said:

I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only consciousness of the ordinary field, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most important step forward, because, unlike any other advance which psychology has made, this discovery has revealed to us an entirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of

¹⁰ *Psychology of Religion*, p. 74.

human nature. No other step forward which psychology has made can proffer any such claim as this.¹¹

Since the day of the deliverance of this utterance, psychology has certainly emphasized the importance of this discovery, perhaps overemphasized it. It has gone forward with revolutionary rapidity in putting forth its hypotheses. The "subconsciousness" of that day has evolved into an unconscious mental background of all conscious activities. And, what is more important, it has been assumed that this phase of the mental life is the more important phase. It is regarded as moving forward in obedience to biological impulse, and, as it were, dragging the conscious mentality along with it.

Perhaps we can best get at it by inquiring how the conception came to arise. It is an hypothesis. How did it come to be put forward?

HOW THE CONCEPTION AROSE.—Perhaps we might well say that such a conception was inevitable from the beginning of psychological science. We can illustrate this by using the iceberg illustration of Dr. G. Stanley Hall. I used it before I knew that Dr. Hall had preceded me in its use. If we should see an iceberg floating in mid-ocean and knew nothing at all about icebergs and their relation to the water in which they floated, we might assume that the iceberg was in its entirety floating upon the surface of the water. But a study of icebergs floating in water would bring out the fact that not all the iceberg is above the surface of the water. Examination would prove that there is a great deal more iceberg beneath the surface of the

¹¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 233.

water than there is above the surface. In much the same way, certain facts of evidence have indicated that mind is bigger than consciousness. An hypothesis was put forward that mind has an unconscious aspect, and confirmatory evidence has been so phenomenal that investigators have reached the conclusion that the larger part of mental life is outside the field of consciousness.

THE BIOLOGICAL BACKGROUND.—As in other respects, psychology has been assisted in bringing forth this doctrine of mind, and in elaborating it by biological science. From its experiments with the lower levels of life, where impulse is of an almost mechanical character, it seeks to carry forward an emphasized importance of impulse into the higher levels of life. Its influence upon psychology might be expected to be in the direction of explaining mentality, as far as possible, in terms of instinct. This explanation minimizes consciousness and enlarges upon the importance of the unconscious processes of life.

THE CONFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE.—The confirmative evidence of the existence and functioning of an unconscious mentality has, to a large extent, come from the labors of the psychoanalyst. These experiments have been carried forward upon the general assumption of the existence of such a phase of mentality. As these evidences have been discovered, synthesized and elaborated, they have taken the direction of a "biological explanation for the necessity to avoid conflict." They have assumed states of conflict in psychic life outside the field of consciousness. Professor Stratton, of the University of California, has written an interesting study of the psychology of religion which treats religion as an effort to escape conflict. Conflicts have

arisen through the suppression of impulses and desires. They have taken up their residence in the realm of unconscious mentality, producing there mental disorder. This is the theory of complexes which lies at the heart of the larger theory of the unconscious mentality. That such conditions exist in the inner hidden life and that relief has been afforded by psychoanalytic treatment, there seems little room for doubt.

It is quite certain that the hypothesis of an unconscious mentality needs criticism; and it is quite probable, as in the explanation of most hypotheses, that the result of such criticism will be a toning down of the conception. Care should be exercised before rushing into complete agreement with any theory. However, it seems to me that the bare fact of unconscious mentality, and perhaps a little more than that, has been sufficiently established for general acceptance. And there is room for belief that a great deal of the working theory may finally sustain itself. The mind is not always conscious, but it is not non-existent when it is not conscious. Our mental life does not go out of existence when we sleep. It exists in various degrees of functioning from that which seems to be complete unconsciousness in sleep to the limited, but vivid, consciousness of dream experience. The mind is more than consciousness. I am aware that the materialist will argue that consciousness is not only to be identified with mind, but that it is a mere functioning of bodily organs and a wholly unnecessary functioning. But psychology is not bound to accept the doctrines of materialism. Mere chemical action and physical change cannot be made to account for thought. We must posit a subject for experience. Since experience is both conscious and unconscious, it is a reasonable

assumption that the subject of experience may be both conscious and unconscious. Up to the present, the hypothesis of an unconscious mentality has squared with the facts of experience and the rules of reason. While for purposes of explanation much has been referred to unconscious mentality that might have been explained by the structure of the nervous system, and some facts of experience have been treated perhaps as purely psychical when they were largely neural, yet not all the facts that have been referred to the unconscious mental life as their ground can be regarded as fully explained in terms of physiological functioning.

GENERALLY RECOGNIZED UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES.—There are certain life processes that we know are unconscious and also very nearly indisputably of a mental character. *Retention* is unconscious. The ideas that have been in consciousness, but have been dropped out of the field of conscious attention, are no longer in consciousness, but still are not lost. They abide, and by the processes of recall may be brought back into consciousness.

There are apparently automatic processes that were not originally automatic but became so as the result of practice, such as walking, or the playing on the piano by an expert musician. They are activities that were painfully learned with a large measure of conscious attention, but have been turned over to the unconscious realm of organic functioning.

There are those activities that Professor Woodworth calls "unconscious side activities." They are illustrated by drumming with your fingers while you concentrate upon some problem, or looking at a picture while you unconsciously take care of your hat and even perform attentions to a lady who may be with you.

There are yet other activities that seem to be performed unconsciously. You try to recall a name; you get stuck; then you drop the matter and let your "sub-conscious mind work." And, sure enough, up comes the name. You worry over a problem in mathematics until you are "wool-gathered." You leave the matter till morning, give it up and go to sleep, and in the morning the solution comes to you at once. It seems that the problem has been worked out by the unconscious mind while you were asleep.

THE CASE OF THE NEGATIVE.—Professor Woodworth has raised some important questions in connection with the assumption of an unconscious mentality for explaining the above phenomena. According to his view, there is no problem in unconscious activity. Concerning retention, he argues with great force that retention is a matter of brain structure, neurone connections. The neural mechanisms are ready for action when the proper stimulus reaches them, but remain inactive till the stimulus comes. The automatic processes of life may be accounted for as the functioning of physical organs according to nature and according to training. Dr. Woodworth explains the solution of the problem on the basis of what he calls "recency value." When you laid the problem aside, the false clues that you had been following had a recency value, but in the interval of rest they lost it and the mind proceeded unhindered in the solution of the problem. The rapidity of the process was enhanced by the freshness and vigor of a rested brain. I am not so sure of the compelling character of this argument. If the fact of retention is a matter of modified brain structure, it is not clear why the false clues should not come up first in the set of associations that took place when the

problem was taken up again. They were the last neural modifications to be made. Just why the brain should push them into the background and bring out another combination of ideas as soon as consciousness resumed its task is a thing not quite clear. It would seem that some agency must have been at work to affect the readjustment of ideas.

Professor Woodworth states his general estimate of the conception of an unconscious mentality in the following language:

If you analyze your motives for doing a certain act, and formulate them in good set terms, then you have to admit that this motive was unconscious before, or only dimly conscious, since it was not formulated, it was not isolated, it was not present in the precise form you have given it. Yet it was there, *implicated* in the total conscious activity. It was not unconscious in the sense of being active in a different, unconscious realm. The realm in which it was active was that of conscious before, or only dimly conscious, since it was of that activity.¹²

But just what is meant by being *implicated* in consciousness? Whatever is implicated in consciousness is a part of consciousness, and it ought to stand out in recognizable form. If it does not, there is no way of identifying it as having been there. And the psychoanalyst could reply that to be unanalyzed means to be unconscious and psychological analysis means nothing else than lifting into consciousness a thing that has not been there before.

SOME QUESTIONABLE THEORY.—But we ought to

¹² *Psychology*, p. 565.

give attention to some very debatable contentions in the doctrine of an unconscious mentality, as this doctrine has been proclaimed. These are the theories of unconscious will, unconscious wishing, and unconscious motives. Schopenhauer wrote of the "will to life," Bergson of the "élan vital," and Freud of the unconscious wish. The first two writers are not directly connected with the "New Psychology," but their thinking is of the same general character. We might bring ourselves to interpret will as blind impulse and we might view with agreement Bergson's idea of a flow of life force through the world process without being forced into utter contradiction and absurdity, but to speak of unconscious wishing is simply to indulge in loose thinking. It is about as absurd as unconscious consciousness. Professor Woodworth is right when he says, "The will to live is an abstraction, the concrete facts consisting in the various particular wishes and tendencies of living creatures."

THE NEED OF CAUTION.—Apparently the "new psychologists" have ascribed many facts to an unconscious mentality that might properly be ascribed to the functioning of the neural basis of mind. They need to be reminded of Occam's razor, that law of parsimony that does not assume anything but what is absolutely necessary for the explanation of phenomena. They may have elaborated an important discovery into a dangerous fiction. Their conclusions need to be sifted. We need have no fear that this will not be done. It is likely to be a fruitful movement, but the fruit must be sorted and the faulty pieces thrown out.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MYSTICISM.—It is interesting to contrast the psychological method of psychoanalysis with the religious method of mysticism, to observe the

difference of direction and the difference in the results sought. Both assume the existence of essentially the same basic psychological conditions.

The psychoanalyst seeks to penetrate the depths of the unconscious mind for the purpose of lifting up the submerged material into the field of conscious attention. He assumes that the instinctive tendencies, in the effort to do away with psychical conflict, have been repressed by the censor. Some of these instinctive tendencies have gone forward as far as emotional expression, which has been consciously suppressed into the realm of the unconscious. But we are not done with them when they are suppressed. They remain in the system. The existence of repressed tendencies and suppressed emotions gives rise to pathological conditions of mind, due to the fact that the organism has been impeded in its functioning. These pathological conditions are called complexes.¹³ The psychoanalyst seeks to discover these repressed tendencies and suppressed emotions—some of which the mind has never been conscious of and some of which has dropped out of consciousness—and bring them up into consciousness and either to give them expression or redirect them so that they may find a way of discharge from the mental life and cease to remain there as dams in the currents of mental life expression. To assert that the assumptions of the theory upon which this method proceeds may be overdrawn and that the results are overestimated is not the same thing as to say that there is nothing in it or that it is altogether wrong. The latter conclusion would at this time, in my opinion, be wholly unjustified.

¹³ The term "complex" is also used to refer to any kind of psychic chester.

Mysticism, on the other hand, is a religious method which seeks to plunge from the stress and strain of conscious life into the depths of subconscious tranquillity. Psychoanalysis penetrates the subconscious to bring things forth; mysticism seeks to submerge the whole being in subconsciousness. Its method of operation is the method of auto-suggestion.

RELIGION AS THE FRUIT OF THE WHOLE MIND.—As far as the religious life is concerned, I think we can say that the conscious and unconscious phases of mentality, however we may define them, both have their bearing. Certainly we can say that both reflective and contemplative mental attitudes have their value as well as active mental tendencies. And it seems as mind advances, and the knowledge of mind advances, greater importance must be given the conditions of placidity and the realm of the unconscious, whether we view them as mainly psychical or mainly physical. Religion involves every aspect of life—conscious and unconscious, mental and bodily, individual and social.

CHAPTER III

VARIATION AND TYPES IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

VARIETY AND DEFINITION.—One of the most interesting facts connected with the study of religion has been the attempt to define it. Perhaps more different definitions have been offered for religion than for any other idea of human experience. The reason is not far to seek. It is the extraordinary variety in religious experience. All human beings have some sort of religious experience, but no two persons in all the world have quite similar religious experiences. This varying content of religious experience has led to the variety in definition of religion. The difficulty in finding a good definition lies in getting it wide enough to cover the whole meaning of religion, and at the same time sufficiently concise.

THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.—I am making use of the term religious experience rather than religious consciousness, because the word consciousness, thus used, has too much of a Lockian flavor, suggesting passivity and spectatorship. Perhaps I might just as well use the word life as the word experience, for I refer to not merely states of consciousness of a religious character, but to religious activity of whatever kind, involving the totality of the life of the individual and of the individual in his social relationships. Without attempting a complete definition of religion, I shall use the word religion to connote the more familiar and normal cases of experience. Perhaps it would be

safe to state in a general way that religion has to do with the pursuit and realization of the highest values and with the conservation of values in general. This was touched upon in a consideration of consciousness. For those who have come to believe in a supernatural order, these values lie largely in that realm. For those who have ceased to believe in a supernatural order, those values lie in a realm of spirituality, a realm regarded as spiritual, whether that realm may center in a personal deity or in a set of impersonal spiritual principles. However vague religious meanings may be, religious life is a very real and definite thing. It is life in relation to considerations that, at least at certain times and under certain conditions are taken very seriously and solemnly. The variety that is so apparent has many explanations, which run according to the character of the causes which have operated in producing it.

TEMPERAMENT AND VARIATION IN EXPERIENCE.—One of the causes of variety in religious experience which has doubtless had too much importance given to it, but which, nevertheless, has been one of the factors operating to produce religious differences and peculiarities, is the fact of temperament. Temperament, which, when closely studied, is seen to have many shades and variations, as many as there are individuals in the world, also falls into divisions and lends itself to classification into types. Temperament may be explained in terms of recurring moods and in terms of mental constitution. The mental constitution may be considered as a factor in the production of emotional moods. Another factor is the set of physiological conditions underlying the moods. Much emphasis has been placed by modern thought on the influence of

mind over body. But it is just as true that body has an important influence over mind. Professor W. J. Thompson tells the story of a man who, after eating pork, experienced great distress and anxiety over the doctrine of election. This man's wife would tell him that what he needed to relieve his distress was not a revelation concerning whether he might be of the elect but total abstinence from a pork diet.

The tendency of a mood to recur until it gives general direction to the emotional life is called temperament. Like the moods themselves, temperament is largely dependent upon physiological conditions. The ancient made four distinctions in temperament. These were the phlegmatic temperament, the choleric temperament, the sanguine temperament, and the melancholic temperament. Those ancients were thinking in straight lines when they grounded the temperaments in physiological causes, though they assigned causes that missed the mark. They thought the different temperaments were due to four humors that existed in the system. The ancients may have been wrong in quartering up the emotional dispositions as they did, but it must be conceded that there are at least four outstanding valid distinctions in temperament verifiable by observation. There are people who are bright, cheerful, optimistic, warm-hearted, responsive. There are people who are slow, calm, matter-of-fact, plodding, lovers of routine and monotony. There are natures that are intense, passionate, dynamic, resourceful, determined and self-reliant. And there are natures that are deep and brooding and inclined to sadness. These are valid distinctions in human character, and they are some of the determiners that account for variety and types in religious experience.

OTHER CAUSES OF VARIETY.—Variation in religious experience may further be accounted for by the facts of individuality as initiatory factors in the development of custom. Dominant personalities provoke imitation and initiate modes and fashions. Imitation spreads forms of thought and lines of action. These crystallize into customs and survive with the following generations. It would not be strictly true to say that they are handed down as traditions. Nothing is handed down. Those who die simply leave things and they are appropriated by those who are left behind. But whatever is left as a heritage increases with age in prestige, power and sacredness. Accumulated tendencies in thought and practice and emotional reaction are thus established and modify the course of religious experience. It is further modified by environmental circumstances, such as climate, physical conditions, racial development, political and social peculiarities, prejudice, and many other factors and forces that operate in the living of life.

VARIATION AND TYPES.—No matter what error we might make in accounting for variations in religious experience, there is no dispute about the fact that there is variation on a large scale and that there are recognized, outstanding types of religious experience—types of religious mind—which have been named and classified with respect to their interrelations and with respect to religious experience as a whole. The finest analysis of religious experience that I know anything about has been worked out by Professor Norman E. Richardson, of Northwestern University. It is in the form of a chart which shows the connection and interrelation of these types.

(1) *The Traditionalist*.—Dr. Richardson has

arranged his grouping of religious mental types around a circle, placing the traditionalist at the top of the circle. This type of mind cannot get along without assuming and insisting upon the recognition of some definite source of external authority. The older that source of authority, the more sacred and valid for him. There is a desire for certainty, but this desire does not run out in the same direction that it does in some of the other types of religious mind. The ground of infallible authority gives the traditionalist's reasoning a starting point and a support upon which to lean. All his reasoning is in the direction of the elaboration of the significance of a basic authority, toward the tracing of its ramifications, and toward the building up of extended arguments for its support. He has great respect for the customs and standards of the past, great regard for everything belonging to the past, especially the distant past. To become a traditionalist does not mean to sink into passive quietude on the bosom of established authority. It means that intellectual activity must run along the grooves which have been marked out and not wander into new and untried ways. There are people who must be this way. They possess a real need for being backed up by something external and accredited by established authority. They are constitutional leaners. They are not to be too harshly censured by the critical-minded. While the critical-minded man does not lean upon a regularly established and recognized authority, he does lean quite heavily upon his own theories and upon what he regards as scientifically accredited information. Fundamentally, therefore, the psychological difference is not so great as it seems.

(2) *The Critical Type.*—The psychological differ-

ence between the traditionalist and the expert, or critical religionist, may not be so great as at first appears, but logically they are opposites. In the critical religionist intellect predominates. Indeed it occupies so much of experience that it tends to take entire possession. There is a demand for proof at every step of thought progress. All authority is theoretically set aside. This type of mind seeks for information that has been scientifically tested and that is scientifically accredited. And upon the foundation of this information it seeks to build up a system of thought that is thoroughly consistent and intellectually defensible. The supreme good is the cold, unvarnished truth. This is the type of religious experience that furnishes to the world the religious philosopher, the theorist, the analyst, the rationalist. This is the type of religious thinker that turns in his study of the Scriptures to the "Higher Criticism." Perhaps he will be found questioning the virgin birth or raising doubts concerning the miraculous element in the Biblical narratives. But it is also this type of religionist who is able to discover for us the subtler meanings of Scriptural teaching and who undergirds his religion with whatever system of rational explanation and defense it is possible for him to muster.

(3) *The Mystic*.—Perhaps not directly opposed to the critical type, but radically different from, is the mystic. His mind is ideo-emotional. His ideas are sometimes surcharged with emotion. He is intuitive in his religious experience, emphatically intuitive. His consciousness is dominated by the tendency toward the immediate apprehension of the facts of experience. He feels things more than he thinks them. He does not usually reach his conclusions by logical processes. He

experiences directly what he regards as the divine presence and revelation of divine truth.

The mystic mind is the poetic and prophetic mind. It is the mind moved by inspiration. The inner soul of the poet, who is also a prophet, and of the prophet, who is also a poet, gets hold by direct consciousness, or by consciousness apparently direct, of some of the larger values and is able to distinguish in a remarkable way between the important and unimportant issues. Poets and prophets have felt truths which it has taken philosophers and statesmen centuries upon centuries by accumulated results of reason to apprehend. I shall have more to say of mysticism in other connections.

(4) *The Executive Type*.—Opposite the mystical type of religious experience is the type that has been labeled "executive." This is the ideo-motor mind which seeks immediately to translate ideas into action. This type of religious person thinks in terms of religious objectives, of programs, of results of endeavor. He expresses himself by working out schemes of administration and in setting up social machinery for the attainment of ends. For him religion is supremely dynamic. His thought is directed toward a practical application of religion to the needs of life. It is out of his brain that come institutions and organized plans of constructive reform and philanthropy. He is not at all worried about authority or precedent if a thing will work. His most satisfactory evidence of truth will be the success or failure in the application of ideas. His contributions to religion are active and creative. He usually has a trusting faith that accepts things as given until they fail to work out in experience. If that occurs, he rejects both theory and authority.

(5) *The Dogmatic Propagandist*.—Midway between

the traditionalist and the executive type is the type that Professor Richardson has denominated the dogmatic propagandist. He is half traditionalist and half executive, the man who possesses the traditionalist's reverence for the things of the past and for established authority and who has also worked out a system of intellectual defense of his view point which he propagates with great zeal. He has a love for authority and a respect for custom combined with executive capacity and great energy. He is aggressive, but he does not originate ideas. He propagates ideas which he has received from others. Usually he desires to see all religious opinion reduced to formulæ and the formulæ duly labeled. He is frequently the literalist who refuses to allow any departure from what he considers the faith once delivered and the champion of the orthodoxy and institutions accepted by his own time and class. He is not necessarily the religious conservative but rather the radical defender of the faith.

With the realization that he leans toward the executive type of experience rather than toward authoritarianism or dogmatism, we may classify under this head the religious enthusiast. The religious enthusiast is one who brings to bear upon both his thinking and activity in the field of religion an emotional intensity and usually an exuberance of spirit. Whatever may be his line of endeavor, he puts his heart into it.

The religious fanatic is the enthusiast gone wild. Fanaticism represents the failure of intellect to control the emotional experience and relate it to the remainder of life. The fanatic is like an engine that has slipped its governor belt. Like any other fanatic, he is likely to be dangerous, perhaps the most dangerous of all fanatics. When the emotions get cut loose from

rational control, they tie up with the imagination and take a plunge in the direction of insanity.

(6) *The Ritualist*.—The psychological opposite of the dogmatic propagandist is the ritualist. He is a formalist in a wholly different sense. His mind is receptive, contemplative, ideo-sensory. He is not usually creative but appreciative. He lacks the spiritual quality of the mystic. His meditations are not profound. He gets religious satisfaction out of sights and sounds and ceremonies. To say that the ritualistic mind gets religious satisfaction implies that its experiences have a mystical tinge. There must be at least a little power of spiritual appreciation beyond mere æsthetic satisfaction. The emphasis of the ritualist is laid upon worship, but worship for him does not have the profound meaning that it has with the mystic. The ritualist often thinks he has been worshipping when he has merely been enjoying an æsthetic soul feast that has had little or no religious significance. As for intellect in the religious life of the ritualist, he requires some intellectual power for æsthetic observance and appreciation, but he probably needs and uses less gray matter in his religious experience than any other religionist.

In my judgment, it would be better to make the word "æsthetic" cover this general type of ideo-sensory religious experience. Dr. Richardson has emphasized the word ritualist, but it seems to me that the word has a narrower significance than he gives it. The ritualist belongs to the æsthetic type of religious experience. The æsthetic religionist is the seeker of agreeable emotions. He feeds upon consolations and assurances and upon sensations that give pleasure. The sensations of pleasure may come from internal rap-

tures or from external influences. Architectural beauty, music, pleasing forms of worship, all the external conditions productive of æsthetic satisfaction are prominent in this type of religious mind and have an important place in this type of religious life. The other type of æsthete in religion feeds on the internal satisfaction of religions, revels in the thought of the love of God and the blessedness of the saved condition, and enters by anticipation into the joys of things hoped for. In either case the chief concern is personal satisfaction.

(7) *The Ascetic*.—Between the mystic and the traditionalist we may place the ascetic. He endeavors to crucify the flesh and extinguish desire. He renounces the world and seeks to get out of touch with its activities.

This type of mind certainly has time and opportunity for thinking. It is undisturbed, as a rule, by distracting influences. In many instances the ascetics have been profound thinkers. They have brought forth philosophy and theology in abundance. But their thinking has been more mechanical than critical, and their intellectual products as a class lack freshness and vitality. Sometimes the thought is tinged with a bitter pessimism and sometimes it is the expression of personal peace and serenity. And oftentimes we find the man of seclusion thorough in scholarship, gifted with artistic talents and abundant in creative labors.

Though the ascetic may be characterized by negative self-feeling, his round of thoughts centers in himself, even if it be only in his self-immolation. His religion is ordinarily highly individualistic and without a pronounced sense of social responsibility. He is egoistic in his self-renunciation.

The ascetic is the melancholy mystic. From somewhere, during the evolution of religious experience, perhaps out of the primitive emotional attitude of fear and the consequent notions of sacrifice, has come the strange idea that pain has religious value. That is the guiding notion in ascetic practices. Perhaps the tendency of melancholy natures to "enjoy" suffering has something to do with it. Suffering, of course, does have its religious value at times, but not just because it is suffering. Artificially induced suffering belongs to superstition rather than to religion. However, I think the dominant motive in religious ascetism is the desire for spiritual satisfaction. The belief has arisen that pleasure is wrong and harmful. Therefore all pleasure is renounced and spiritual satisfaction is sought and found in experiences of self-renunciation and pain.

(8) *The Reformer*.—The opposite of the ascetic, who renounces the world, is the ethico-religionist, who seeks to transform the world. He is characterized by positive self-feeling, which, strange as it may seem, issues in altruistic service. He is the social reformer. His work is Messianic. His thinking is applied to schemes of social betterment and to the evolution and propagation of sociological opinions. His social consciousness dominates his whole experience. He frequently loses sight of individual values in his enthusiasm for social values.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGIOUS TYPES.—These types of religious mind all have their place in the religious life of humanity. There is no possibility of getting on in any religious program without taking them into consideration. The problem and task is to properly correlate and control them, to relate ourselves to them and to bring them into harmonious relation

with one another. If we find ourselves given to any extreme, it will help us greatly to study all these types and seek their respective view points in a charitable, tolerant way. And it is easily seen that the ideal religious mind is the one bearing all the essential characteristics of these various types of mind in perfect proportion. It should be our effort to approach this perfectly proportioned experience.

THE WAY OF ESCAPE FROM THE TYPE MIND.—We cannot escape the type mind, even a little way, until we are willing to study opinions different from our own. Fairness would suggest such a study, but the lack of it is quite general. It is the rule for men and women to read the books that coincide with their own ways of thinking. All too frequently they are unwilling to read anything else. There is an erroneous assumption that their thinking along these lines is kept strong and vigorous by being kept free from the influence of contrary opinions. In every other phase of life, even thought life, strength is gained from resistance. It ought to be so in the development of religious experience. As a matter of fact, it is so. Thinking is bound to fall into ruts from such intellectual methods of procedure as the study of only one set of opinions with regard to any given subject. This tends to fix the mind along the lines of a distinct type.

SECTARIANISM.—A feature of advanced religious development, especially pronounced in modern Protestantism, is the grouping of religious people into parties or sects. The types of religious experience that I have been discussing do not form bases of the division. The lines of variation seem to run another way. It is important for the science of religious psychology to determine as far as possible the causes of sectarianism

with a view to eliminating the conditions that may be disadvantageous to religious development. This is not an easy task, but some of these causes are quite obvious and others are discoverable.

1. Perhaps we may as well begin with racial and lingual causes of religious parties. There are certain religions that follow these lines of cleavage. Where such cleavages do not exist, pressure is felt in the direction of producing them. Of course, as a general principle the drawing of racial lines or any lines of division in religion is bad. But the tendencies in that direction are not wholly harmful. Sometimes lingual conditions force the grouping of peoples of one tongue together. It would be better for religion and for world civilization if it were not so, but it is so and there is no immediate remedy. The congenialities of racial homogeneity may constitute a basis of social solidarity for a religion. And every people ought to have a type of religion that is indigenous to its own life soil, and this condition will be an inevitable result of any continued religious development. But if there can be at the same time an overarching bond of unity that may transcend these forms of diversity and preserve social unity of a larger scope, it is much better for religion and for humanity. And religion should operate as a social force against the tendencies toward racial cleavage and racial antagonisms. However, this cause must be included among the causes that operate toward partisanizing religion.

2. In the second place, we must take account of the temperamental and typical causes of religious division. These are natural causes too. There is such a thing as a Presbyterian type and temperament. They are normally the intellectual type, ordinarily prosperous

and respectable, frequently people of culture. It has been remarked that if a poor and commonplace family join the Presbyterian church, it will begin to show evidences of prosperity and take on tone and dignity. This does not mean that all Presbyterians conform strictly to type, but this is the type. On the other hand, there is the Methodist type, democratic, emotional, frequently uncultured, less dignified, and precise, often poor in this world's goods. The Baptists and Methodists are preëminently churches of the common people. And the Episcopal, Presbyterian and Unitarian are typically the churches of the more aristocratic. Professor Santayana has shown with keen insight how Catholicism has a peculiar appeal to Latin people, and Protestantism, especially of the simpler and plainer varieties, an appeal to the Nordic peoples.

3. There are causes not yet mentioned that are sociological in character. One of these is immigration. Groups of people who have one country and go to another, constituting in a new setting a transplanted community, carry with them a set of characteristics and objects of religious loyalty that differentiate them from other elements of the population of the new country. Also people set free from the conditions of a previous environment tend to become inventive, to evolve new opinions and to inaugurate new social movements. Also, paradoxical as it may seem, in this connection, staying in one place through a long period of time becomes a differentiating factor in a group, tending to fix and establish customs and beliefs against modification by neighboring groups that may form contacts with this fixed group in the course of experience. Isolation, of course, intensifies the individuality

of a group. Within the group there may operate divisive tendencies that will bring into existence new parties. There is the tendency toward innovation that revolts against that which is established and fixed, and the forms of protest that arise against stability and against change, expressed in various forms of liberalism and conservatism. Among the sociological factors that enter into the production of religious cleavages, the various prominent factors of sociological explanation may be mentioned, such as gregariousness, emphasized by McDougall and others; "consciousness of kind," emphasized by Giddings; imitation, made basic by Tarde; and the "fellow feeling" of Adam Smith. Most of these social tendencies are both unifying and differentiating principles. The "consciousness of kind," for example, tends to unite us to those of our kind and to separate us from those not our kind, and imitation marks off new ways of functioning and tends to secure a social repetition of the same.¹

4. Creedal causes of division are growing less and less effective. They were never so effective as they seemed to be. Nevertheless, doctrinal differences have been causative factors in the development of denominationalism. They have been most potent in preserving the divisions that have been due to other cause. Most of the doctrinal cleavages are due to differences in emphasis on forms of belief. And difference in emphasis on forms and practices, beliefs and attitudes, has been itself a potent factor in producing denominations.

¹ Another factor is sectionalism. This factor was largely responsible for the division of denominations in the United States during the struggle over slavery, and it still tends to keep the divisions alive.

5. Administrative differences have led to divisions in religion. There are those who believe in Congregational, Presbyterian or Episcopal Church government. They feel more at home under one or the other. Their political opinions and aptitudes have a great deal to do with it.

6. But the most potent of all the factors in dividing religious people into separate or opposing parties have been strong and ambitious personal leaders who have inaugurated social movements of a distinctive character on the foundations of social leadership. Persons are better able to command loyalty than principles. Some of these divisions have been justifiable. Some have been essential contributions to progress. But unless a leader has a greater cause than the cause of unity, he cannot justify a schism in a body of religious people; and unless the situation demands a break with the existing order rather than a sacrifice of ideals exceedingly precious, he cannot justify it. Creating a religious division is a heavy responsibility. A man who does so merely for the sake of distinguishing himself or maintaining an opinion of secondary importance or making for himself a field of prestige or power is guilty of a sin that only ignorance can extenuate.

The ultimate aim and ideal in unification cannot be uniformity of opinion or practice or taste. Neither is such a thing desirable. But the unification of the forces of religion for the conservation of all essential social values for all humanity is desirable, and no higher religious ideal than such a unity is conceivable. The most effective forces for unification in religion are those forces that are working for the widest kind of social sympathy and the highest ideal of human brotherhood. Among them may be mentioned public

education, social intermingling, the agencies of commerce, general intercommunication that breaks through lingual barriers, public opinion, fashion, and all those factors that are working toward the conditions of a world community.

CHAPTER IV

RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION

LIFE AND MOVEMENT.—A distinctive characteristic of life is movement. We have no knowledge of motionless living beings, and apparently motion can be generated out of none but living sources. Since mind is at least closely related to all the facts and processes which constitute life, if indeed it may not be completely identified with that which we call life, a study of any sort of mentality is concerned with the actions of living beings. It is concerned with behavior as well as with consciousness, with the external manifestations of life as well as with the internal experience. The movement is psychological investigation in recent years that has been known as Behaviorism has been a limitation of the science of psychology to a consideration of processes and activities. Other subjects have been purposely ruled out. Whatever shortcomings this method may possess, it has served to emphasize the dynamic character of life and mind, an emphasis that has met an urgent need.

Professor James very properly treated the instincts, the emotions and the will with reference to the production of movement. He made large use of the word and idea of motivation. Life in the world, like everything else in the world, is apprehended and interpreted in terms of its effects; and its effects must be stated in terms of action, either in terms of action upon some-

thing or receiving action from something. All experience, as Professor Dewey puts it, is an activity or an undergoing.

We have just been considering the variety and the types in religious experience. It is now in order to consider the generating conditions of religious activity, the internal causes which, whether they start from within or whether they are responses to something without, get religious activity started and give it direction. I have called this *religious motivation*. It is, in other words, a study of religious motives in their psychological rootage.

It will be well right here to be sure what we mean by a motive. A motive is something that produces motion. It may be thought of as an incentive outside the mind which moves the mental life into certain processes. As such, it has a secondary concern for the psychologist. He is interested primarily in mental facts. But a motive may be defined also as that mental state or condition which gives rise to a line of action. It may be a pull or a push. It may be an experience driving the mind forward from behind or it may be an objective which the mind holds in view and which stirs the organism to action.

IMPULSE.—In the first place we may study religious motivation from the standpoint of impulse. For purposes of discourse convenience at least, this may be regarded as constituting a distinct phase of mental life.

Impulses are tendencies to action. Innate impulses are called instincts and acquired impulses are called habits, but impulse may be thought of as tendency to action, the direct current of all motivation. We may be driven by impulse toward action in the direction of certain ends without foresight of those ends and with-

out a previous definite education in the line of the activity toward which a pressure is felt. There may be an accompanying consciousness, even an understanding of what is taking place, but without a conscious direction of the activity. The impulse in such experiences is simply a felt pressure toward the action. Consciousness, where it accompanies impulses, comes close to being what Huxley called an epiphenomenon. It is a sort of spectator of what is going on.

I have never seen a better explanation of impulse than the following, namely, that it is the tendency of an organism to act according to its own nature. This seems to me to hold the truth of what is so widely taught concerning the power of the instincts. For utterly irrational impulses, which have apparently no relation to organic structure, I have no explanation to offer, nor have I seen one which was entirely satisfactory. They seem to be wild, jungle tendencies in developing mind, a part of the insurgency of life.

As suggested above, the instincts are the native tendencies to action, the unlearned responses of the organism. They are not, properly speaking, tendencies to action that have developed with developing life, but the original tendencies, factors of the hereditary equipment at birth, original determiners of characters and conduct. If we take the position that here may be impulses that have their rootage back in the primary tendencies of the organism, that were potential in the original equipment and brought out in the processes of life expression, we may widen the meaning of instinct, but at the same time we cannot avoid weakening the concept for purposes of scientific explanation. We make instincts more indefinite in character and more difficult to locate and classify. Just the

same, I am of the opinion that such modification of the original tendencies of the organism does take place in experience. There is no certainty that they retain their original character and determinative power throughout a course of changing experience.

The psychology of the past few years has been largely a study of instincts and impulses. The conative tendencies have held the whole field. All the developments of life and all the lines of conduct have been referred to these springs of action. This is all very well, but the attempt to find an appropriate instinct for every line of action has brought a kind of psychological result that has not been based entirely upon scientific method. In a previous chapter we took account of how Professor Dewey came forward with the assertion that no line of conduct is referable to specific instincts for explanation. He even went as far as to say that there are no specific instincts, clearly defined, structurally grounded and definitely traceable. Whether we can bring ourselves to his view or not, we are bound to admit that the reference of conduct to specific instincts has been greatly overdone. In this connection I wish to repeat a previous suggestion that there are unquestionably some definite factors in our original life equipment that give direction to the course of experience, or have influence in giving such direction, but the attempt to analyze personality so completely into biological factors that we have the whole of life explained by separate instinctive tendencies is unwarranted. It is neither logical nor scientific to hunt for some appropriate instinct to account for each phase or fact of conduct. It is even less logical and less scientific to invent the appropriate instinct. But it must be a great shock to those biological determinists

who have followed this line of explanation to learn that the citadel of their theory, so long regarded as impregnable, is now being stormed by a behaviorist.

The Religious Instinct Theory.—It has not been many years since the theory of a religious instinct had wide acceptance. Now, for the most part, the religious life and the religious consciousness are regarded as too complex, too elaborate, to be explained by any such thing as a religious instinct. The religious instinct would suggest a structural basis for religion in the nervous system, and the attempt of physiological psychologists to locate a structural basis for a religious instinct has not been attended with success. In fact, it has run into the ridiculous. The word "instinct," when applied to religion, has generally been used in the sense of a special religious faculty. But modern psychology can no longer tolerate the faculty hypothesis. The mind acts as a whole, and all the returns that come in bear out the fact. It ought instantly to be seen that the theory which regards the whole organism as tending toward a religious consciousness, a consciousness which inevitably appears at the proper level of development, is more comprehensive in its claims than a religious instinct theory. The whole man is involved in the exercises of religion. Religion is not merely intellectual or emotional or volitional or instinctive. It is all these and more. It is too complex, therefore, to be grounded in a religious instinct.

Reference of Religious Phenomena to Other Instincts.—Another attempt to give religion an instinctive basis has resulted in the theory that religion is grounded in the sex tendencies. This theory was advanced many years ago, but it has had a new emphasis put upon it by the Freudian school of

psychoanalysis. Indeed Dr. Freud has accounted for about everything in human experience by the fact of sex. It is the basic *libido* of all life. Sex is more than instinct with Freud. It is the central channel of life and everything else is margin. One is tempted to wonder if this could be a private obsession, a sort of abnormal interest on the part of the distinguished doctor, so strong that it gives an exaggerated importance to sex. That it is important there is no doubt and that it influences the whole life outlook is beyond question, but to assume that it explains every life activity is giving to the sexual impulse an importance not yet warranted by the evidence of experience.

Professor James says that one might as well interpret religion as the perversion of the respiratory function as the perversion of the sex function. In this connection he refers to the Bible's references to respiration and to the fact that in some religions the foundation of all religious discipline consists in the regulation of aspiration and inspiration. He goes on to say:

The plain truth is that to interpret religion one must in the end look at the immediate content of the religious consciousness. The moment one does this, one sees how wholly disconnected it is in the main from the content of the sexual consciousness. Everything about the two things differs, objects, moods, faculties concerned, and acts impelled to. Any general assimilation is simply impossible. What we find most often is complete hostility and contrast. If now the defenders of the sex theory say that this makes no difference to their thesis; that without the chemical contributions which the sex organs make to the blood,

the brain would not be nourished so as to carry on religious activities, this final proposition may be true or not true; but at any rate it is profoundly uninformative. We can deduce no consequences from it which help us to interpret religious meaning or value. In this sense religious consciousness depends just as much upon the spleen, the pancreas, and the kidneys as on the sexual apparatus, and the whole theory has lost its point in evaporating into a vague general assertion of the dependence, somehow, of the mind upon the body.¹

Professor Dewey says:

The treatment of sex by psychologists is most instructive, for it flagrantly illustrates both the consequences of artificial simplification and the transformation of social results into psychic causes. Writers, usually male, hold forth on the psychology of woman as if they were dealing with a Platonic universal entity, although they habitually treat men as individuals, varying with structure and environment. They treat phenomena which are peculiarly symptoms of the civilization of the West at the present time as if they were the necessary effects of fixed native impulses of human nature. Romantic love as it exists to-day, with all the varying perturbations it occasions, is as definitely a sign of specific historic conditions as big battleships with turbines, internal combustion engines and electrically driven machines. It would be as sensible to treat the latter as effects of a single psychic cause as to attribute the

¹ *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 12.

phenomena of disturbances and conflict which accompany present sexual relations as manifestations of an original psychic force or "Libido." Upon this point at least a Marxian simplification is nearer to the truth than that of Jung.²

These statements by these eminent psychologists furnish a sufficient answer to the argument that religion may be explained in terms of an instinct or group of instincts, such as are supposed to be the basis of sex activity. However, let it be kept in mind that no matter how religion may be grounded psychologically, that has no necessary bearing upon the validity of any religious teaching. A religion might conceivably have a very fine psychological origin and, as a system of truth by which to live, be utterly false.

EMOTION.—Motives are grounded, not alone in native impulses, dependent on the nature of the organism as well as its evolutionary background, nor on impulses developed out of the organism, but motives may arise out of the incidental facts of experience. All feeling, as James insisted, is in the direction of producing movement. He classified the more important movements consequent upon a cerebro-mental change as instinctive or impulsive performances, expressions of emotion and voluntary deeds.

The emotions may be defined as "stirred up states of mind." They are states of mind highly charged with the feeling element of experience. The feelings constitute one principal phase of the life. By feeling we mean that phase of experience which has to do with pain and pleasure, with likes and dislikes, with desire and repugnance, with satisfaction and disappointment.

² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 153.

There are psychologists who find a neutral ground of feeling in a feeling of indifference. But it seems to me that this distinction vanishes in a study of attention. There is a selection in the field of interests. The affective phase of the mental life is the interest-bearing phase.

The simplest and most elemental feelings are those directly arising from sensation. They have their immediate source in the five senses. The higher and more complex feelings carry a representative factor and have far-reaching ramifications out into the whole realm of experience. They are the emotions.

The idea of activity must be carried through all our thought of psychic life. The mind is an agent and not a passive and receptive reservoir into which facts are poured. The human organism is about the business of living and life involves movement as a fundamental condition and characteristic. The emotional consciousness is the mind's feeling consciousness of what is going on, the internal aspect of impulsive expression which may in turn generate other action.

The James-Lange Theory of the Emotions.—This approach to the study of the emotions leads us to a consideration of the famous James-Lange theory of the emotions. This theory got its name, not from any direct collaboration of the American psychologist with the Danish investigator, but because it was announced in all its essentials by these two distinguished thinkers at about the same time, and credit was given both psychologists in the naming of the theory. The theory is in brief that bodily changes follow directly the perception of an exciting fact and our feeling of these bodily changes as they occur constitutes emotion. The reflexes in action produce the emotion. James holds

that a man is angry because he strikes, sorry because he weeps, afraid because he trembles. He declares that every genuine repetition of bodily changes will reproduce an emotion of the same kind and quality as produced in connection with the first occurrence of bodily change.

I am willing to concede that the action of bodily reflexes does produce emotion sometimes. But I am convinced also that emotion may give rise to action, in many cases may precede bodily expression. Emotions are not merely "moved" states of mind, but may be also "moving" states of mind. The doctrine that emotions in every case must be the effects of outside stimuli upon the nerves of the body, producing immediate sensations, which are worked into emotions after bodily responses have been elicited, certainly overlooks the production of emotion by the presentation of mental images. The objects that produce the most intense emotions are frequently of an entirely imaginative character. They are internal facts of experience. They may be memory images or they may be anticipatory images, conjured up out of the mysterious depths of the imagination; but there is no doubt about the fact that they excite emotions. Thinking cannot proceed as a process of cold abstraction, the comparison of pure ideas. It is the flavor of an idea, or the imagery with which it is clothed, or the associations called up, that can stir the emotions into being. It is true perhaps that bodily effects may be produced by the imaginary object and the emotion may be the feeling consciousness of the effect produced within, but certainly we must find that the source of the emotion lies within the mental life rather than in the world without. This seemed to me so simple and obvious

that I supposed that I had done Professor James an injustice by assuming that he had overlooked it. I felt that somehow he must have included it in his discussion of emotions, and that I had lacked penetration to discover it, until I found that his distinguished successor, Professor McDougall, had pointed out this same defect.

Professor Thorndike declares that the questions involved in the James-Lange theory have not been settled. However, that is not a matter of supreme importance for the study of the emotions, for they must be studied as they are, no matter how they arise. But a corollary of the theory is of much greater practical importance and seems to have the backing of the testimony of experience. This is the idea that expression in action intensifies emotion and repression weakens and tends to kill it out. The higher and finer emotions, if they are not to die out in the soul and render it dull and unresponsive, ought to issue in movement, ought to find immediate expression in acts of will. All the fine feelings and splendid impulses that die within us without a chance of worthy expression tend to clutter up the inner life with the débris of internally destructive explosions that render it more and more ineffective and futile.

The emotions are facts of consciousness. They are not merely thrills of neural excitement. They have meaning. They thus have a direct connection with intellect. Our feelings, with their trends of significance, give rise at once or soon after to ideational processes.

Emotions, since they may generate action, may be regarded as sources of motivation. Any attempt to catalogue the religious motives, however, can be little

more than an approximation. They are so many and so various. As it would be unprofitable in this connection to consider all of the emotional motives of the religious life, we shall content ourselves with considering a few.

Fear.—The fear motive has been regarded by many psychologists in the field of religion as primal. Primitive man stood bewildered and frightened in the presence of a dreadful universe. Beyond the rudimentary and immediate facts of existence was a vast unknown that presented direful possibilities and out of which came some terrible and inexplicable actualities. The imagination of man began to work with that unknown and to conjure up even more fearful facts than experience gave forth. His effort was to appease the frightful beings of that other world and to ward off the disasters that might come from the vague and misty regions of divinity. And the fear motive still dominates the great world mass of worshipers. There are millions of devotees in all religions living under the ignominious and abject slavery of fear. Priestcraft is held in dominion and power by the use of fear methods of control. There is even a sort of Christianity that holds its people in fear of saints and devils, of calamity in another world, of being cut off from salvation after death. It is only in the highest ranges of religious development, and among a comparatively few people, that we may find the idea of a God of love who seeks the free devotion of His children.

Happiness.—It was not a slow transition from appealing to the supernatural to ward off disaster over to enlisting the service of supernatural powers for the securing of advantages. It almost followed inevitably, after getting the supernatural powers placated, that a

sense of peace and security should come as the result of sacrifice. This was the other side of the matter. It furnished the happiness motive of religion. There are very many whose religious efforts are for the sake of spiritual peace and the æsthetic satisfactions that come from religious endeavor. The joy and thrill and ecstasy of it go a long way in the religious desires of many persons. And who shall say that the motive is illegitimate or unworthy? We are entitled to the pursuit of happiness, not only in the exercise of political privileges, but also in the realm of religious experience. However, we must confess that this motive is egoistic, and, in nobility and moral worth, beneath some of the other motives of religious living.

The Sense of Duty.—It is difficult to say when the ideas of right and duty entered into religion and the feeling of oughtness entered into religious practices. Kant contended that the feeling of oughtness was categorical. I am inclined to agree with his intuitionism on this point. But however we look at the matter, it is certain that when the feeling of oughtness entered into man's attitude toward God, the moralization of religion began. And in relation to its moral ideals, every religion that we know anything about has to do with the attainment of righteousness. If there is a religion that has the duty motive entirely lacking, I have seen no account of it.

Love.—The supreme religious motive is love. That motive has appeared in the advanced religions. It is dominant only in Christianity. It can exist only in harmony with the idea of a loving God. Christianity's doctrine of the Father-God brings out the religious motive of love, and the motive cannot be established

in the heart that has not learned the value of love to mankind.

Spiritual Passion.—No study of the emotional life as related to religion can afford to overlook the fact of spiritual passion. It is this that gives intensity to religious experience and earnestness to religious endeavor. It is the ardor element in religion. There are those who are superficially religious. They do not take their religion seriously. They do not feel it keenly. They do not enter into it with enthusiasm. They may lack the power to feel deeply. And people who lack the power to feel deeply also usually lack the power to think deeply on that subject. And there are persons who can wax warm on other themes but who lack intensity in religion. But the feeling of intensity in religious experience is a true measure of its vitality.

The Religious Revival.—The most phenomenal expressions of religious emotion in modern times have been found in the religious revival. The religious revival, with its present characteristics, is one of the features of modern Protestantism, or rather of that variety of Protestantism known as Evangelical. The primary aim of a religious revival, and the primary result, is the awakening of religious interest. The religious interest spreads as a contagion, not only in crowds where the herd tendencies can operate, but also in social waves among whole peoples, just as does any other social enthusiasm.

The modern religious revival has been attended by some strange and grotesque exhibitions of religious orgiasm. This is not a cause for wonder. The religious orgy has existed from the beginning of religious practices. In fact, the orgy as a psychic phe-

nomenon is not peculiar to religion. It has manifested itself as a part of the social expression of the race just about ever since human life began to have social expression. An early example is the harvest jubilee among primitive peoples. Another is the sex orgy, attended with dancing, exchanging of mates and wild social excesses. A classic illustration is seen in the set of orgies that gave being to Bacchus. We have that brand of orgasm very much alive to-day. For example, the New Year's celebration in New York. These examples of an orgiastic propensity which is general serve to show the volcanic character of the human nervous organization and the thinness of the wall of separation between sanity and insanity. Where neural energy fails to be expressed in rational ways, we blow up, individually or socially, and experience at least a temporary insanity. When this insanity receives social expression, we see the wild excesses of the group orgy.

Emotionalism has borne more than its share of blame for the excesses of the religious orgy. As a matter of fact, the religious orgy, including those strange and grotesque phenomena of the revival, is neural more than emotional and dominantly physiological rather than psychical.

A serious question has been raised as to whether the revival any longer has a place of usefulness in religious endeavor, and the opinion is freely voiced that it is a passing phase in religious evolution. If reference is made to some of the outlandish facts that have characterized many of the revivals of the past, let us devoutly hope that the opinion is correct. That would mean that religious experience has cleared itself of some of its monstrosities. But if reference is made to the primary meaning of the revival, the awakening of

a religious interest that spreads as a social contagion, then the loss of the revival would be a spiritual calamity.

HABIT.—No fact of experience is more familiar than the fact of habit. What do we mean by habit? We mean an acquired tendency to action. Animals at certain levels of life seem to come into the world with a full equipment of native tendencies toward a daily round of behavior. But humans, on the other hand, come into the world with a meager equipment of set tendencies, and these rather weak and vague. A great deal is left to acquirement and development. Professor Dewey takes the ground that habit is the main force in the shaping of conduct:

A combination of traditional individualism with the recent interest in progress explains why the discovery of the scope and force of instincts has led many psychologists to think of them as the fountain-head of all conduct, as occupying a place before instead of after that of habit. The orthodox tradition in psychology is built upon the separation of individuals from their surroundings. The soul or mind or consciousness was thought of as self-contained and self-enclosed. Now in the career of an individual, it is regarded as complete in itself, instincts clearly came before habits. Generalize this individualistic view, and we have the assumption that all customs, all significant episodes in the life of individuals, can be carried directly back to the operation of instincts.

The inchoate and scattered impulses of an infant do not coördinate into serviceable powers except through social dependencies and companionships.

His impulses are merely starting points for assimilation of the knowledge and skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends. They are agencies for the transfer of existing social power into personal ability; they are means of reconstructive growth. Abandon an impossible individualistic psychology, and we arrive at the fact that native activities are organs of reorganization and readjustment.³

It is difficult for us ordinarily to be aware of how completely we are under the power of habit. We may have the illusion under ordinary conditions that we are comparatively free from its power. Our prideful wills often boast of their freedom and superiority. A story that illustrates in an emphatic way the working of the law of habit will serve to show us how thoroughly life may come under its mastery. Dr. Merton S. Rice relates it as follows:

I saw Mrs. Maybrick just after she was set free from prison wherein she had been confined in a stone cell for many years. I asked her if she would tell me in the fewest possible words what was the first thought that came to her when she was told she was set free, and she replied in a flash, "Eight feet." I told her I didn't understand what she meant, and she replied: "I have been for many years confined in a stone cell, eight feet long. I have tramped the floor of that cell until I wore it down by the tireless determination that some day I would get my freedom. I have walked back and forth on my eight-foot journey until eight feet seemed measured into my very existence. When

³ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 93.

at last they opened the door and told me I could go, I started, and at the end of the first eight feet I turned and started back. I had to turn myself about again, only to repeat the same experience at the next eight feet of my way. Again and again that same awful fact of eight feet that I had year by year trampled into my life presented itself in my way, and to this moment I have literally to force myself across every eight-foot measure in my path.⁴

A friend of mine, a very distinguished and learned person, once took occasion to give me a lesson in personal development. He said: "Never allow yourself to fall into habits; change your walk; change your mannerisms constantly; vary your attitudes." I have a very great respect for that friend, but I am glad that I did not undertake to take his advice. I am coming more and more to see that his advice was impossible to follow. Habit forming is inevitable. Not only is it inevitable, but desirable. It is not the habitless life that we need, but the one with the right kind of habits.

Custom. Social habits, the habits of groups or peoples, are called customs. People get started doing certain things in certain ways and they have the tendency to keep on doing them in those ways. Habit and custom follow the law of repetition. There is no rational explanation for many customs that exist. About all a custom needs to get started is an initiatory act by someone who can command attention.

Most of the institutions, rites, ceremonies and practices of religion have come about as the result of the

⁴ *Dust and Destiny*, p. 12.

evolution of custom. Many of them were originally called into being by the needs of adaptation. Having been handed down from generation to generation, they have acquired the sanctity and authority of age. Those which prove to be unnecessary or harmful will doubtless in the course of time, under the searching and winnowing influence of critical thought and the testings of experience, be weeded out and left in the general wastage of the ages. But this will not take place rapidly. Old customs and ideas have no greater tenacity in any field of life interest than in religion, unless perhaps it may be in the realm of law and politics.

It may be almost a sacrilege to those who are accustomed to think of religion as entirely a matter of spontaneous spirituality to say that religious life and practice are largely matters of habit. Yet I am convinced that this is largely so.

Perhaps it will seem strange to speak of the habit of prayer. Prayer may be at first entirely spontaneous, arising almost involuntarily from the felt pressure of great need. It may be so at any time of stress or emergency. It is only in the religious practice and voluntary worship that prayer becomes regular and habitual. There are some persons who never seek divine help except in situations of extreme need. There are others who never leave recourse to God out of the important affairs of their lives. It is as natural for them to pray as to eat. It becomes a part of their daily life and practice.

I believe the attitude of Jesus toward God was habitual. It was as natural for him to turn to the place of prayer as for water to flow down hill. When He had been through periods of arduous and trying ministry, He sought the place of prayer for the restora-

tion of spent forces, for the recharging of His being with new spiritual energies. He would go into the mountains weary and heartsick. He would go forth into the world again with shining face and aggressive spirit. Jesus was recognized by his disciples at Emmaus by His familiar attitude of prayer when He gave thanks for the meal. Just as it was His custom to go to the synagogues on the Sabbath, so his life was regulated in other respects by religious habits.

Church attendance is largely a matter of habit. Our attitudes toward the church and the forms and practices of religion are determined largely by tradition, and tradition is rooted in habit. Habit becomes custom and appropriated by successive generations is tradition. Our forms of worship are thus determined and our ethical attitudes taken. None of the ethical principles of religion has really taken possession of our lives until it has become habitual. I once heard a man utter the striking truth that no man is honest so long as people must watch him to keep him honest, that no man is honest so long as he must watch himself to keep honest, that no man is genuinely honest until honesty becomes natural with him. That means that he has acquired the habit of honesty. In the same way we acquire habits of unselfishness, kindness, generosity, patience, godliness. By living the religious and moral life in regular detail, carrying out its principles in the acts of our lives, we establish the godly and righteous life and character.

CONVICTIONS AND BELIEFS.—Intellectually, life is motivated by convictions and beliefs. This means that thought generates convictions and beliefs and convictions and beliefs generate action.

The intellect evolves religious beliefs. These are

interpretations of experience. They sometimes seem to swing clear of experience and to lose connection with it. But without an experience of a religious character, these religious beliefs would never arise. And, in the last analysis, they are the mind's interpretation of the world given in experience. These interpretations are not built up according to logical principles. They are usually not the results of formal reasoning. On the contrary, we feel certain things to be so, arriving at the belief we know not how, and then we begin to search for supporting reasons for underpinning our beliefs. If we are sufficiently critical of ourselves, we begin testing our beliefs by comparisons with other results of experience. This whole process is true, not of religious belief alone, but of all opinion whatsoever. In science hypotheses are laid down as beliefs. Then a more elaborate reasoning evolves these hypotheses into a theory with arguments to support it. Finally, it is tested in relation to other items of experience and accepted as a working fact or rejected as untenable.

Religion must go forward on the basis of conviction. Its claims rest upon convictions. Its moral sanctions are matters of conviction. Its best enterprises are undertaken out of conviction. The consecration of religious persons is grounded in inner conviction. Where a great deal is claimed for authority, even that authority is rooted in conviction. It is impossible to read any scriptures without getting the idea of the very great importance of conviction as a religious motive. Conviction is the positive inner sense that things are so. But it does not remain merely that. It strengthens itself with evidence or wears itself out in a test that refutes it. It supports itself with reasoning. Religion cannot remain in the realm of unsupported belief. It

must proceed into a sense of certainty. Religion can verify completely many of its original convictions. And it can gather sufficient evidence to render reliable and probable the unverifiable things of faith. The conviction that certain things are so or not so is the exercise of faith. It continues its testing and sifting. If it ceases this weighing and testing, it dies out within the soul. It cannot live and not perform its function. Faith, or conviction, is an intellectual activity. It is dependent upon and supports the thought activity of induction and inference.

Religion needs a vigorous thought life. It needs it for the sake of vitality. All the life and power will go out of religion when thinking ceases. All genuine and wholesome emotionalism will die out. Thinking and feeling may get out of proper proportion to one another, but neither can stand alone. We never find one phase of mental activity entirely separated from other phases. If one is weakened, all are weakened. And a vigorous thought life also is required to give religion a rational foundation and stability. A common tragedy is the tragedy resulting from an underdeveloped religious thought life. People go ahead in the other phases and departments of life, continually thinking and revising their opinions and attitudes. One day they awake to the discovery that their intellectual life is lacking in symmetry. They find that, as compared with their ideas on other subjects, their religious ideas are childish and immature. And since life is a unity, it becomes necessary at some time in the course of experience to bring all our ideas into relation in a correlated system. And the ideas that are underdeveloped will not fit into our mental system as a whole. Then we must make a very hasty and laborious

readjustment or we shall probably find ourselves rejecting the more immature ideas as outgrown and wholly unnecessary to our main system of thought, as those things which have served their purpose in our childhood, but which must in our more advanced development be regretfully discarded along with the fairies and Santa Claus. Oftentimes this is a very tragic experience. It means consigning to a little urn of tender memory the ashes of religious faith and hope.

PURPOSES AND IDEALS.—We come now to a consideration of a somewhat different kind of religious motivation. The kinds that have been discussed represent a flow of energy from a storehouse of hereditary and experience material accumulated in the past. They constitute a drive from behind, a propulsion. The motivation of purposes and ideals is in the nature of a pull by an incentive toward an objective projected beyond present experience.

Character is determined, not alone by factors of the past, but by one's desires, interests, ideals, objectives. There may be a lack of harmony in our motives, but still it may be said that largely we are what we are because of our desires. The dominant desires, or system of desire, and the final desire or final set of desires, determine to a very great extent the character of the life.

Life is lived according to direction given it at determining junctures. In the conflict of desires all action must be neutralized into a dead equilibrium or an end must be chosen and a corresponding course of action followed. Thus destinies hang in the balance of decision and the important, crucial moments determine the longer courses of action in between. Then we may say that life is largely determined by the aggregation

of desires and incentives from which we choose our objectives and by the choices which we make. This reminds us that the intellect is involved in an act of willing, for choice means discrimination and discrimination is intellectual in character.

A purpose is an end held in view for accomplishment. It may be the culmination of a plan, or it may be an end held in view to be reached by any plan or set of plans that may be evolved for its attainment. A purpose is an end held in view without a necessary implication of the means of reaching it.

An ideal is a set of mentally envisaged conditions that are chosen and held by the mind as desirable. They represent the mind's supreme standards of value, its highest value judgments with regard to possibilities.

Now, since religion is in its very essence an evaluating factor in life, it is at once evident that for religion ideals and purposes are of supreme importance. A religion is to be measured in terms of what it has done, what it is doing, and what it is endeavoring to do. Its final objectives, its goal of perfection, its values for society and the individual, are matters of first importance.

The ideals of the religions of the world are many and various. Buddhism has as a final objective the extinction of individuality. Mohammedanism sets up a set of material and fleshly ends as the supreme values for time and eternity. Christianity has as an objective for individual striving an end which is just the opposite of that of Buddhism. It aims at enlarging self-realization and widening and intensifying the spiritual consciousness. There is variety in the emphasis on the different values that may form the whole combination of religious values for the different religions. For some

of them the immediate consolations and rewards are paramount, the ministries of religion for this present world. For others the last things, the rewards of eternity, the things beyond this earthly vale, are emphasized as of supreme importance. And there is variety in religious emphasis among the followers of the same faith. There are those within the Christian fold, for example, who think of redemption as for a few individuals who are to be picked out of a bad world. For other Christians the Christian ideal is emphatically social, covering the transformation of civilization and the attainment of a social order that is righteous and godly. For some the complete winning of personal allegiance on the part of every individual in the world to the ideas that they hold valid is the ultimate objective of religious labor. For others ecclesiastical domination of all the forms and phases of civilization seems sufficient. Some religions would attain their ends by persuasion, some by physical force, some by the imposition of organized authority.

The main source of a religion's vitality is its purposes and ideals. A religion is just as vital as its aims. When these lose force, when they cease to claim and secure the investment of human energies, the seeds of decay have set in that mean the end of that religion. Unless the hold of those objectives on the imagination and the endeavor of its followers can be restored, the dissolution and discard of that religion is certain.

CHAPTER V

HISTORIC EXPRESSIONS OF RELIGIOUS ASPIRATION

RELIGION VIEWED AS A FORM OF ASPIRATION.—Religion may be thought of as a form of aspiration. If religion represents the effort to realize life's supreme values—and I think there is no dispute about that—then religion is a form of aspiration. It is the outreach of the soul toward the supreme realities, the effort of the soul to come into right relation with those supreme realities as they are conceived and as they are vaguely felt. Religious aspirations may take the form of a groping in the field of the Unknown upon the assumption that something bigger and finer and infinitely worth discovery lies just beyond the realm of immediately apparent fact.

This groping of man to relate himself with the higher realities and to realize the higher values is both pathetic and sublime, the seal of his limitation and the credential of his nobility. The fact that man has religious capacities and religious aspiration, even though they may seek fulfillment and expression in grotesque and absurd forms and practices, is a big item to be put down to man's credit in the outset of an estimate of his worth. The glory of the human lies in the fact that, though he stands biologically related to brutes, he has been all through the ages, in diverse ways, seeking fellowship with Deity. His dreams, his ideals, his hopes, his aspirations are directed to that

which is above and beyond the world of his past and immediate attainment.

There is no more interesting study than of the ways in which man has sought to bring himself into relation to the highest realities. This line of study, broadly viewed, constitutes the whole field of the science of comparative religion. Now in the discussion which I have planned, I have not had the thought of entering into that field or even touching it more than incidentally. I desire merely to take out of the history of the religion of the past some of the significant forms in which religious aspiration has found expression and to use those facts for psychological purposes in a way that may possibly throw greater light on the religious functioning of mind. I do not mean to take them all into consideration or to treat those that I do take in exhaustive fashion. I frankly do not regard myself as capable of performing such a task as that. I merely desire to consider them briefly and suggestively, because I believe them to be symptomatic in character and, therefore, pertinent to a study of religious aspiration viewed as a psychological fact.

MAGIC AND RELIGION.—One of the most primitive forms of human effort in getting into relation with the supernatural, or the world beyond the realm of immediacy and familiarity, has been denominated magic. It may be argued that magic has nothing to do with religion, that it is in contrast with religion. But no one can deny that magic is a form of aspiration and that it seeks to affect the world of commonplace things through an appeal to, or a manipulation of, the supernatural.

Much has been written on the relation between magic and religion. The connection seems to be formed

in the relation between magic and prayer. Magic is more difficult to define than prayer. The use of the term has been more uncertain and confused. But certain main ideas are clear, and these happen to be the ideas that relate magic to prayer.

Magic is like prayer in that it is the expression of desire. It is unlike prayer in its method. Dr. George Galloway states the difference. The idea of magic is control, while the idea of prayer is dependence.

After the study of various theories concerning prayer and magic, I have been able to reach some conclusions of my own. Dr. Frazer, the anthropologist, holds the well-known theory that magic and prayer are so utterly dissimilar that they never could mix, and that the failure of magic as a method of attainment of desired ends gave rise to prayer. Dr. R. R. Marrett holds that there may be a transition from prayer to magic and back again. Since both belong to the sphere of the supernatural, and because the latter tends to be conceived as any affair between wills, magic, though distinct, has something in common with religion, so that interpenetration and transfusion are possible between them. Professor Jevons finds that the supreme difference between religion and magic is that the former is social in its aims and the latter is anti-social. He argues that there has been all the while a yawning chasm of irreconcilable difference between the two. There is another theory that magic is the outgrowth of religious decadence.

My own conclusions are about as follows: Prayer and magic are alike in that they both recognize the supernatural and that they are matters of desire. They proceed by different methods toward the attainment of these desires. Magic employs spell, hocus-pocus,

incantation and any possible method controlling the power regarded as supernatural. It aims at bringing the supernatural under the control of the individual working the spell. Prayer, as a rule, involves a higher conception of the supernatural order and recognizes its superiority over human affairs. The method is, therefore, the method of petition and the final result the coalition of wills, either by the granting of the petition or the bringing of the will of the petitioner into submission to the will of the superior power to whom petition is made. Prayer and magic have both been used by the same persons for the attainment of ends desired, and there has been a shift from one to the other. There has been no observed decadence of magic and recognition of it on the part of primitive peoples as has been assumed by Dr. Frazer. Religion has not grown out of magic, for its origin is quite as ancient as that of magic. Magic is not a result of the failure and decadence of religion, for religion was found among primitive peoples, and identified by prayer, and was certainly not decadent at that period of human life. Yet we must admit that when religion does become decadent and corrupt, it tends to run over into superstition and its practices into magic. The formulas of prayer are magical elements in prayer. When they are not used for the sake of definiteness and order, but are regarded as essential and efficacious, they partake of the nature of the magic spell. Repetitions, such as the use of the prayer wheel in India or the reiterating of the name of Allah in the prayers of Mohammedans, are examples of magical tendencies in prayer. And the feeling on the part of Christians that prayer is not quite right unless it closes with "Amen," preceded by other regular formulas, is a leaning in the direction of

magic. But, on the whole, the evolutionary tendencies of prayer have been upward toward spirituality and a place of honor, while magic has among enlightened peoples been relegated to the realm of legerdemain, where it is recognized as a thing of trickery and deceit and interesting only for the skill of the deception. However, magic had such an intimate connection with religion on the lower levels of human development that in many cases it is possible to construe magical practices as forms of religious aspiration.

CEREMONY.—Another form of the expression of religious aspiration, closely akin to both magic and prayer, has been the religious ceremonial. An explanation of religious ceremonies must draw from a number of sources of fact, for ceremonies have been motivated by various causes.

Some of them have been evolved as the rites of magic. Magic has followed certain lines of marked-out procedure. Some of these rites have dropped out their original significance and still persisted. Some of them have retained their original magical purpose. Whenever magic is found in connection with religion—and it is found very widely—ceremony is prominent and emphatic in the mixed practices. All magic is accompanied by ceremony, but ceremony may be unaccompanied by magic.

Ceremony has in the past, and still is where myth prevails, a dramatization of myths. The myths that have arisen as the crude and childish story explanation of cosmic facts have enactment and observance in the form of appropriate ceremonies symbolizing the facts represented in the myth. Seed time and harvest, the change of the seasons, the major interests of the group, have all had expression in myth and ceremonial.

Other ceremonies may be explained in terms of custom. The group just did certain things, many times without rational explanation, or certain outstanding leaders of the group did them, and they were repeated. The judges of England wore wigs while on the bench centuries ago, and wigs still persist in English courts. Courts were opened with certain forms of procedure in the long ago; nobody knows why they were thus opened but the forms of opening them still persist. So in religion, just as certain ancient categories of thought have persisted, though useless for the expression of modern ideas, so certain forms and practices persist, though their values are no longer apparent. Others have been invested with new values. Many of them originated in the inexplicable contingencies of human development.

With the development of ritual, ceremonial symbolism becomes more definite, more significant, more rational, more spiritual. Those acts of ritual which at first celebrated the qualities and achievements of men may become channels through which communion is formed with the powers regarded as divine. And the acts and facts of ritual, visible and material, may come to represent invisible and spiritual realities of a high order. On the low levels of ceremonialism there is a fusion of symbols with truths symbolized, and the thought and emotion of the worshiper center in the immediate acts and objects of the ceremony, but on the higher levels there is an incidental use made of the symbols and the endeavor is toward getting through the symbol to the spiritual reality symbolized.

In the field of religion ceremonialism constitutes the etiquette of worship. Just as it has seemed appropriate to hedge about a king or other distinguished and

honored person with elaborate manners of approach, so it has been regarded as appropriate to approach the divine presence according to prescribed forms of approach. These forms of reverent and respectful approach to the divine presence constitute much of the ritual of modern worship.

Ritualism has a proper relation to religion and a genuine spiritual usefulness. Some symbolism and some ceremony are essential to the concretion and preservation of religious practices. Ritualism, dangerous as its overuse may be to the power and the spontaneity of the spiritual life, is an essential factor in religious success. It is a means for the social expression of religion. The people can join their voices and merge their minds and hearts in the ritualistic service. It gives a stronger social consciousness to the service, a sense of fellowship and unity of thought and activity in the assembly. One of the sources of the power of the Roman Catholic Church is its ritualism. The churches are filled because the people have a large part in the services. Any minister must be careful lest the service fall entirely into the hands of a few persons and the large number in the congregation be deprived of any active part in worship. Too much ritualism may have the tendency to sap the personal vitality of religion, but it has often, by being a concrete expression of religion, preserved its definite forms from fading out altogether.

SACRIFICE.—An expression of religious aspiration that can be traced back to the very beginnings of religion is the religious sacrifice. Sacrifice has been found to have two motives. The original religious attitude was doubtless, as I have previously suggested, one of fear, and the supernatural powers were not regarded as

friendly. Therefore the primitive worshiper sought to appease his god. The device upon which he fell for doing this was the offering up of something in order to appease his god and turn away his anger. The gods were regarded as taking peculiar pleasure in the sacrifice of life, and oftentimes it has been regarded as necessary to offer up human sacrifices to conciliate them. The other motive has been the desire to come into communion with the god, to share his power, to partake of his nature. The sacrifice that was pleasing to him was regarded as containing a sort of supernatural potency because of the sacredness of the sacrificial animal and because of its identification with the god in the rites of sacrifice. The desire to please the gods and to enter into communion with them has not always been unselfish. The primitive worshiper sought to use his god to his own advantage, and the modern worshiper has not entirely lost that motive.

In the more advanced religions these motives of sacrifice have found expression in other directions. The desire to please God finds expression in a life of service rather than in the rites of sacrifice. Paul furnishes us with the language of the transition: "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service." The transition is in both the conception of God and the idea of sacrifice. The desire to come into communion with God finds its complete satisfaction for those who are deeply spiritual in prayer and meditation.

PRAYER.—The most characteristic, important and essential historic form of religious aspiration is prayer. Prayer has been so closely identified with the whole development of religion that it has been very truly

remarked that a history of the practice of prayer might well stand for a history of religion.

Psychology has no right to discuss the divine response to prayer and the objective results accomplished by that response, but psychology can legitimately consider the subjective effects of prayer. These are the retroactive results, results of the back-action of prayer, or prayer's recoil in the soul. Also psychology has a right to study the mental processes involved in the offering of prayer.

Prayer as thought involves ideas; as action, it is a matter of volition; as desire, it is emotional; as presenting religious objectives to consciousness, it is imaginative. In its wider ranges it will involve the complete individual in its processes. But I desire to study prayer psychologically from the standpoint of value. That is the religious standpoint, and this is a religious study.

Prayer Has a Soul-Unifying Effect on the Worshiper.
—Prayer is thus the soul's means of correcting its spiritual defects. The divided personality becomes unified. Prayer is the process which brings about conversion, which involves a correlation and redirection of conflicting motive systems within the mental life. Prayer is the spiritual warfare in which the conflicting forces within the soul reach a decisive result of struggle. Prayer is often a struggle for the possession of the inner life by conflicting purposes.

The doctrine of modern biology is that all life is a process of adaptation to environment. Psychology has taken over this assumption, namely, that the inner struggles of men, as well as the outer struggles, are efforts at adaptation. Adaptation may come in two ways. It may come through a surrender to conditions

and the following of the line of least resistance. This will lead to weakness and finally to extinction. Or adjustment may come through the mastery of conditions and the adaptation of environment to the triumph of spiritual forces. Prayer, in the main, pursues the method of conquering conditions and conforming environment.

But this process in the spiritual world is regulated by a supreme factor, the will of God, as understood by the religious person. The struggle of prayer is the process of making the will of God supreme over all motives. The soul of man does not surrender to the will of God as a defeated and conquered thing. The spiritual nature of man shares the triumph of the divine will over those inner forces that are regarded as evil and unspiritual. The submission of the religious soul to the will of God is a triumphant submission, the submission that recognizes itself as an appropriation of power, a surrender that sees itself as victory.

Prayer Generates Faith.—If a certain measure of faith is essential to sincere and earnest prayer, the exercise of prayer is necessary to the development of a profound faith. Prayer requires faith in order to get started, but only a minimum of faith. As the exercise of prayer proceeds, faith is generated. Professor Coe argues that a prerequisite of prayer is not so much faith as a particular direction of attention. The unconvinced have often been overwhelmed by the exercise of attention toward those things for which they have had distrust or antipathy. So he says that in prayer faith is often born or reborn. Many a man has started into prayer troubled with uncertainty and burdened with doubt to emerge from his prayer experience grounded in certainty and firmly settled in his convictions and

beliefs. His prayer has begun in a struggle with doubt and ended with the possession of a triumphant, confident, victorious faith.

Prayer is a Dynamic of Religious Labor.—The normal individual cannot pray without getting hold of serious convictions of duty. These convictions become the spur of endeavor. The prayer for the realization of ends suggests action in the direction of those ends. The contemplation of high values suggests effort toward the realization of those values. Prayer has often been the origin of missionary zeal or of the moral passion for reforms or schemes for the organization of religious forces for great endeavors. The zealots in any moral cause are usually men of prayer. Some men seem able to give themselves to a passionless contemplation of the true, the good and the beautiful, but they are the exception. More often they break away from their cloistered place of prayer filled with the passion for service and reform.

MONASTICISM.—One of the historic forms of religious aspiration belonging to most, if not all, religions is monasticism. The psychological causes of monastic movements have been many and varied and perhaps not all of them entirely discoverable.

Perhaps the strongest motive for monastic life has been a spirit of revolt against prevailing conditions. Monasticism has pursued the method of withdrawal from undesirable conditions. It is a fine tribute to mankind, a big fact to put down to humanity's credit, that the heart will turn sick at sin and will rise in revolt against ungodliness and immorality. And monasticism has at times in the history of mankind seemed to offer the only way out from a world that appeared as hopelessly bad. But when we take a large view of life,

monasticism is seen as the most futile and ineffective form of revolt against evil. It savors of weakness and cowardice and selfishness. Those qualities of character and motives of life are not always consciously present, but monasticism entered into as a protest of withdrawal from a hard and evil world puts the shrinking soul that runs away in a position that is hard to defend.

The monastic life may also be chosen as the natural expression of an ascetic tendency in religious experience. Withdrawal from society may represent self-abnegation. Monasticism in that case is not a way of escape from an undesirable world, but a way of renunciation of a world that is held as desirable but less desirable than the end to be obtained through monastic self-renunciation. The practices of such a monastic life will be thereafter the practices of a cultivated asceticism. They will consist of a crucifixion of the flesh, a renunciation of earthly pleasure, an espousal of the way of pain as the way of spiritual satisfaction. Just where the virtue is in pain I have never been able to determine. Just how the negation or destruction of most of the natural tendencies that God has implanted within us will please God is a mystery that I have never been quite able to fathom. I have noted, however, that asceticism feeds greedily upon the doctrine of original sin. But the dogma of original sin must have somehow sprung from the larger general notion that natural life is somehow predominantly evil. That notion may have arisen in some way out of the struggle of life for completeness. If that is so, it is the most amazing paradox of human thinking.

But the monastic life might be entered into because of its positive attractiveness. Going into it might involve neither a spirit of revolt nor a submission to a

life of self-abnegation. It offers a society of congenial spirits. It presents an opportunity for the cultivation of spiritual like-mindedness and for the development of a community of theological homogeneity. I can understand how certain types of individuals might look forward to such a life with the keenest anticipation, entirely willing to enter into its disadvantages for the sake of its peculiar advantages. Monastic life offers leisure, freedom from distraction, guaranteed support, opportunities for study and contemplation, a not at all disagreeable picture of a life of quietude and peace. And it would have the covering of religious sanction.

Monasticism, from the standpoint of the wide world of mankind, represents desocialization in religion. The ideals are, for the most part, highly individualistic. The emphasis is necessarily to a great extent on the world of the unearthly. There has been a minimum of hope of the transformation and redemption of a human world from its sin as an earthly and social achievement. There have been exceptions. Such orders as that to which St. Francis of Assisi belonged, under such leadership as he furnished, went out from the monastery to minister unto a world of sin and need. The monastery served in their cases as a place of retreat and spiritual reënforcement, a spiritual base of surprise from which they went out to carry on their ministry to man.

MYSTICISM.—I now come to the consideration of mysticism as a historical expression of religious aspiration. I have previously considered it as a method of psychological approach and as a type of religious experience. I do not wish it understood that mysticism is set over against monasticism. I recognize that there may be such a person as a monastic mystic or a mystic

monk. But mysticism has constituted a definite form of religious aspiration all down the centuries of religious history.

Mysticism originally stood for mystery and occultism in religious experience. It has not entirely dropped the flavor of these meanings yet, but it has come to stand more emphatically for other qualities in religious experience. The mystic makes feeling a cardinal fact in religious experience when he does not make it the one essential fact. He professes to feel truth; and that is his objective, rather than pleasure or gratification. The feeling of truth, the sensing of realities, is feeling but not emotion. It is intuition, or direct and immediate consciousness of truths without cognitive processes.

What is the function of intellect in the mind of the mystic? It influences the mystical experience from behind and follows up the experience with reflection concerning it. No mystical experience is uninfluenced by previous thinking and belief. For example, no Mohammedan or Buddhist ever has mystical experiences involving Christ, and the Protestant does not come into a sense of communion with the Virgin Mary. The mystic's interpretation of his own mystical experiences is an intellectual process. His intellect enables him to supplement and clarify, and perhaps criticize, the things that come to him by "intuition." It enables him to relate and systematize the materials of his mystical experiences.

All the great religions have had their mystics. St. Paul gives us the circumstances of a mystical experience in the first part of the twelfth chapter of Second Corinthians. St. Francis was a mystic. Luther had mystical experiences. John Wesley and Oliver Crom-

well have been called practical mystics. The writings of mystics have been vast in extent and voluminous, and much has been written about mysticism. It forms an important part of the psychology of religion.

But not alone in religion is mysticism found. It is also found in poetry. Tennyson was a self-confessed mystic. Wordsworth was a mystic in his communion with nature; so was Walt Whitman. In fact, it may be said that the mystic mind is essential to the poetic temperament. And mysticism may be found among scientists who have experiences of direct communion with nature.

In the milder mystical experiences of religion there may come to the soul of the worshiper a sense of ineffable peace and security. Paul describes it as "the peace that passeth all understanding." John Wesley, in describing his Aldersgate experience, tell us that in the service of worship he felt his heart strangely warmed. Mystics have entered into experiences that to them are indescribable, yet supremely genuine and significant.

Mysticism in religion may run into the wildest insanity, but he who has not somewhere entered into some phase of the mystic realm may be said to have no religious experience at all. He may have religious idea; he may accept religious teachings as verities; he may have the rational elements of faith; but he is not in the genuine sense of the word experientially religious. The God-consciousness, with its attendant emotions, lies within the realm of the mystical.

Professor Pratt makes a suggestive reference to mysticism when he identifies it with romanticism.¹ He says that romanticism is essentially an exaltation of

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 366.

imagination and emotion over intellect. The mystical method deliberately turns away from intellectual apprehension to feeling and direct consciousness. The conclusion seems quite inevitable when we remember that romanticism represents a revolt from rationalism toward freedom of fancy and the expression of passion. Professor James contended that the movement in literature which received the name of romanticism had its manifestations in a number of other fields of expression.² In philosophy it appears as subjectivism, regarding experience as one long eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge; in theology it appears as antinomianism; in art, as sensualism and sentimentalism; in scholarship and experimentation, as scientificism. It has the abiding and distinctive characteristic of a seeking of experience for the sake of the experiencing and it all the while tends to regard all life and all reality as existing for the sake of being experienced. This is easily recognized as a basic tendency of mysticism. I think Professor Pratt is right in saying that what is called romanticism in literature may be called mysticism in religion.

Some of the mystics have worked out detailed prescriptions of method for the attainment of mystical experience. These have variations, but they all include certain essential psychological steps and corresponding stages of experience.

First of all, the mystic gives himself over to meditation. This is not in the nature of reverie or an aimless day-dream consciousness. It is rather the contemplation of certain chosen religious ideas or objects. Previously I have suggested that mysticism strives to plunge into the depths of the mental realm beyond the

² *The Will to Believe*, p. 165.

field of conscious attention. But that is only part of the matter. Mysticism also seeks a concentration of consciousness. It seeks to get rid of the incidental facts of consciousness that it may give itself the more completely to one fact. It is a narrowing of consciousness to the idea or object held in contemplation. All surrounding facts fade away, leaving the object of contemplation standing alone in the field of attention. Its background is an objectless blur. This getting rid of superfluous and distracting consciousness is called *purgation*.

The intensified awareness of the object of mystical contemplation takes on an enhanced clearness and vividness. The sense of its presence and reality becomes exceedingly keen. The mind seems to be lifted to new levels of appreciation and understanding. This phase of mystical experience is called *illumination*.

But the intense white-hot consciousness of such concentrated attention cannot be long sustained. Ideas are not long-lived. Feelings endure much longer. The consciousness that remains to the mystic when ideas and images have passed out of view is a feeling consciousness, sometimes a condition of rapture, sometimes a calm of ineffable peace. This condition is known as *ecstasy*.

But the process ordinarily does not stop with the ecstasy. Ultimately the feeling of rapture departs, complete unconsciousness, that of exhaustion, ensues, and the subject is left in a state of *trance*.

Such is a psychological description of the process and stages of the mystical experience of the more radical sort. But psychology has no right to speak concerning the truth-attaining power of the mystical consciousness. Perhaps the concentrated, narrowed,

intensified consciousness of illumination is better able to apprehend the realities of a spiritual order. It seems reasonable, but it must be determined on other grounds. And as Professor James has suggested, such experiences may have authority for those who have had them, but we have no right to impose them as divine revelations on others. Divine revelations need to be tested in the further ranges of experience and by reason.

It would seem very awkward to treat inspiration as a form of aspiration, but the experiences of inspiration have been largely the results of the mystical outreach after God and the higher spiritual order. Inspiration may be closely identified with that phase of mystical experience which has been referred to as illumination. The idea needs clearing on both its psychological and theological side. The latter is beyond the province of this discussion, but perhaps some little contribution may be made toward the former.

Inspiration has been prominent as a fact of religious experience throughout the course of religious history. The ancients gave to inspiration a miraculous and occult significance which is perpetuated in the mechanical inspiration theory still prevailing in a certain type of theology. The subject was regarded as possessed by a supernatural influence. Plato, for example, says in the *Timaeus*, "God has given the art of divination, not to the wisdom but to the foolishness of man. No man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he has received the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled in sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession." Sometimes there were efforts to attain the plane of inspira-

tion through the use of physiological exercises, drugs and intoxicants. Perhaps intoxicants got the name of "spirits" from some such use.

But the more modern view, and the one growing in favor, is the one suggested in connection with the idea of mystical illumination. It is an enhanced and quickened power of apprehension. We have all experienced it when we seemed to be lifted out of ourselves and up to new heights of advantage in viewing reality. The poets and prophets have had it in large measure.

CHAPTER VI

RELIGIOUS BELIEF

THE NATURE OF BELIEF.—I have previously dealt with religious belief as a form of motivation. I propose now to consider its nature and conditions. A belief is an attitude of acceptance of an object or condition as having reality. I have the opinion that this definition will hold good, whether the belief is vague and inarticulate or whether it is clearly thought out and supported by undergirding reasons. While intellect may be regarded as dominating the evolution of beliefs, they have emotional, volitional and imaginative elements. That is to say, they have a feeling tone, a sense of pleasure or displeasure, in the acceptance of an idea as true; they are not independent of the slant of the will; and they get vividness and substance from the contributions of imagination.

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF BELIEF.—Where do we get our beliefs? We develop some of them, but most of them are furnished us ready-made. We inherit them. We are born into them. They are the established background of our thought lives. They form a part of the social setting in which life finds itself at the first moment of self-discovery. They are the working ideas with which we start our intellectual labors. It is the nature of child life to accept all primitive conditions. We start in believing in what we see and hear. We take things without discrimination and the critical

faculty develops very gradually. The primitive mind or the child mind is naturally credulous. The child learns to ask questions at an early age, but they are not the questions of doubt and criticism. They are the questions of an insatiable curiosity. When discrimination reaches a certain development, it begins to compare facts carefully and to raise questions of doubt. The mind begins to distinguish true and false. Then it sorts out ideas as acceptable and unacceptable and furnishes itself with reasons for its acceptance of some ideas and its rejections of others.

Then our first religious beliefs are taught us. We take them over and make them ours, accept them without question and act on them. They are not theories. From the standpoint of those who accept them, they are not worked out interpretations. They are simply working assumptions.

CREEDS.—A creed is a formulated statement of belief. It represents the effort to critically, and with more or less care, work out an interpretation or a set of interpretations of certain phases or forms of reality. A creed is at least a fragment of one's philosophy. Creedal statement indicates the crystallization of belief and the establishment of certain conceptions. It also means a fixation in thought, and if stated too completely it tends to interfere with future thought advancement. A religious creed represents an attempt to state religious experience in set terms, to cast it into set forms or patterns for the sake of definiteness. The disciples of Jesus, after the wonderful experiences of association with him, especially the manifestations of a resurrected Presence, and the Pentecostal experience of the reception of the Holy Spirit, could go forward, as far as they were concerned, meeting every possible emergency with

the support of an inarticulate experience and a faith of feeling rather than of definite conceptions. But when they would go forth to preach that experience and state their faith in terms that were to be grasped by those who were separated from their own emotional background, they found themselves face to face with an entirely different situation. They must state the conceptions into which people were to be baptized. The essentials of Christian belief must be made as clear and definite as possible. They must endeavor to convert experience into dogma. That was the only way to save Christianity from evaporation. The task presented was colossal. They must attempt to reduce to definition that which seemed to merge with the Infinite. They must undertake to describe the indescribable. They must seek to convey ideas of experiences for which language has ever been inadequate. The result was the historic creeds. And the common error is to regard creeds as the ultimate nomes of fixed truth when they are only the attempts to state the meaning of fluid and expanding experience, which has always evaded clear definition because of the utter depth of its significance. It naturally follows that this living, flowing, abiding experience must have restatement as conceptions shift and as terminology changes. But we are perpetually in need of dogmatism. The one who would do away with it is shallow in his interpretation. We cannot make our experience articulate, definite and vital to ourselves or others without dogmatism. A creedless religion is a formless and hollow thing that finally fades into nonentity. We need form to give experience clarity and experience to give the forms of belief substance, life and power.

BODIES OF BELIEF.—In addition to the formulated

creeds we find among the members of various religious parties bodies of unformulated belief. It may exist in traditions or writings that are more or less generally accepted by the members of the religious bodies in the part or in toto. There is very much more variation and flexibility in the acceptance of these forms of belief, although the general body of belief helps to give character to the religious party to which it belongs. As an illustration of what I mean, there is no statement of the doctrine of entire sanctification in the Articles of Faith of the Methodist Episcopal Church, yet it has been a part of the general body of belief of Methodists of this denomination. Its founder taught it, its preachers have preached it, and it has been widely and generally accepted as a Methodist doctrine. This is merely an instance of what exists in all religious divisions.

THE OBJECTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.—The objects of religious belief, like the objects of all belief, have come from experience, either by momentary chance or out of vital need. They are only incidentally and secondarily the creations of logical reasoning, if in any sense they may be said to result therefrom. There has been a great variety in the multitude of objects of religious belief and a detailed study of them would be inappropriate and unprofitable in this connection, but a study of the common and most important objects of religious belief ought to be helpful and enlightening.

BELIEF IN GOD.—God is the most important of all religious objects. The idea of God is unquestionably the main idea in the whole field of religion. There is wide variety in this belief, but in all genuine religion that has lived long enough to develop it is discovered to exist.

There is a vast difference between a creedal definition

or a philosophical doctrine of God and the God who is the object of a living conviction. And the psychologist is interested primarily in living human attitudes. He may have interest in the origin of the belief in God, but his interest in the origin of a belief cannot be other than secondary to his interest in the cause of a sustained and abiding itself. He can very well leave a consideration of origins to the historian and anthropologist.

Professor Pratt, following Bain, classifies belief in God into four divisions, indicating the underlying causes of such types of belief. The first of these is the habitual, or authoritative, belief. It may be what Professor James characterized as "faith in someone else's faith" or faith in an accepted source of authority, such as the Church or the Bible or general opinion. A second type of faith is the reasoned type, which consists of an accepted belief, supported by argument. The third type of belief is denominated the affective type. Belief in God adds an emotional quality to the accepted idea of God. The fourth type of belief in God is the faith that arises from deliberate cultivation.

What are the psychological essentials in the idea of God as an object of belief? This question is raised concerning the living conviction of God's reality rather than any theoretical conception of God. It seems to me that they are of two kinds.

To define or conceive or objectify God in any way necessitates the use of anthropomorphic terms. As a matter of fact, He is so conceived and attitudes are taken toward Him with reference to His anthropomorphic attributes. These anthropomorphic attributes are physical, social and psychological. To some people God is thought of as having human form. In times

past in some religions He has even been imagined in animal form. Also, He possesses physiological functions. In a monarchy God is likely to be thought of as a King. Jesus represented God as a Father. The highest personal idea of God is gained by projecting and enlarging the notion of human personality.

The idea of God is both imaginative and conceptual. The imaginative idea makes for definiteness, vividness and vitality. The religions that make large use of the imagination have a strong prestige with the multitudes. Idolatry makes for definiteness and immediate intensity of religious devotion, but tends toward religious immaturity, superstition and low ethical levels.

On the other hand, conceptual thinking concerning God, if not carried to extreme, tends toward the rationalizing of religion, spiritualization and moralization. But if it becomes depleted of all imaginative content, it works a religious paralysis and frequently leads to atheism. Professor Pratt tells the story of an honest deacon who confessed in prayer meeting that his idea of God was a kind of "oblong blur." And Professor Swain, of Yale, tells the story of a minister's wife who stated that by refining her conceptions of God she had left to her a God that was so vague and attenuated that she could get no help from Him.

In the second place, the idea of God as we find it in living convictions is pragmatic. By that I mean that it is an idea evolved in response to human needs, the needs of heart and conscience. The living God enshrined in the heart of human faith is a God of values. But this God is not merely a God of values, a subjective God in the minds of men, as Professor Ames and Irving King contend. The dynamic God of religion is objectified. He embodies ideal conceptions,

ideal needs and values, but it requires a sincere belief in an objective Deity, "a power not ourselves," to keep religion alive.

Not only is it true that religion rests upon a continued belief in a real God, but this belief must satisfy persistent human needs. Professor Leuba, with keen insight into this phase of religion, has with great penetration and understanding uncovered the essential attributes of a useful God who can sustain a vital religion. He must be a spiritual agent, a psychical being who can do something for the worshiper. The conception of a static God can have no religious significance, whatever its significance may be for philosophy.

In the second place, this God must be superhuman. Comte's Church of Humanity failed because of this limitation of his God. No generalization or mythical representation of humanity can command for any very long time a sustained religious devotion.

And God must be conceived as causally adequate for all emergencies. Insufficiency is an intolerable idea in connection with divinity.

There are those who refuse to believe in God because they cannot see Him. But Professor Leuba wisely points out that men will ultimately cease to believe in a God that they do see. Invisibility is a prime requisite of an enduring God. Religion thrives on the vision of the invisible. Jesus as visible in the flesh had far less power with his disciples than Jesus as an invisible presence. He realized that it would be so and deemed it expedient that he go away.

But invisibility must not be thought of as inaccessibility. Men must feel that they have an approach to the divine presence. They wish to come into fellowship with the object of their belief. Herbert Spencer

thought he had made a great discovery when he put forth the doctrine of the Unknowable and argued that it was the kind of God that would satisfy man's appetite for the mysterious. But the lure of mystery is the hope of discovery. There can be no sustained interest in a hypothecated unknowable. Such a God is utterly unapproachable.

Finally, men believe in a God who exercises benevolence toward men. That is the kind of God they need and the only kind of God they will give serious consideration. Only in its primitive stages does religion recognize evil deities. The final God of humanity must be a good God.

BELIEF IN A HEREAFTER.—I have used the phrase "belief in a hereafter" advisedly. Belief in immortality is a less accurate phrase. Immortality has the strict meaning of deathlessness or immunity from death. It implies a belief in the essential indestructibility of the human soul. There are many religious people who believe in survival after death, either universally or by a limited number, who do not accept the notion of an inherent immortality in the human organism. And there are those who accept the Christian doctrine of resurrection without at the same time accepting the idea of immortality for the human soul. Belief in life beyond death is not necessarily synonymous with belief in immortality.

One of the most interesting aspects of the belief in a future life is its persistence. It may wax and wane, but it never dies. Of course, that offers no argument for the validity of the belief, but it stands out clearly as a psychological characteristic, indicating the power of the idea in the life of the race. And it offers a starting point of approach for a philosophical examination

which may yield results of a valid character. It is certain that a belief that is vital and tenacious cannot be lightly dismissed. Also a study of such a belief will surely lead into the inner courts of human nature.

There are those who, like Professor Santayana, cannot believe in the future life as an experience to be actually realized, who have rather pathetically labored to bring forth substitutes with which they evidently console themselves and which they offer to others. Some have even gone as far as calling them forms of immortality. For example, there is the idea of a biological immortality. It is argued that one may project his life forward by means of offspring that will carry the characteristics of his life on and transmit them to succeeding generations. But a little analysis easily dissipates such a notion as that of biological immortality. In the first place, if life might be prolonged through such a process, there would be no immortality in the fact unless we could assume that the human race would go on forever, an assumption attended with even more difficulties than the assumption of the immortality of the individual. In the next place, a strict account of the facts of generation reveals that in its processes it is not the life of the parent that is transmitted, but the potentialities of the life of the offspring. It is not the set of characteristics of the parent that the stream of heredity carries forward, but a set of similarities. There is here neither survival nor immortality.

Another substitute for this belief has been called social immortality. But that disappears with analysis just as quickly and as surely as the other substitute. It is the idea that we may preserve ourselves by investing ourselves in social movements and institutions.

There is in the idea a valuable truth of a poetic character, but it has no bearing on the question of survival of death. If we could be assured that human institutions would never come to an end, the idea would have greater significance, but even then it would be a mere preservation of results in a line of causation. It would not be a real extension of life.

Our intellectual respect must go out to those who are willing to grapple with doubt and who are willing to face facts squarely. In the last analysis, one either believes in a hereafter or does not. When he does not, frankness is as commendable as in any other connection. Feeding hungry hearts on husks is rather doubtful business.

Men and women look forward to a life after death as under one of three general conditions of existence. The most widely accepted and most primitive idea is that of individual survival, either with or without the restoration of the body. Also this is the most definite and valuable idea. No one can successfully deny this. The second idea regards the individual as absorbed at death into the life of the Infinite Ground of Reality. A third view regards the individual as continuing his own existence as a manifestation of a phase of the life of the Absolute. Concerning the second idea, it is difficult to see very much more in it than the spiritualization of the law of the conservation of energy, or law which Professor J. Arthur Thomson has pronounced "little more than a pious assumption." And it certainly involves disintegration of personality or the merging of identity with a larger identity. To call that immortality or survival of death is almost as forlorn as looking forward to a survival in indestructible atoms or cells or in the vegetation that might make use of the

chemical elements composing our bodies. It is a kind of strain on logic to call it immortality. The third idea is consistent with a certain type of philosophy. It is simply the application of an interpretation of this life to the life that is believed to go on after death.

I recognize that I am moving among big ideas very swiftly and making but scanty observations by the way, but the character of the general discussion determines the method. I shall close this chapter with a consideration of the psychological foundations of a belief in a hereafter. The suggestion of Professor Pratt, previously applied to a consideration of a belief in God, proves equally useful in this connection.

Primitive credulity and authority lie at the basis of a belief in a future life. Indeed, it is not belief in the continuance of life, but disbelief, that must be acquired. The child has a natural tendency to accept the persistence of life and the discovery of death comes with the force of a shock. Therefore, we may be said to start life with a presumption in favor of its perpetuity. And upon this basis it seems the most natural thing in the world to have a belief in immortality arise. Perhaps dreams and hallucinations have made contribution to the imaginative aspect of the belief. Authority has settled the conceptual forms that constitute our working faith in immortality until it is revised by reason. Habit has given us the custom background of all the various beliefs and helped to determine the direction of development.

When the plane of argument is reached, the type of reasoning takes the form of "rationalization." But that is not different from the reasoning that supports any belief, religious or non-religious. The most convincing arguments are the arguments that mind, being

of a different order of reality from the body, will not share with the body the processes of disintegration that ensue from death and the argument that the evolution of temporary beings, of such an ephemeral and evanescent character as some earthly lives indicate, would be indicative of cosmic futility. The latter argument, when related to a belief in God, makes God's laborious work of evolving the climax of creation through long centuries of development, only to snuff it out at the end, an utterly unthinkable performance.

Emotionally the belief is grounded in a sense of bereavement and loss and in a desire for a fuller life. Professor Coe has shown that the more primitive belief in survival is a fear reaction, a belief in ghosts from which there is a shrinking. And he shows that in the emotional development the belief is not grounded primarily in a desire for extended life and a shrinking from dissolution, but in a desire to immortalize the loved and lost. He has given expression to his view in the following beautiful language:

The question, "Do men desire immortality?" is ambiguous. It may mean, "Do I desire an extension of consciousness merely as mine?" or "Do I desire to be a permanent part of a permanent society?" One who answers emphatically "Yes!" to the latter question may well say "NO!" to the former. Now, the whole conduct of men shows that the personal-social relationships that they most enjoy they do desire to continue. One does not willingly lose friend A, even if one is convinced that an equally good friend, B, is ready to take A's place. Love individualizes the object to which it attaches itself, so that some of the value

is lost if the individual perishes. Moreover, immortality, or something like it, is desired for great souls who have made the social struggle their own—souls like Lincoln, for example. Nobody is willing to have such a person dissolved. If we assent to the dissolution, it is because we feel helpless to prevent it. But even then we commemorate our friend and hero in anniversaries that reawaken or create a sense of fellowship as in the cause of liberty. More than this, by these processes we incorporate him into our communal life as a permanent force. This does not of itself imply that we believe him immortal or that we are trying to bestow some form of immortality upon him, but rather that fellowship with him is so precious that every trace of it is as far as possible preserved—we would have him live if we could and we would stay in his society if we could. This process is carried only a step farther, if even a step, in the faith of several religions that their founder remains after his death as the actual living leader of his people. When Christians cling passionately, as many do, to the “living Christ,” they bear witness to this, at least, that Jesus is to them so satisfying a personality that he deserves to live forevermore.¹

The citing of the above does not mean to imply anything illegitimate or unworthy in the desire for a continuation of personal existence. And this desire is normally one of the elements in the emotional ground of the belief in a future life.

'Tis life whereof our nerves are scant,
Free life and fuller that we want.

¹ *Psychology of Religion*, pp. 295-96.

This utterance of Tennyson voices an almost universal longing. Where the desire is not present, there has been a disappointment with the life that now is; a disenchantment and weariness or an unpromising picture of what the future life might mean interferes with the working of the normal desire.

Death meets men in the form of a challenge which furnishes a volitional stimulus to a belief in survival. Goethe's famous question, "Do you think a coffin can impose on me?" is indicative of how men of ambition meet the challenge of death. Dr. L. P. Jacks says that death throws a mantle of futility over all human endeavor and argues that men must find a faith that will span the chasm of the graves before life can be worth the living. I think he is right. We must either find a faith in a future life or take the attitude of Bertrand Russell, facing death "with an unflinching and unyielding despair."

OTHER OBJECTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF.—Belief in God and in a future life are the main religious beliefs. Other beliefs are subordinate and incidental. A future life implies a theater for its activities. The life of those who have achieved salvation, or have received it, is regarded as carried on in the region of heaven, and a life that fails of salvation is thought of as spent in hell. And there are those who believe in a midway region of a purgatory or intermediate state which finally culminates in heaven or hell. Belief in a devil could have originated in primitive man's fear reaction toward the supernatural. Evil deities have been common conceptions in many religions. Philosophically the belief has probably arisen through the personification of the forces of evil. In Zoroastrianism, a very highly developed religion, we find an eternal dualism of good and

evil in the main principles of good and evil, which have been named Ahura-Mazda and Ahriman. The belief in angels is highly imaginative in character and might have some historical connection with animism. All religious beliefs have their psychological basis, whether helpful or hurtful, whether true or false. They are called out by external stimulus or evolved out of inner need or evoked incidentally and sometimes inexplicably out of the creative fertility of the imagination. And after they become facts of experience, as we have noted elsewhere, they become forms of motivation for conduct.

CHAPTER VII

RELIGIOUS THINKING

DEFINITION.—Thinking, in its simplest sense, is the association of ideas. That is the widest and most general definition that can be offered. Thinking may become the relating of ideas with reference to a purpose or plan, or scheme. Thinking may go higher and become the comparison of ideas with ideas, and the grouping of ideas into systems of thought. When thinking rises to the discriminative plane, it becomes intellectual. It is on the way to knowledge. At the conclusion of one of his lectures on knowing as an aspect of experience, I asked Professor Dewey to state the difference between thinking and knowing. He replied, "Thinking will be knowing if it doesn't get stuck on the way."

Religious thinking is of course the thought processes that deal with the facts of religion. It is the association of ideas that have some sort of connection with the subject of religion.

Religion is not wholly a matter of ideas, but every religion has a system of ideas. Ideas play a part in the vaguest and dimmest religious consciousness. And religious consciousness does not proceed a great distance until it becomes reflective. As this reflection progresses, dogmas appear, and are set down as recognized propositions of religious truth, or what is regarded as

religious truth. As this reflection deepens still further, it gives rise to the philosophy of religion and systematic theology. Religion follows the trend of life development as a whole. Life, as it advances, becomes more and more ideational and reflective, and therefore self-conscious.

The intellect ought forever to control the religious life. As has just been suggested, there is more in religion than ideas, theories, beliefs and plans. There are the feelings, but those feelings must be interpreted, and directed, and related to the whole of experience. There is the will, but the will must be made intelligent. It must not become the following of blind impulse. There is the imagination, but imagination without the critical aid of reflective intelligence will run wild. There are the inherited capacities, but those inherited capacities must be correlated with spiritual ideals and regulated by spiritual principles. The supreme and dominant aspect of religion is forever and always the intellectual aspect. Reason is regnant and cannot be removed from her throne without a resultant catastrophe.

KINDS OF THINKING.—Dr. James Harvey Robinson has very pertinently and wisely pointed out the fact that there are various kinds of thinking. The failure to recognize this fact, and to carry the recognition into discussion, has rendered very much of the thought about thought inadequate and not very instructive.

(1) *Reverie*.—Perhaps the greater bulk of human thinking may be denominated reverie. It is uncontrolled thinking, the free association of ideas. The mind is set adrift on the sea of experience without a hand upon the helm. Whatever the waves toss up, whatever may come in the path of the drifting, is the thought result. All our minds are turned loose in that

fashion very much more than we like to admit. Some minds are in that state pretty much all the time.

That reverie is a valuable state of mind there is no question. It is well to have some day-dreaming, some fancy, some chance drifting. We need at times to let our imagination have pretty free reign, but not all the time. It is needless to say that this state of reverie, except for furnishing material for after-reflection, makes a very small contribution to the sum total of knowledge.

In the field of religion this sort of thinking has had a large part, with some wild and grotesque results. This has been especially true of mystical experiences. The tendency to take the imaginings of the mind in the uncritical processes of free association of ideas as divine guidances, as the sure evidence of the presence of God and the voicing of His will, has led many honest souls into the wildest absurdities. We need to take into consideration the fact that our minds are all the time throwing up into consciousness all kinds of ideas, and perhaps the majority of them strange and foolish. They must be assorted and tested by the powers of controlled reason working according to the laws of intelligence.

(2) *Rationalization*.—Akin to reverie, frequently the champion and defender of its findings, is the kind of thinking that has been given the name "rationalization." It is the process of building up a course of reasoning to sustain ourselves in going on believing as we already believe. Certain beliefs are espoused, certain opinions adopted, certain positions taken; we set out to sustain ourselves by argument in the possession of those beliefs and opinions.

The reasoning of rationalization is often the reason-

ing of self-justification. And, as Dr. Robinson has suggested, good and sufficient reasons may be offered for the possession and retention of an opinion which are not the real reasons. One may belong to the Republican party or to the Methodist Church and offer very plausible and convincing reasons for belonging. But the real reason may be quite different. It may be that he began voting the Republican ticket because his father voted it before him and that he joined the Methodist Church because he happened to live near a Methodist Church when he was a boy.

I recognize the vicious possibilities in rationalization, but I do not share Dr. Robinson's unsparing condemnation of this form of thinking. I can see a legitimate place for it. Sometimes it may be useful and sometimes necessary. The mind throws out hazards, or conjectures, without any logical foundation that can be discovered, and then tests them out. The work of science to which Dr. Robinson pays such high compliment has not always been based on pure experiment. Many of its explanations have been drawn out of the imagination and then tested to see if they could be supported by sufficient experimental evidence and argument to be sustained as theories. The rationalization of hypotheses is certainly rationalization, but it has proved itself to be a very useful sort of rationalization.

Then there are those experiences that we cannot explain by which we come into the possession of a conviction. The hypothesis of the working of a subconscious mind has been offered. That might be the true explanation; but, whatever the explanation, there is no doubt about the experience. F. W. Boreham treats it in his essay on "A Woman's Reason." We arrive at conclusions and then find reasons for support-

ing them. We come to feel that things are so and find our reasons afterward. Often our conclusions are unassailable, though we have reached them by faulty logical processes or by none at all. We just feel that they are true. We cannot tell why. Any reasoning to support such conclusions as this is rationalization, but it is an inevitable rationalization and I see no way of getting around it. The danger lies in the failure to recognize rationalization as rationalization. Unless it be recognized and stand out in the mind for what it actually is, it may lead to all kinds of fallacies.

(3) *The Reasoning of Expediency*.—There is a kind of thinking which is direct and immediate in character, which deals with practical issues and adjustments. It is the application of intelligence to the business of keeping alive. It is the reasoning of expediency. This kind of thinking has its legitimate and useful place in the religious life. Jesus admonished his disciples to be "as wise as serpents and as harmless as doves." Paul used a great deal of practical shrewdness, both in getting himself out of difficult situations and in getting Christianity established in strategic places. Oftentimes the way in which a religious leader handles a concrete situation will have far-reaching consequences in the character and development of the religious movement of which he is a part.

(4) *Creative Thought*.—In many ways the most important kind of thinking is the thinking of creative intelligence. That is constructive intellection, the kind of thinking that makes a positive contribution to the world's life. Invention, discovery, art, literature, science, are the output of productive intelligence. That is the intelligence that does things, that modifies the world of men and things by its impact.

Religion has furnished a fruitful field of labor for creative minds. It has required inventive genius and statesmanship to fashion its devices and to plan its campaigns and perfect its organizations. And the need is not a thing of the past. There must be a constant readjustment, readaptation and reconstruction through the years to come. Religion furnishes a field of limitless exploration for the discovery of new truth and new methods of operation. Religion has been in the past the inspiration of the finest sculptures, painting, music and architecture; and as long as the human mind has an æsthetic aspect and religion is a field of supreme interest, its realm will call for artistic expression. Religion has been the inspiration and soul of the highest literature of the past. It holds within its domain the supreme values of the human heart. Literature reflects life, and religion is life at its highest. Science and religion are not opposed and it is impossible to keep them apart. Science deals with established truth. There is nothing so vital to religion as established truth unless it is faith, and science cannot get anywhere without faith. Moreover, there is a proper field for religious science, and religion stands sorely in need of getting itself scientifically grounded.

(5) *Criticism*—But the intelligence that must preside over all other thinking is criticism. It must sift conclusions; it must weigh results; it must inspect devices; it must judge productions; it must test out hypotheses; it must prove all things and hold fast that which is good. It is corrective intelligence.

The intellect has a subordinate place in the religion of the common man. It is completely overshadowed by the emotions and imagination, especially the latter. The process of critical thinking is difficult and dis-

turbing. Men like to have their religion as a sanctuary of peace. They love to think of it as a realm where things are settled and sure. They shrink from carrying into this sacred realm the questions which disturb their complacent trust. They do not like to worry over such questions. This explains the general desire for a standard of external authority. Men shrink from settling questions of religious belief, of moral duty and of general propriety at the bar of reason and conscience. And the overconservative religious thinker has approved this disposition and sanctified it as simple, trusting faith. It is the minister's solemn duty, as well as his most difficult task, to quicken the thought life of his people and keep them gouged and prodded out of their intellectual lethargy with respect to religious truth. The unquestioning faith, so freely commended by the pious reactionary, is the sleep of death; and if there is an awakening before the earthly journey is over, it will probably be one of tragedy, disillusionment, and hard skepticism. Doubt is quite as important and quite as useful, in proper proportion, as faith in the development of a well-grounded, well-rounded and well-ordered religious experience. Constructive and corrective skepticism has its place. We need it to keep us from being overcredulous, overemotional and given to superstition. We need it to make us carefully test the materials of religious experience, properly appreciate them and rightly apply them.

We cannot go forward with a developing and enlarging religious intelligence without undergoing a constant modification of opinion. The human mind is synthetic in its functioning. It loves comprehensive systems, and it accordingly takes the materials of thought and builds them into systems. And it has a constitu-

tional dislike for parting with its own creations. There is an egotistic tendency within us to keep permanent the results of our own thinking. But this may become fatal to progress. In the course of the development of the Christian religion a system of dogma has been built up. In the earlier periods of the development of this system of doctrine, there was great freedom and vitality in Christian thinking and in Christian experience, generally speaking. But after this growing body of opinion had hardened and crystallized into set forms, the attitude was taken that this was an absolute and permanent deposit of truth, placed by divine decree in the custody of divinely chosen custodians. Immediately the church set about resisting change in religious ideas. And all progress that has taken place in Christian thinking since that time has met with resistance. Protestantism was a revolt. Its spirit was originally the spirit of religious liberty. But Protestantism has developed its own systems of established belief that have champions who resist change, and thus resist progress. All truth is eternal when universal relations are considered, but not all opinions or systems of opinion are permanent. There are very few propositions that are eternally established as truth. The progressive thinker lives on the line of perpetual discovery, and must continually revise his interpretations of reality according to his own ever-widening horizon.

ABSORPTION IN NON-ESSENTIALS.—It is a curious and pathetic fact that a vast amount of religious thinking has been wasted on non-essentials. Volumes have been written concerning questions that do not matter. It is a sign of religious vigor when the intellectual efforts of religious thinkers is directed toward the consideration of big and vital questions, the main and

fundamental issues of religion. Speculative questions have their value. The reaching of conclusions concerning matters that lie within the speculative realm helps to give the soul peace and the intellect a sustaining philosophy. But the questions of larger importance are the questions that attach to the main certainties of existence and the practical relations of life.

THE INTELLECT OF JESUS.—Let us turn to the mind of Christ for illustration. Dr. H. H. Horne, of New York University, says concerning the qualities of the intellect of the Master that, "His thinking was intuitive rather than discursive or argumentative; concrete rather than abstract; positive rather than negative; creative rather than critical." Jesus was direct in his thinking. He had no time to be otherwise. He had a great message of vital truth to deliver. He could not stop to argue about it, and arguing about it would not have been wise. It was mainly truth to be tested by practice. He was dealing with life as he found it. He was offering men new and different ideals that would transform life. His business was the redemption of human beings that needed new spiritual life. He came that men might have life and have it more abundantly. He could not, therefore, express his purpose in a gospel of repression. He must preach doctrines of positive promise and furnish a program of positive actuality. There was a sense in which his whole program was a criticism of his age and of the past, but it was a criticism which offered a new view of life and furnished a new doctrine of existence. It did not so much contradict the religion of the past as transcend it.

Now, when we compare the intellectual method of Jesus with that of most of the thinkers of the Church down to the present day, do we not find a rather striking

contrast? He is direct while they are discursive. He is delightfully concrete, while they abound in dry abstractions. He is positive, seeking to set up a new righteousness that will overcome sin, while they are negative and advocate the destruction of sin by repressive measures. He is creative and offers a far-reaching program of human redemption, while they spend their time making men of straw and attacking them. Only in recent years has there arisen a school of Christian thought that has undertaken to think through a program of social salvation based on his teachings of the Kingdom of God. And there has been found a saving remnant in the church that is giving itself to the scientific adjustment of the Christian life to the world in which it is lived in its practical relations. This is the modern religious education movement. No religious development since the founding of Christianity is so significant as this discovery that the religious intellect has been playing around the fringes and neglecting its supreme task, the working out of a practical program of Christian living that will realize in its completeness the ideals of Jesus. We have quite a great deal of critical thought, perhaps not enough, but a great deal. We have a superabundance of theological speculation. But Christianity needs actually to be tried out on life. This has never been adequately done. It is the supreme task of Christian intelligence. It is the place for the functioning of the intellect after the mind of Christ.

CHAPTER VIII

ETHICIZED RELIGION

RELIGION AND MORALITY.—When we are born into the world, we are plunged into a realm of concrete demands, responsibilities, restrictions and duties. We do not begin life on the basis of ideal principles. In the process of life's development, as we work out our life philosophy, we seek to give our conduct a rational foundation and more and more we spiritualize our morality. The process of the spiritualization of our conduct, the development of moral ideals and principles, is the process that we call ethical development. The set of ideals and principles that constitute the philosophy of conduct we give the name of ethics.

There have been many and lengthy discussions concerning the relation of ethics and religion. There have even been attempts to completely identify them. The argument has usually run along to the effect that no man could be fully religious unless he were completely moral, or completely moral unless he were fully religious. True as that statement may be, as an actual fact that there is a distinction to be made between religion and ethics. It is perhaps true to say that, in the concrete cases of religious experience and moral life, we do not find people fully religious nor do we find them completely moral. Religion has peculiar reference to an order of reality beyond the world of immediate experience. It is true that it undertakes to relate

the world of more immediate reality to the world of higher reality, but the emphasis of religion is on the world of higher reality. But morality—and morality idealized and spiritualized is unchanged in this respect—puts its emphasis upon the facts and activities of our immediate world and our present life.

NON-MORAL RELIGION.—Religion in its lowest terms is certainly connected with all the little and intimate details of everyday life, but even there it has a bearing in the direction of something that lies beyond the immediate. The dominant fact in this early religious condition is the sense of a governing potency whose sanction and aid is to be invoked. But the religion of these lower levels is blurred so that it is difficult to distinguish the two. While the customs and taboos seem to have a religious sanction, when we delve deeper into the matter, we find that the force behind custom—other than the pressure of primitive society—is the fear of the magical influences of revengeful spirits. And the mere pressure of society, as well as this fear of evil consequences, is not essentially ethical. That is to say, it does not consider the rights and wrongs of the case but only advantage and disadvantage.

It is quite possible, even in the more advanced stages, to divorce religion and morality to a very great extent. If this does not seem logically possible, we may reply that life is not governed entirely, or even preponderantly, by logic, and what is logically inconsistent is not only psychologically possible but actual. We may wonder why it is possible for the man in business to use practices in his daily business life that are inconsistent with the ethics of Christianity and at the same time seem to be spiritually fervent and religiously devoted on Sunday. But we overlook some very important

facts. For one thing, the devotional aspect is only one aspect of the religious life. We may have that phase of our religious character well developed and be defective in respect to other phases. This business man who is unethical in his week-day practices may be entirely sincere in his Sunday devotions. He has not sufficiently ethicized his religious experience. He has succeeded in keeping certain religious values unrelated. The moral values of his religious experience are out of proportion with the devotional values. In the same way the Southern negro may steal chickens and engage quite earnestly and sincerely in religious exercises, even on the same evening. He is able to appropriate the emotional satisfactions of religious experience without allowing himself to be hampered by its moral demands and restrictions. He is not necessarily hypocritical. It is a question of selective attention, and the moral values have not yet come sufficiently into the field of attention. There are many religions in the world to-day, some of them hoary with age, that have quite completely, or almost completely, kept clear of morality. They have to do with other kinds of satisfaction. They seek to offer consolation and explanation and peace without at all assuming that righteousness is a vital element of the religious life. Some religions are not merely lacking in moral development; but are positively immoral. Their practices are immoral and degrading and affront the human conscience, even of the worshipers. I mean to say there is sometimes a felt contradiction between the moral conscience and the religious conscience. There are some gods that are regarded as immoral and are worshiped by base and degrading forms of service in order to please that divinity which is regarded as having a character that is loose

and vicious. Evil deities have their place in religion and their effect in working demoralization.

It is also true that a religion may have high moral ideals so mixed with vicious traditions and corrupting superstitions that those moral ideals have little chance to get in their work of ennobling human nature. They may be kept in a secondary and remote background of thought and feeling that keeps them out of power and influence. They may be regarded as sublime and beautiful for poetic moods, splendid as superficial sentiments that get no real command of life, but chimerical and impractical in the actual facing of facts. Thus regarded they become hopelessly ineffective. The moral principles of a religion must get down into everyday living before they become anything more than futile measures. The only hope of such a religion that has a worthy set of moral principles is to undergo a resetting in the minds of its followers in such a way that those principles may become operative. A religion that cannot ultimately satisfy the demand of the human soul for moral completeness is doomed to extinction. The moral values are supreme.

The Christian religion, as set forth by Jesus, undertakes to be a complete moral system. All its fundamental relationships are moral relationships. It starts with man and man's social relationships and, from that standpoint, approaches relationship to God. It regards man as living in a moral world and having certain moral relationships that are supreme considerations for a program of living. Man's first assumption must be his obligation to his fellows. Christianity starts with that assumption: "If ye love not man whom ye have seen, how can you love God whom ye have not seen"; "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least

of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." Religion is, from the Christian point of view, an extension of morality. It is morally extended until it includes God within the system or scheme of moral relationships. Man's relation to God is regarded as moral and God's relation to man is regarded as moral. Mutual rights and obligations are assumed.

THE IDEA OF GOD IN THE MORALIZATION OF RELIGION.—The ethical development in religious experience has corresponded with the development of the idea of God. The ethicizing of the idea of God marks the ethical progress in religious development. In tracing the connection of moral and religious development Professor Hobhouse shows how the development of the idea of God has influenced ethical development:

The same development may be described from a converse point of view by altering the question, and instead of inquiring into the basis of early morality, asking what is the ethical character of early religion. The reply will be that in the first stage we find that spirits, as such, are not concerned with morality, though some spirits by their position may be affected by certain kinds of conduct which they resent. In the second stage we find spirits whose essential function is to preside over certain branches of the law, and as development proceeds, they become servants of gods, who supervise morals generally. Yet even at this stage, gods are not always, or necessarily, perfect beings; if there are some who represent physical and moral ideals, there are others who exhibit not only the evil passions of contemporary men, but also some

of the darkest practices of primitive humanity which their own worshipers have outgrown. Some gods are good, but goodness is not yet the essential attribute of God.¹

The history of the development of religion, as touching ethical development, indicates that morality did not rise to the plane of ideals and principles sooner than the people came into the possession of a spiritual conception of God.

The most important fact, therefore, for the moral development of religion is the idea of God. If the ideas of God prevailing among a people are consistent with a high moral ideal, the power of that religion for lifting up and ennobling life is immeasurable; but if the ideas of God are morally low and base, or even normally indifferent, the degrading and demoralizing effect of religion is immeasurably bad. The value of a religion may be estimated in terms of the proportion of the moral elements of that religion to the non-moral and immoral elements.

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE.—The word conscience is a good illustration of how words change their meaning in the evolution of a language. Conscience originally meant just about what the word consciousness now means. The French have retained that significance, but the English word has undergone a great shift in meaning. From knowing with respect to an ideal or standard, a later usage than the original, it has come to stand for the functioning of moral judgment. For many it stands almost exclusively for the feeling aspect of moral judgment. I prefer to make it cover both the judgment and its emotional accompaniments.

¹ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 448.

I have in mind one psychologist who regards conscience as the voice of repressed good. That seems to me to be narrowing the word down to an unwarranted compass. Conscience is the functioning of the mind in passing judgment with reference to right and wrong together with an emotional sense of oughtness with reference to what is felt to be right. Psychologically, it is moral judgment plus a feeling of oughtness plus an impulse toward what is judged to be right. The whole experience of the functioning of conscience covers these facts, and if a temptation is present in the form of an impulse counter to the moral judgment, there is also a sense of conflict.

Conscience may also be recognized and defined as the internal, or conscious, aspect of moral volition either as an antecedent process or as a consequence of conduct. In what we may call conscience we find the capacity to pass judgment with regard to the ideas of right and wrong, to make choices of courses of conduct with reference to those ideas, together with a felt pressure toward what is conceived to be right.

Conscience is a fact of experience. There may be wide differences of opinion as to its nature and origin, but the fact exists undeniably in experience. The philosophy of conscience is a different matter from the experience. You may accept Kant's doctrine of the categorical imperative; you may agree with the scholastics in their doctrine of *synderesis*; you may ground it in habits of thought or association of ideas; you may dissolve it into various phases of mental phenomena, which constitute the activity, or functioning, called conscience; you may give the experience a label or leave the label off; whatever you do, you cannot escape recognizing the fact of definite attitudes of will with

reference to right and wrong and the presence of an imperative, or sense of oughtness, exerting pressure in the direction of what is judged to be right. Of course, conscience is not an entity or faculty. It is a distinction in thought, a recognized phase of the functioning of the mental life.

Conscience has been thought of as "antecedent" and as "sequent." The "sequent" conscience is merely conscience acting with relation to things of the past, producing remorse, regret and possibly repentance. The experience is described by Tennyson in "Sea Dreams":

He that wrongs his friend
Wrongs himself more; and ever bears about
A silent court of justice in his breast,
Himself the judge and jury, and himself
The prisoner at the bar, ever condemned;
And that drags down his life.

Conscience thus viewed is primarily emotional, involving the emotions of regret, remorse, shame and fear. It is intellectual in that it recognizes values and passes judgment according to principles. It may bear volitional fruit in subsequent conduct. The volitional fruitage is called repentance.

We may approach the idea of conscience from another angle and consider its psychological constituents under more exact and more modern terms—sentiments, complexes and dispositions. These more recent psychological terms refer to psychological constellations containing two factors, an internal tendency and an idea taken from environment. Those constellations which we consciously accept we call sentiments. Patriotism is a sentiment containing the idea of our country and certain emotions and tendencies attached to the idea. Those constellations which we

unconsciously accept we call dispositions. A man who has a high regard for honor will find himself unconsciously responding in the emergencies of life to the sway of the idea. Those constellations which are rejected as unacceptable we call complexes. Complexes may be otherwise distinguished and defined, but this statement of their nature holds good. The sentiments, dispositions and complexes at work make up the functioning called conscience. They all enter into the motivation of conduct.

THE MANNER OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT.—But how were the ideas of right and wrong generated? They came by evolution. Life went into action. Individually habits were built up, and socially customs were established. These came about as the results of the interaction of life with the physical and social environment. And the individual and social consciences were brought into being very much in the same way that language was evolved. Habit and custom established standards out of the material of impulse activity, and intelligence slowly criticized, corrected and revised the forms and standards of conduct. Individual experience, mental development and accumulated knowledge have all been factors involved in establishing and revising standards. There have never been any fixed and unchangeable standards of human conduct, and no absolute moral ideals have been definitely adopted. There have been moral principles that have met all emergencies and that seem to be adequate for all future emergencies, but they must stand the test of future experience. Farther than this we cannot go psychologically, but philosophy has much more to say on the subject. From our human standpoint, we see the moral ideal ever changing and ever enlarging.

Moral conscience is a growing fact. It develops by bringing more and more objects and activities within the moral realm. It develops by bringing more and more people under the sway of a socially developed moral system.

FUNCTIONAL COÖRDINATION.—If religion and morality have had distinct lines of development, they have been coördinated. They need further coördination. They have a natural affinity. Religious faith, the sense of the eternal, the notion of life stretching into an everlasting future, give to morality a dynamic, a soul, a ground of intensity, a stability, a reality. Morality as connected with religion is religion's noblest and most spiritual aspect. And religious evolution is more and more toward an identification of one with the other, toward a religion that represents morality completed and perfected.

CHAPTER IX

CONVERSION: RELIGIOUS MENTAL TRANSFORMATION

THE TRANSFORMATION OF MIND.—One of the encouraging and hopeful facts of life to all who are laboring for a better human world is the possibility of changing mind, altering its character, transforming it. There has long been in existence the notion that human nature in its essentials is a permanent and fixed thing, that all minds are built according to set patterns, patterns that conform to racial variety, but which so firmly determine the character of set lines of mental life that no radical transformation can possibly take place. This idea persists very stubbornly and strenuously; but in spite of that the thought of the world is shifting around, or over, to another view. It is gradually being recognized that human nature is just about the most changing and changeable thing there is. Along with the idea of the unchanging nature of humanity has persisted the idea that the individual character becomes at certain stages of development unalterable and firmly set in a state of inflexible fixity. There is admittedly a tendency in that direction, but to say that the mind may be so thoroughly set in a definite mold that it cannot undergo radical transformation is to say too much. Moreover, there is great need, for the sake of lifting life to higher levels, of radical transformation in both the social and the individual mind, in the character of peoples and in the

character of persons. Professor John Dewey, on his return from the Orient, is reported to have said, "The real problems of the Pacific is the problem of the transformation of the mind of China, of the capacity of the oldest and most complicated civilization of the globe to remake itself into the new forms required by the impact of immense alien forces." I think this is a great statement and I wish to suggest that what is needed for China is the same thing that is needed by the individual mind in confronting the exigencies of life. And the problem of religious ministry is to affect the needed transformation, both individually and socially.

THE LAW OF PERSONAL COMPLETENESS.—I have mentioned in another connection the organization of personality. In this connection I wish to say that the development of personality follows the law of completeness, and that redemption consists in making life whole. Jesus had that conception of redemption and emphasized it. Whether it is regarded as the restoration of lost powers, remedying defects in character, or putting undeveloped life under the conditions where it may fill out to maturity, redemption may be regarded as the process of making life whole. It is, therefore, in line with fundamental organic tendencies.

DISORGANIZATION OF PERSONALITY.—By the overuse of particular impulses, the mental and moral system may be thrown into conflict and disorganization. Emotional complexes are formed within the system, and these tangled masses of conflicting impulses and desires form psychical sores on the personal life that hinder a full and harmonious functioning of life forces. Evil has a functional character. It is the maladjustment of life forces. It has a positive reality. It is not a mere negative good, but a positive disorganization of life.

But its reality is functional and not existential. Sin is the deliberate choice of a low ideal and has the worst possible effect in disorganizing moral personality. It has no existence in itself, but it stands for havoc wrought in moral life by vicious choices.

REORGANIZATION OF PERSONALITY.—Personality that is disorganized must be reorganized. The soul must be reborn. That which Jesus so emphatically asserted centuries ago is now taught openly to-day, not as a religious doctrine but as a psychological need, by such psychologists as Dr. Hadfield and Dr. Maurice Nicoll of the recent Freudian School of psychoanalysis. Dr. Hadfield shows how the need of such a process has been felt and symbolized in human experience for centuries. The Phoenix, wandering from the home altar through the world and returning after a thousand years to be consumed on the altar, that out of the ashes may arise a new Phoenix, is a representation in myth of this vital human need. The ceremonies that inducted the Australian boy at the time of his majority into adulthood—the crawling into a log as a boy and crawling through to come out a man, the burial as boy and unearthing as man, the bath in which he is represented as a new creature—are primitive ceremonial symbols of this vital need. The dreams of men who have had a consciousness of duality in personality, dreams in which one self has seemed to perish while the other gained strength and clearness, are the phantasies that indicate this vital need of personal transformation. The experiences of puberty with a sense of emerging into a different kind of life is an analogy illustrating it.

This transformation which is defined as a psychological and spiritual rebirth, or reorganization of the

personality, has been widely and appropriately named *conversion*. What is involved in conversion? If one were to attempt to answer that question exhaustively, it would be a declaration of an exalted opinion of his powers of understanding and expression. But it seems to me that something definite can be said in reply to that question.

TRANSFERENCE.—There is a transference of emotions, impulses and attention from one set of interests to another set of interests. For example, a man might transfer his affections from hunting dogs to his family, from his family to his neighbors, from his neighbors to humanity. This transference might be partial. A young man may transfer a portion of his affection from his mother to his wife, but not all. The mother might still retain the affections that appropriately belong to her. In religious conversion there is such a shift that life is often released from trivial and damaging interests and becomes concerned with spiritual and moral and eternal objectives.

SUBLIMATION.—There is in most cases, if not all, a psychological process that the psychologists have named sublimation. It is a redirection of the fundamental emotional tendencies in such a way that they are diverted from their original ends to purposes that both satisfy the individual and promote general good. There is a surplus of original energy that in advanced conditions of life does not find expression through original channels and could not find expression without working harm to both the individual and the community. That energy should be made to find other channels of expression. The energy of the pugnitive impulse, or at least the energy ordinarily consumed in fighting, may be turned into the channel of aggressive

moral endeavor and thus find expression. If these impulses can find actual satisfaction in fighting evil, they are performing their normal and habitual functions. If from fighting the good they are turned to fighting evil, we have a case of transference. If from any pugnative functioning they are turned into a channel of expression which is not fighting at all, we call that sublimation. Fear turned into caution is the normal development of the emotion. Fear turned into mental alertness might be called sublimation. However, we may conceive these things, whether we believe in separate instincts or whether we believe in a single fund of life energy expended in definite directions for the attainment of ends, we must realize that completeness demands the full functioning of energies for general happiness and vigorous life.

CHANGE OF HABIT SYSTEMS.—Rebirth could not take place without a complete reorganization of the developed personality. Conversion necessarily requires a reorganization of the habit system of a life. This is a big requirement. Habit tends to settle life into definite ways of expression and definite forms of conduct. No man could have emphasized this latter statement more strongly than Professor William James. At the same time he recognized the possibility of changing habit systems and allowed a place for such a psychological transformation in the field of habit as conversion implies. He even gives a set of rules for leaving off old habits and acquiring new ones. And these rules might be well heeded in the accomplishing of a religious conversion. Any doctrine of conversion that leaves out this consideration is fatally defective. I care not how radical and explosive the emotional experience of a conversion may be, how fresh and vital

the new ideas, how genuine and sincere the new enthusiasm, the life cannot be changed without reorganizing its habit systems, and that will be accomplished by strenuous effort and great patience.

INTRODUCTION OF NEW FACTORS.—But that is not all. New mental factors are introduced into the personality. They have not previously appeared as such. They may have been latent in the system awaiting the moment that would call them forth, but they have not previously appeared as factors in the individual life. They appear as new ideas, new interests, new beliefs, new convictions, new sentiments, new purposes, new motives. A birth of definite religious experience in the soul means a new order of functioning, a new life.

AWAKENING, REINVIGORATION.—And that is not all. In rebirth the life receives a new reinforcement, a quickening, an awakening. It must get this quickening power from some source outside itself. Notwithstanding the surplus energy that must be taken care of in sublimation, no life has the power to reorganize itself and bring itself to completeness. It is not merely affected by maladjustment of functioning powers. It is weak. It needs a reinforcement of energy. Psychology is not permitted to go outside its own field and find the proper source of energy. But, leaving religious psychology behind for the moment and entering another field of religious opinion, I venture to suggest that the power needed is "the power of God unto salvation." By this I do not mean a strength generated within the soul itself by its faith in God, but a reënförceiment of energy coming directly from a divine source.

THE TIME FACTOR.—The time factor in conversion has come in for a great deal of discussion. Is conver-

sion gradual or instantaneous? It seems to me that a proper answer to that question would depend upon the content given certain terms. It would depend on how conversion might be conceived. If conversion should be regarded as the initial experience in a process of personal transformation, then I can see how it might be regarded as instantaneous. But if the term conversion were applied to the whole process of personal reorganization and readjustment for bringing the life to religious completeness, then I should say that considerable time might be used up in the process. Or perhaps conversion might be regarded as a pivotal point at which the life would take a new direction. That point would be an instant. Or a life might conceivably be going right and functioning properly up to a point where it must choose its direction, decide for religion or against it, espouse a low ideal or a high, a point that was vital for the future of that life. The point of transition to a conscious fidelity to God and the claims of religion might be legitimately referred to as an instantaneous religious experience. If the first content given conversion be adopted, then this experience would be an instantaneous conversion. To me the result, not the time element, seems vital.

Swiftness or slowness in religious transition will depend upon the peculiarities of the individual. His past experience may greatly influence the process. And the degree of phenomenality will also depend upon these two factors in the case. An emotional type or an abrupt and radical transition, or both, will probably produce a phenomenal and demonstrative conversion. But these seem to me to be incidental factors that furnish no useful criteria for determining the genuineness or worth of a conversion.

I have hinted at a conception of redemption as creating the conditions for the filling out of life to maturity. This is the ideal. The less need there be for abrupt transition or for radical reconstruction, the less a life may hold that needs to be undone or cast out, the better for that life.

CHAPTER X

THE FACT OF GROWTH IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

THE IDEAL IN RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT.—The ideal religious person is not the one who has come suddenly into the possession of religious attitudes through a violent spiritual upheaval. Such an experience ought to be the exceptional and abnormal religious experience rather than the type regarded as the model to be striven for. The religious experience of Jesus may be taken as the Christian ideal. He *grew* “in wisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man.” In the case of the life that has proceeded wrongly, developed the wrong habit systems, sentiments, dispositions and complexes, a reorganization of personality, a rebirth, is necessary. A man who, like Nicodemus, has grown up with the wrong religious ideals, needs to be born from above before he can even see the Kingdom of God. But the ideal religious experience is the one which emerges steadily in its religious consciousness and adaptation, assuming right relations to God and man as life unfolds. Religious education, then, should be at work in preparing the environment into which children are born, shaping and directing the infant life, adapting itself to the needs of child life, using the opportunities of adolescence and securing “growth in grace and spiritual knowledge” throughout the whole course of personal experience.

THE BASIS OF A WIDE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY.—An

examination of psychological treatises on religion will reveal the fact of a great variety in method of approach. But the one outstanding idea dominates the field, namely, is the idea of growth. Dr. Irving King, for example, entitles his study, "The Development of Religion." The first published volume in the field of the psychology of religion was that of Professor Starbuck, in 1899. This was an empirical study of religious experience in the field of evangelical Christianity and was divided into three parts: *Conversion*, *Lines of Religious Growth not Involving Conversion* and *Comparison of the Lines of Growth with and without Conversion*. These instances of the use of the subject indicate the prominence it has held in the field of psychology from the very beginning of the development of the science.

THE UNFOLDING EXPERIENCE.—Life develops by stages, and religious experience of a certain type, and in a measure of all types, unfolds with the unfolding of life. It may be contended that conversion is a universal fact of religious experience, that the emergence into a religious consciousness, however gradual the process, and the acceptance of religious ways of life by any method whatever constitute conversion. If conversion is given that definition, then a distinction must be made between that type of conversion which brings in the religious life by orderly processes of growth and the type that brings it in by abrupt transition and radical reorganization of the personality. Then any question that may arise in this connection is merely a question of terminology. The thesis of this chapter is that religious experience may begin very early in childhood and move continuously forward through the remainder of childhood and adolescence to

a maturity that manifests itself as the religion of the adult.

THE RELIGION OF CHILDHOOD.—The period of childhood is the period of beginnings. Childhood introduces the individual to the conditions of unitary existence and to the world in which that existence has a setting. It is the period which gives personality its initial bent, or set of directions. To use the analogy of the plant world, it is the period of rootage and preliminary establishment in the soil of environment.

At present a great deal of interest in the child is being shown. A long while ago John Locke made the wise and fruitful suggestion that childhood might be a doorway to the understanding of human life in all its stages and aspects, only the fruit of the suggestion was different from what one might naturally and rightfully expect. It has taken a long time to get the idea into practical use in education, but at last it is being accomplished. In the effort to control experience science has reached the discovery that the fullest control is attained by applying scientific methods of direction to life in its infancy. The first immediate result of the discovery of the importance of this was a marvelous reduction of the rate of infant mortality. Another result was the opening up of a new field of scientific exploration which is yielding some impressive discoveries. One of these discoveries is that we do not start life as a blank and we do not develop it by the mere reception of impressions.

A few years ago the teacher of beginners in the public school started out with the assumption that the six-year-old child knew nothing, or nothing worth considering. The assumption functioned as a pedagogical principle. We are emphatically realizing to-day how

utterly erroneous was that assumption. The average child of that age has, comparatively speaking, a vast fund of knowledge. He has perhaps learned more in that first six years of his life than he will learn in any subsequent twelve, and has undergone a greater personal development than he will ever attain in any subsequent twelve years of his life. The child begins his development amazingly early and carries it forward with breath-taking rapidity. He is at an early age a philosopher who makes the whole world his field of operations. He has acquired a working vocabulary of three to four thousand words, according to some authorities, and at any rate a very great number. The child of that age has formed a great number of habit systems and his ways of approach have been largely determined. There is no such thing as complete plasticity at any time in the development of the infant life, but the long period of human infancy affords an extended condition of plasticity. However, the personality begins to take shape at a very early age and the child rapidly becomes set in his ways.

The child receives his initial religious opinions, as well as all his other initial opinions, ready-made at the hands of his elders. He is born into a world that offers him a set of working ideas. He is completely dependent, trustful and credulous. It is in the course of experience, as he works out an interpretation of his world from his own viewpoint, that he becomes at all critical. He has no internal experience of religious realities. His religious objects are external and, as long as they remain so, entirely satisfactory. He develops a sense of right and wrong at a very early age and applies it to the objects of his religious world as well as to his parents and the other members of his

limited social community. His life is earnest and real.

But care must be exercised in the interpretation of the unfolding of child life, lest the mental and moral continuity of the life fail of attention. We may regard the child life as unfolding by stages, but we must keep in mind that these stages do not appear as abrupt transitions and there is no law of uniformity governing their appearance. The theory of recapitulation, for example, has not been scientifically sustained. It is only roughly true. The most that the investigations upon the basis of the theory of recapitulation have brought forth is that childhood development is by periods, and that without being discontinuous. Therefore the investigations in the study of childhood have offered nothing contradictory to a theory of the continuity of religious experience, beginning with the first moment marking a religious attitude and continuing forward to the utmost attainment of the religion of the mature mind.

THE RELIGION OF ADOLESCENCE.—Adolescence may be regarded as the blossoming period of the human life. It is the period of spontaneous physical, intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual awakening to the larger issues of life. It is often a period of storm and stress, due to the adjustment of the mind to new conditions of organic development. The intensity of this storm and stress depends largely upon how well or how poorly childhood development has prepared for the crises of adolescence, upon how gradual and unmarked are the religious adjustments. This is a matter of direction and training. It depends upon how firmly the childhood opinions have been impressed and upon the character of those opinions. If they are

utterly unadaptable, rejecting them and adopting an entirely new outfit of intellectual furniture for this interior will precipitate a severe emotional and intellectual crisis. The upheaval, if it results in a religious life, will produce psychological phenomena not unlike those in the experiences of radical conversion.

Adolescence is the normal period of character achievement. Religious experience takes on an internal aspect and the fundamental principles of conduct are adopted. It is the period of blossoming idealism, and this idealism enters into character formation or gives place to a practical materialism. Adolescence is the character fixing period. Never at any other time is the individual so responsive to formative influences on the higher intellectual and spiritual levels.

THE RELIGION OF THE ADULT.—The religion of the adult corresponds with the other aspects of adult life. It is the period of maturity and fruit bearing. In most adults religious opinions are well established. The adult is set in his ways. Flexibility varies after the period of adolescence, but the mass of the attitudes are fixed and will, without some revolutionary experience, never be altered. There are refreshing exceptions. I have seen men who even down to old age kept a vitality in thought and a freshness and adaptability in intellectual life that made them superior in capacity for religious growth to persons many years younger.

But life has found its channels. It ought to have completed its work of preparation. It ought normally to be ready to do its work upon the basis of its established character and to make its contributions to the life of the race.

Concerning the religion of the mature mind, it may

be said that it is rationalized, it is established, it is emotionally satisfactory, it is practical and active, it is what the mature man or woman lives by. It is no longer a struggle after adjustment, a searching for desired and uncertain assurances. It is an achievement, an anchorage, a crystallization of character. (1-)

CONTINUITY IN RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.—I hope I have made it clear that I regard the normal religious experience as continuous and not as a succession of abrupt transitions and radical crises. There can be such a religious person as the unconverted religious person, in the psychological sense, the person whose spiritual needs are met at every stage of religious development and whose spiritual life represents a steady flow from birth on to maturity, from infancy into fullness.

POST-CONVERSION GROWTH.—The religious experience, whether developed along with the whole experience of the individual or initiated in a conversion crisis, is subject to further growth. Conversion is an initiatory experience. It represents the sudden and phenomenal beginning of a new line of experience and conduct. It is a rebirth. The converted person is religiously an infant and must grow to maturity in the attitudes, opinions and practices of religion. The reorganized life needs to be brought to the completeness of its powers and possibilities.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

THE DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.—Development may be thought of as the free unfolding of life and experience, the natural and unguided process of exploration and discovery in the world about us which may incidentally give rise to religious ideas, feelings and activities. But we are apt to give too large an importance to this idea of development. The freedom of life is decidedly limited. The farther we go, the more completely we realize that our movements are limited and conditioned. Life tends to settle into set forms, and systems of control are evolved for determining the directions of experience. Religious experience is not different in this respect from the remainder of experience. It is not entirely the spontaneous and natural ongoing of an independent course of discovery and achievement. Religious development has been subjected to controlling forces just as have other lines of experience. Whatever may be the extent of the determining power of heredity, it is operative in religion as elsewhere. Whatever may be the power of habit, as manifested in the tendencies of individual life and in custom and tradition, religion has its share in it and is modified to the same extent as other phases of the developing life. Finally, when we pass beyond the directive influence of hereditary tendencies and of acquired tendencies to action and

thought, we find that religious experience is amenable to rational direction and that our religious lives are under the control, not only of our own minds, but under the sway of other intelligences. Minds that have long ago been taken from the conscious and living participation in the activities of life are still wielding control by virtue of the ideas generated and expressed in the past. The directed development of religious experience through intelligent methods of control is religious education.

There is a growing recognition throughout the world of the need of a more scientific and more effective religious education. Thinking men and women are coming to realize that religion has been too long a matter of wild vegetation, a sort of volunteer growth that is resulting in a decline of general morality and spirituality and a reversion of religious thought and practice to the lower levels of superstition. More and more it is being discovered that the higher results of religious development cannot be attained without cultivation.

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.—In the United States a peculiar factor has entered into the situation and operated in the direction of a disproportionate religious training to that received for the other aspects of life. It is the principle of the separation of church and state in connection with the condition of religious heterogeneity in the population of the country. This country set out to be a land of freedom in matters of opinion and sentiment. Therefore it divorced itself from religious establishment. Education has been carried on largely by the state and has performed the service of promoting democracy by establishing a community life for the various elements

of race and opinion in one population. The state must preserve this most effective instrument for its own preservation and the perpetuation of its ideals. But because of the religious heterogeneity, the diversity of religious opinion, the partisan hostility and jealousy of the various religious groups, the state has not found a way to promote religious education and at the same time be fair to all the various religious parties. Along with state education, the various denominations have carried on systems of general education, sometimes in competition with the state and more and more patterned after that conducted by the state. The net result has been a wholesale neglect of religious education and an utterly one-sided life development. Because we have lacked the dynamic of a religious influence proportionate to our general intellectual development to give soul to morality and support and meaning to life, we have been producing an ever enlarging mass of moral and spiritual defectives, and we failed to discover what was the matter with us until we began to face conditions that threaten the life of the nation. We have been preparing the conditions that threaten the extinction of rational religion with all the consequences that might ensue.

THE GENERAL INADEQUACY OF THE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OF THE PAST.—While many other countries have not had the same governing causes for the neglect of spiritual development, they have experienced results that have proved almost as disastrous to civilization. The religious training that was carried on was not universally the kind that produced spiritual light and life. Too often it was ultra-mechanical. Much of it was the dry didactic of a deadly dogmatism. Too much of it was the mere learning of forms and the cul-

tivation of a slavish subjection to an arbitrarily imposed authority. The ideal of the development of a spiritual personality was not among its objectives.

A MODERN MOVEMENT.—Fortunately, if it has started in time, there is now going on a movement that promises very much for the development of religion in the future. It is the modern religious education movement which aims at correlating religious experience with the other phases of normal life and applying to the development of religious experience the same standards and the same scientific methods that are being applied to the other phases of human experience.

THE TIME ELEMENT.—It has been discovered that education requires time. The time element in life development is an essential element. The time given to religious culture has in the past been pitifully meager and all out of proportion to the time given to other phases of education. In the majority of churches in the United States less than half an hour each week is being given to religious instruction and much of that instruction is educationally inferior and offered by unprepared people. It has been determined by leaders in the modern education movement that not less than three and one-half hours a week should be given to instruction that is specifically religious in character.

A NEW MOVEMENT IN GENERAL EDUCATION.—Not merely in the more restricted field of religious education do we find an awakening, but in the whole educational world there is a profound stirring. Perhaps it is the appearance of the delayed effects of some efforts of educational leaders through a number of years. This awakening is in the nature of a recognition that the most important business in the world is the

business of living, that living is more important than knowledge getting. Consequently fact education is giving way to value education. The discovery is being made that the most important thing to learn is how to live. And this general movement furnishes a favorable set of conditions for the success of the religious education movement.

AN UNFORTUNATE ANTITHESIS.—In the past few years an expression that has become altogether too popular is the saying that religion is “caught” and not “taught.” Like many another epigram that has received wide currency and been popularly quoted as something brilliant or profound, this saying is a fallacy containing, as the worst fallacies do, sufficient truth to make it plausible. As a matter of fact it is neither brilliant nor profound. It is based upon a narrow idea of religion as well as a narrow idea of education. It carries the conception of religious experience that limits it to the emotional or mystical phases of religious experience. The wider meaning of religious experience as including religious activity, religious feeling and religious thinking is not in the mind of the one who gives expression to this utterance. And education is evidently thought of as the mere impartation of information. When we think of education as general development under rational control and experience as any form of life activity, the antithesis itself disappears. Then we can see that religious education is itself controlled and directed religious experience. There is seen to be in the realm of religious experience a place for the cultivation of religious ideals, motives and activities as well as the development of a sane emotionalism. Removing the force of this notion will go a long way toward removing the idea among people

who are desirous of a spontaneous religious life and a vital sense of religious reality that education stands for religious formalism and mechanicalism.

THE DEFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE PAST.—Aside from the quantitative inadequacy of the religious education that we have had, there is needed, as suggested above, a qualitative reform that will change the character of the instruction. This is quite as great a need as the need for more religious instruction.

Too much of the religious instruction of the past has been of the nature of fact education. It has been too largely a matter of the impartation of information. Of course, much of the instruction has been sadly lacking in information, but the underlying theory of the instruction was the impartation of facts, facts of Scripture history, facts of doctrine and other facts of useful knowledge, good in a way but not representative of the true aim of education. The objective of developing a religious life that would function properly in relation to its conditions and also the development of social principles that would lift all of life to a higher level has not been sufficiently held in mind.

And religious teaching, because of ulterior interests and the influence of partisanship, has descended all too frequently to the plane of mere dogmatic propaganda. Such propaganda could be no more than incidentally educational.

Also the conception of religious truth as a fixed and unchanging body of truth has stood in the way of adapting teaching to the needs of advancing life. The all-important thing has been the acquisition of sacred shibboleths and learning how to wear the regalia of religion in proper orthodox fashion.

THE WIDER VIEW.—Perhaps the time has come when we may dare to hope that religious instruction may be carried on for its value in giving people better lives and that, relieved of much of the bitterness and bigotry of religious partisanship, we may approach the problems of the spiritual life in the scientific spirit and with constructive purpose. Religious instruction then may become useful in helping people to live wise, useful, happy, godly lives. And it will undertake to present all the significant value considerations for the purpose of leading life toward the full realization of all its normal possibilities. We may even dare to hope that soon the comparative method in the study of religion may become generally accepted and that religious experience as a universal fact in the life of the human race, with the various significant spiritual contributions, may become the subject of wide popular study.

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL.—One of the major problems of all education is the proper adjustment of freedom and control. There is in progress a timely and determined revolt against making education the imposition of opinion. Nothing is more clearly established than the sacred rights of individuality. But at the same time it is recognized that education cannot proceed successfully without a large measure of direction from school and teachers. How to steer between too much control of the mental efforts of pupils and inadequate direction of educational processes constitutes the educational problem. What are the goals, the ideals, the objectives of education? There must be some idea of an end to be reached. And this idea must be fairly definite. Perhaps the position may be safely taken that those social and

moral ideals that have stood the test of experience shall be clearly set before the student along with those that are new and yet to be established, with the clear understanding that the student is to exercise intellectual liberty and take his own personal attitudes toward questions of debate. The direction of experience becomes, then, a direction of attention. That a definite study discipline and a fixing of attention are necessary there seems little room to doubt. And studying the social values seems to be the most vital task confronting education, whether viewed as a whole or departmentally.

CHAPTER XII

THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT PSYCHOLOGY

THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.—The "New Psychology" is a much used term, not merely in scientific circles and among educators, but also in popular parlance. It has reference to the psychoanalysis of Freud, the analytic psychology of Jung, certain instructive theories of social psychology; and, for many, it would include the doctrines of the New Nancy School of Psychology. It lays emphasis on the unconscious, the instincts and the emotions.

The New Psychology has not yet passed through sufficient criticism to have its real contributions to science boiled down and filtered clear of the useless stuff that attaches itself to all new ideas and discoveries; but, as put forward at present, it clearly overemphasizes the sex impulse, gives the unconscious mind an importance out of all reasonable proportion, and carries with it an assumption of determinism that is unnecessary and that probably will not stand up in a complete system of psychological science, to say nothing of what philosophy will do to it. I have referred to the attempt to ground religion in the sex impulse. That is another illustration of the vicious and unscientific tendency to hunt for origins in discreet divisions of a unitary mind. Psychology has demonstrated forever that mind cannot be sectionalized. Its activities can only with difficulty be distinguished in thought. But the assump-

tion of the psychoanalysts who have dealt with religion, that it is a process by which the ego seeks to relate itself to its entire environment, is scientifically and philosophically correct. I have already referred to the utilization of the surplus energy of instinctive tendencies (organic tendencies is a better term, covering original tendencies and habitual tendencies) to action in substitute activities in dealing with transference and sublimation in the chapter on conversion. This serves to suggest that psychoanalysis may greatly influence religious theory and religious effort, but it cannot undertake to give a full explanation of religion.

The term "New Psychology" seems to carry the idea of psychological all-inclusiveness, as if those ideas were the only ideas worth while and all the labors in the field of psychological science in the past had gone for naught. I do not like the term. That is why I did not use it in the heading of the chapter. "Recent Psychology" carries no such implication.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.—The fundamental assumption of both the Freudian psychoanalysis and Jung's analytic psychology is the fact of an unconscious mentality. Not all the doctrines of these schools would be discarded with the rejection of the assumption, and certainly not all the methods, but that assumption does lie at the foundation of those systems of psychological theory. In a previous chapter I have considered unconscious mentality in relation to conscious mentality as constituting a new field of psychological investigation. I purposely made the discussion less thorough than it would have been if the present chapter had not been kept in mind. I desire in the immediate discussion to put emphasis upon the religious significance of unconscious men-

talities; and at the same time, if possible, to go a little more deeply into the psychological aspect of the subject. I have referred to the definitely determined spheres in which mentality has been regarded as unconscious, or rather in which certain unconscious functioning has been regarded as mental. I think I did not stress the idea that the doctrine of an unconscious mentality as taught by these recent psychologists set forth the hypothesis of an unconscious realm that was inaccessible by means of association and memory, the ordinary means of lifting material out of the mental depths, but accessible only by special means and methods of approach. As a matter of fact, that is the assumption. They really conceive of three layers of mentality: (1) that which is in the field of conscious attention; (2) that which is immediately below the surface of consciousness and accessible by means of the normal functioning of the mind; (3) and those profound depths of the mental life that must be plumbed by the analyst, or some extraordinary agency, before proper adjustment and reorganization can take place in the case of a diseased mind.

Let it be kept in mind that all these doctrines of the mind and the methods in accordance represent the pathological approach to mentality and all the minds examined are supposedly diseased minds. The general implications have been left out of account. But the general psychologist, the philosopher and the religionist cannot leave them out of account.

THE RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF AN UNCONSCIOUS MENTALITY.—What are the religious implications of such a doctrine of mind? There are two that come first. One of these is the assumption of a psychical life, distinct from the body, and greater than conscious-

ness. It is essentially the doctrine of the soul. That might be one phase of the hypothesis of the unconscious mind. That interpretation is essentially the view of Professor McDougall as set forth in his *Body and Mind*. It would restore the force of all the arguments and implications in connection with the assumption of the existence of a soul. The other interpretation would be the one which has been doubtless in the minds of the authors of the hypothesis. That is the notion that the unconscious mentality is the great underlying system of instinctive functioning, connected with an endless stream of heredity, and determining the course of life, together with whatever incidentally appears in consciousness. Basically it is a doctrine of physiological functioning, and it is a theory of mental life thoroughly consistent with a materialistic philosophy. This latter interpretation involves either a complete surrender of religious faith or such an explanation of it that it may be adjusted to some spiritual theory of life and of the universe.

To illustrate the possible variety in the thought reaction to this theory as a doctrine of instinctive functioning, I shall take the views of two distinguished thinkers, both of them psychologists and philosophers, Professor William McDougall and Professor John Dewey. Professor McDougall accepts, in its essentials, the doctrine of instincts upon which Freud has built his theory of unconscious mentality. By this I mean that he admits a large system of instincts and definitely classifies them. Professor McDougall is a spiritualist in philosophy. He calls himself an animist, but it means the same thing. He sees no inconsistency in accepting a doctrine of instincts along with the doctrine of a soul. Instincts, then, are regarded as

the definite methods of the soul's activity. They give character and form and attributes to the life of the soul. Professor Dewey, on the other hand, might be accused of materialistic leanings. Certain it is that he would not be led astray by any theological enthusiasms. Yet Professor Dewey rejects the idea of specific instincts and grounds human development and conduct in the interaction of the living being with environment, by which a determinative system of habit and custom is worked out. If I may put beside these opinions of distinguished thinkers my own humble conclusion, I would accept McDougall's doctrine of the soul, with whatever margin of unconscious life the soul may have, and, with slight modification, Professor Dewey's theory of instincts.

If we accept the idea of the Freudians that the unconscious mind is basic and the conscious mind an outgrowth, that life is mainly motivated by instincts and tendencies that lie below the plane of consciousness, an interesting question immediately confronts us, How was intellect evolved? The assumption of this and all evolutionary psychology is that the mentality of man was evolved out of the mentality of animals, that all mentality is basically instinctive. Is intelligence an instinct? Is reason an instinct? Is personality an instinct? If these questions are answered in the negative—and the accepted definitions of instinct will force such an answer—then where did those personal factors that differentiate the human from the brute come from? There is admittedly great religious significance right here. Either interpretation of the unconscious mentality theory that may be taken has its religious implications. If we accept the theory of the soul, we are placed in accord with some very well-

established religious opinions. If we ground all mentality in instinct—and that means that mind has been kept in existence and in process of development by the transmission of the tendencies which become the original equipment of each new mind—then there is left in the process a gap between instinct and reason which gives ground for a doctrine of divine interposition by which a new order of beings is brought into existence.

LIBIDO.—We have made mention of “libido,” the Freudian name for the cosmic force behind all life. That may be nothing more than the tendency of living beings to keep on living. Freud gives the libido a sexual background and regards it as the energy which flows out in definitely determined channels, the instincts and impulses. Professor Dewey very strongly urges other outlets for life energy, those determined by habit. Freud aims at shifting the flow of this energy in such a way as to relieve conflict and produce a free and normal functioning of the whole organism. It seems to me that a rich vein of real truth lies somewhere along here. I cannot give sex the importance as a dynamic that Freud does, but otherwise I believe he has made a valuable contribution to science in his insistence on a central life force. There is a channel of energy which makes life go forward. And this suggests a central channel of energy running through the whole cosmic life—not a new idea, but a very important one for the evolutionary theory of life. The smaller channel of life energy flows out from the main channel as the small blood vessel flows out from the artery. And fagging life must be refreshed from the main channel of life energy. We may regard that central channel as the life drive of God’s life and the small channel as the life drive of the individual. I hinted at

the idea of reenergizing the reconstructed life in my doctrine of conversion. Right here, it seems to me, is the key to it. This takes us into the sphere of philosophy, to be sure, but it is difficult to trace the religious significance of a psychological theory without following it a little way into philosophy.

This doctrine of a cosmic life force is not limited to the assumption of an unconscious mentality. It holds good for all mentality. When the drive of life is seen in the field of conscious attention, it appears as volition, a drive toward a recognized purpose.

The idea of unconscious mentality may be greatly restricted within the scope accorded it by the psychoanalysts and still be a realm of abounding possibility. It may be that on the plane of the subconscious the Holy Spirit accomplishes much of his ministry to the soul of man. It may be that out of that realm we draw those conclusions, without logical preliminary, that we call intuitions, those certainties that we feel without knowing why. It may be that deep down in this level of mind is the rootage of our profoundest convictions. The future will doubtless have much to offer concerning these things.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTELLATIONS.—The whole effort of psychoanalysis is to relieve psychical conflict. Let us consider briefly some of the ideas involved in the theory of psychoanalysis, ideas that have to do with the elimination of conflict, terms that have been given phrases of psychical conflict, terms that suggest the devils of a diseased mind. I refer to complexes, phobias and phantasies.

A complex is a psychological constellation formed by the attachment of emotions and impulses to objects or experiences presented by the environment, but which

because of their repugnant character, are unacceptable to the person to whom they are presented. The psychoanalyst looks upon these complexes as being consciously or unconsciously repressed into the realm of unconscious mentality.¹

The conception of unconscious mentality, as put forth by the Freudians, is not absolutely essential to the theory of complexes. Those psychical constellations might be thought of as pushed out of the field of conscious attention, as implicated in conscious functioning, obstructing it and producing conflict and mental disorder, without being introspectively discerned. It seems to me that the Freudians have made a case for repression, and for unconscious mentality as the realm to which complexes are repressed, that is rather strongly supported by evidences that have not yet been squarely met by critics. However, I can see the possibility of the rejection of a vast bulk of the theory of unconscious mentality without a complete rejection of the theory of complexes.

Professor McDougall has given us essentially the same idea as the complex in his definition of a "sentiment." He defines a sentiment as "an organized system of emotional dispositions centered about the idea of some object." He simply has a different approach, the normal mind being considered by McDougall while Freud investigates the diseased mind. A sentiment, then, is a psychological constellation in which emotions and impulses attach to an acceptable idea, object or experience. I have been careful to use terms that do not imply that the dispositions of a complex or sentiment are necessarily through instinct but out of

¹ This is a special use of the term. The *Outline of Science* defines a complex as a network of mental elements.

experience in general. The Freudian assumption that they are always instinctive belongs to the general theory of Freudianism rather than to the special theory of complexes.

Complexes give rise to that which Professor James referred to in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* as the divided self. Paul refers to it as a war in his members. It is a state of inner conflict. This conflict may be generated by sin, the conscious acceptance of a low ideal. It may be resolved by a religious experience that will set free the dammed-up energies of the soul.

PHOBIAS.—I have referred to fear as a religious motive. Fear is a state of psychic conflict. It probably lies somewhere between the impulse to fight and the impulse to flee, but at any rate it puts the soul in turmoil. In following out a special line of psychological investigation, scientists have enumerated and defined a whole catalog of fear tendencies, to which they have given the name phobias. Agora-phobia is the fear of wide spaces, and there is a corresponding fear of narrow confines. Hydro-phobia an aversion to water, photo-phobia an aversion to light, skoto-phobia a fear of darkness, pyro-phobia a fear of fire, and phobo-phobia a fear of fear. One might go forward with the list to a very great length.

The discovery of these characteristic fears was of very great psychological importance. They may offer the explanation of many taboos which have played such an important part in primitive religious life and for whole systems of superstition. I remember an incident of a negro who would not eat a rabbit that had been killed in a graveyard. His job on the hunt was to carry the rabbits, and he kept that rabbit apart from all the other rabbits that it might not be put in his

portion at the end of the hunt. He connected the killing of the rabbit in the graveyard with his fear of everything connected with dead bodies, a fear characteristic of the negroes of the South. Perhaps it was also the working of the fear of the occult, the symbolic and the mysterious. A thousand signs and taboos may be evolved from this line of phobia. Voodooism is an elaborated system of magic and taboo built on fear. This form of phobia may seize upon any trifling circumstance and enlarge it into an ominous thing of dread. For example, if a child should be given a knife as a present and with that knife it should kill itself, one who labors under the influence of one of these phobias would start the saying that it is bad luck to give a child a knife.

That which starts as fear may not remain fear. It may manifest itself in later experience as a revulsion. Even in the pronounced pathological conditions, the phobia usually appears as an antipathy for certain objects or a repugnance toward them.

Phobias, for the most part, have been thought of as pathological in character. They are certainly not all symptomatic of organic disorders. Some of them may be perfectly natural aversions. But, if they appear as fear reactions, they need to be lived down, for fear is useful only in developing prudence and caution. I regard the fear motive as the lowest and most unworthy motive that may be used in religious appeal. The highest ministry of religion ought to aim at eliminating conflict from the soul and at bringing life to harmony and completeness. "Perfect love casteth out fear."

THE PHANTASY.—The third term in the parlance of recent psychology which is used to describe or indicate a state of conflict is the word "phantasy," a rather old

word with a new usage. A phantasy is a psychic complex in which the individual pretends that certain wild and wonderful facts about himself are true. The phantasy is always extravagant, non-introspective, and usually involves a realization of inferiority; it is wish-fulfilling, and gives rise to abnormalities of character and to nervous diseases. It is a sort of psychical struggle of the individual to pretend or fancy himself into a being that he is not or into a condition of existence that his judgment would tell him is not real. It may be a sort of retirement from the stern realities of life into a brain study or day-dream. The psychoanalyst tells us that all this evolving of phantasies is unconscious. I should rather call it unstudied than unconscious. In my judgment, it is not strictly unconscious, nor the result of the working of an unconscious mentality.

The phantasy is to be found in many religious experiences of an abnormal character and in some not ordinarily regarded as abnormal. In that remarkable little book, *Recent Psychology and the Christian Religion*, Cyril E. Hudson refers to Christian Science as a striking instance of phantasy on a large scale, the pretense that pain does not exist, a phantasy betraying the essential feature of all phantasy in giving a twist to reality in the desire to escape from it.

REPRESSION.—In the chapter on conversion consideration was given to transference, sublimation and rebirth, all terms of recent psychology. Perhaps there is no need here of giving further attention to those ideas. But the evil of repression needs consideration. It is a principle of psychoanalysis that the repression of a complex will cause a diseased mental condition. Religious experience has demonstrated again and again

how secret sin destroys the soul. And the repression of life tendencies has produced abnormalities in religious experience. The damming up of emotional feeling is bad for the individual. The life of harmony and completeness demands a rightly proportioned expression of all the natural tendencies. Any unnatural mode of living will produce not only mental, but moral and spiritual disorder. Too much introspection is bad, but now and then some of the things of the inner life need to be lifted up into consciousness or released in the full expression of the powers of the soul. There may be a conscious repression of tendencies and an effort to sink even the memory of acts out of sight. Confession may help that condition. But as Mr. Hudson has pointed out, if the repression has been unconscious and the patient is unaware of the real cause of his trouble, confession will not reach the case. Then if the psychoanalyst can bring relief, he may be performing a spiritual ministry as well as relieving a pathological condition of mind. Sometimes, too, religious experience of a revolutionary character has performed the service of curing mental disease. The ideal, whether viewed from the standpoint of religion or psychotherapy, is to give the soul its autonomy for living an untrammelled life in the expression of its powers. Neither does this mean a life of abandon, unregulated and uncontrolled by reason and spiritual principles. It means the harmonious functioning of a well-balanced organism.

SUGGESTION.—Recent psychology has shown a sincerity in that its leaders have not labored to be consistent, either with themselves or with one another. Sometimes they follow very closely the same paths of opinion. At other times they contradict one another

flatly. That is true of the representatives of the New Nancy School and the Freudians. The former have given emphasis to the power of thought rather than instinct, and their contributions have been mainly in the study of the phenomena of suggestion.

The general psychological interest and wide discussion of suggestion arose out of the study of the phenomena of hypnotism. It may be defined as the direct transmission of mental moods from mind to mind. Baudouin defines suggestion as the realization of ideas by the subconscious mind. That might merely mean that the mind receiving suggestions is unconscious of the process of their transmission. I believe that may be assumed as a general principle of suggestion, or a general characteristic. The power of suggestion is due to a social quality of the human personality, as nearly as can be determined a perceptual capacity. *Hetero-suggestion* is the result of the direct interaction of minds. *Auto-suggestion* is the personal appropriation of the influence of another which is held in consciousness and repeated in consciousness until the ideas and feelings and activities suggested are emphatically impressed. It is the presentation by the mind to itself of certain ideas that it seeks to impress on itself. It has been very wisely said that no hetero-suggestion amounts to very much until it becomes an auto-suggestion and that there is no auto-suggestion that has not first been a hetero-suggestion.

Suggestion is divided into three phases. The first may be stated as the acceptance by one mind of propositions from another mind without support of evidence or logical demonstration. It may follow from a variety of causes. The person accepting the opinion of another

will probably be influenced by his liking or his very high respect for the other person, which will incline him to accept without question his ideas and opinions. Lack of preparedness for dealing with the subject of the opinion may make him susceptible to a ready acceptance of that opinion. Any number of incalculable factors might enter into any one concrete situation to determine the result.

The second phase of suggestibility is called sympathy, and is treated by some psychologists as an emotion. It is induced emotion.² It is complex emotion spread from one person to another. The sight of the symptoms of an emotional state will tend to awaken the same emotional state, not as an exact copy, but sufficiently to give it the same general qualities. Sympathy is not pity; sympathy is not necessarily tenderness; but sympathy is what the name implies, the entering into a like state of feeling, of suffering, with another.

Professor McDougall has an important word to say concerning the ethical import of sympathy:

There are persons who are exquisitely sympathetic in this sense of feeling with another, experiencing distress at the sight of pain and grief, pleasure at the sight of joy, who yet are utterly selfish and are not moved in the least degree to relieve the distress they observe in others or to promote the pleasure that is reflected in themselves. Their sympathetic sensibility merely leads them to avoid all contact with distressful persons, books, or scenes, and to seek the company of the careless and

² This induced emotion is the result of inter-stimulation and is a conditioned response grounded in the past experience of the sympathizer.

gay. And too great sensibility of this kind is even adverse to the higher kind of conduct that seeks to relieve pain and to promote happiness; for the sufferer's expression of pain may induce so lively a distress in the onlooker as to incapacitate him for giving help. Thus in any case of personal accident, or where surgical procedure is necessary, many a woman is rendered quite useless by her sympathetic distress.³

The third phase of suggestion is imitation. This is the induction of bodily expression.⁴ It is, speaking more carefully, the taking over of the acts of bodily expression from one person by another. Tarde and Baldwin have treated imitation as instinctive and made it the basis of the whole social process. But imitative actions are so various in kind that they are not attributable to a specific instinct. They involve too many varied mental processes. It is better, therefore, to think of imitation as a phase of the larger fact of suggestion. Perhaps it would be better to say that imitation grows out of suggestion. But it certainly begins, however complex it may become, as induced bodily expression.

Suggestibility, or conformability, is an essential factor in the making of community life. It is the basis of community opinion, community sentiment and community activity. It creates standards, conventions, customs and laws. Without it such a thing as a social mind or social organization would be impossible. Such a thing as a contract theory of society, a scheme worked

³ *Social Psychology*, p. 99.

⁴ "Imitation" is a term involved in controversy. Professor Bogardus regards it as any kind of response to suggestion. But the writer holds with Dr. Bernard that the response must directly resemble the stimulus.

out on the basis of cold reason, sounds fine as a theory but does not square with the facts of life and experience.

Suggestibility may be studied in its most intense and phenomenal forms in what is familiarly known as crowd psychology. Ideas and opinions become accepted by the numbers of a crowd without reasonable bases. Feelings are contagious. Waves of emotion sweep over a crowd as waves sweep over the surface of the deep. Actions are started that seem to have no motive for the individual mind except the fact that the mass is doing these things. The fact is that in a crowd people think together, feel together and act together.

But the phenomena observable in crowd conditions are also observable to a less intense degree in the wider ranges of social life. What is known as the herd instincts are operating toward the production of group opinion, group feeling and group activity. May I venture to suggest that this is not the operation of herd instincts but the widening of the area of suggestibility by increasing the range of mental interaction. The gregarious tendency will account for that grouping of living beings on the earth, for their desire to live together, for their elemental satisfaction in one another's presence and for the horror of utter loneliness, but it will not account for the phenomena of mental interaction after these living beings are brought into social relationship. Neither will any other specific instinct account for them.

I have previously referred to auto-suggestion. I desire now to return to a consideration of this subject and to include in that consideration something concerning its place in religious experience. A striking example of the practical use of auto-suggestion is that

made famous by Dr. Coué. The patient says to himself religiously, as a matter of regular discipline, "Every day in every way I'm getting better and better." It is not surprising that startling results have followed this course of treatment. The fact has long been known to physicians that a strong relation exists between mental states and bodily states and in many cases of physical disorders, especially nervous disorders or those immediately affecting the neural centers, a change in the mental attitude may radically affect the physical condition. Auto-suggestion is the direct method of bringing about a change in the mental attitude.

Christian Science has employed hetero-suggestion and auto-suggestion, especially the latter, in wholesale fashion, not only for the purpose of healing physical disorders but for making a philosophical and religious adjustment to life. One gets rid of disease by suggesting to oneself over and over again the idea that there is no such thing as disease. One gets rid of sin and evil by telling oneself over and over that all is God and all is good, and therefore there can be no sin and evil.

There are really no bounds that one might set to the range of auto-suggestion in religious experience. Fearful and wonderful things may be conjured out of the realm of the imagination. It might be difficult to determine how far those things really correspond to the reality independent of one's own mental content. Professor George Santayana believes that all religious objects have come out of poetic fancy and the sense of their reality has been impressed upon us by suggestion and auto-suggestion. For him prayer is a soliloquy in which the soul satisfies its religious cravings by its own power of suggestion. I desire to call attention to the

fact that this theory offers no explanation of how original ideas of a religious character came to get a footing in the mind. This seems to me to be a vital omission.

But auto-suggestion may have a place of practical service in the religious life. After convictions have been tested by experimentation and critical self-examination and found workable and sound, we may deepen and intensify their hold upon us by the process of auto-suggestion. And when old habits of conduct need to be discarded and new habits formed, auto-suggestion may perform valuable service in making the transition by holding our effort up in consciousness and making it so master our minds that the discarded idea or practice will be crowded out by sheer competition for attention. And it is certainly fortunate for us that we can select that which is worthy and dwell upon it until the idea bears fruit in our character. Paul is making an ethical use of this power when he urges it upon his people: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things." He knows that in holding these values in contemplation they will undergo a sea-change into their likeness.

Hetero-suggestion has also an important place and utility in the religious life. Much of the familiar and also much of the unfamiliar phenomena of religion is due to the working of suggestion. Religion is highly socialized and, therefore, holds in its content the results of mental interaction involved in social intercourse.

The prescribed modes of religious practice come

under the head of results due to the operation of suggestion. What is known as "cult" belongs here. "Cult" refers to the prescribed activities of religion, the ceremonies and gestures, the hocus-pocus, the detailed rites, together with their elaborated significance.

But suggestion is also to be found working in the freer activities of religion. Let us take for example the phenomena of revivals. Here is to be found the communication of ideas, feelings and actions by the power of suggestion. When the crowd is brought together in successive services, more and more do the individual minds come under the sway of the common interest. And the evangelist in charge usually strives to produce an emotional sensitiveness. If he is a man of magnetic personality, this is not difficult to accomplish. And it is legitimate if properly directed and reënforced by the supports of reason and practical common sense. Very little can be done toward moving the will until the emotions are stirred.

But such an emotional responsiveness is undeniably created in every revival that is worthy of the name. Once it is created many and varied results may follow. The crowd is rendered susceptible to suggestion and the outcome will depend largely on what someone may set going while this condition is on. Let one set of feelings be given expression and this same emotion will spread like a wave over the crowd. Let some phenomenal action be started and that will spread. I have read with very great interest of the revival phenomena of a century or more ago, the falling and jerking of people under the influence of religious excitement. I was privileged to see it in my own ministry on one occasion. I was conducting meetings in a primitive community of the Southern mountains. I am ready to testify that

the preaching was not of a super-emotional character. No one could have been more startled at the results than the preacher. But the strange actions simply got started by one individual and spread to others. It is a perfectly natural phenomenon for people of a certain kind. The critical faculty has not been developed. Inhibition is shut off by the creation of a condition of emotional suggestibility. A great surge of feeling rises within the individual and must find a path of discharge. Nothing is more natural than that it should overflow into the muscular channels, producing the peculiar physiological activity that was manifest in those meetings. That discharge was communicated to others by suggestion while they were in a state of emotional suggestibility and thus it spread over a considerable portion of the crowd.

Just because there have been extreme psychic phenomena in connection with revivals, and many unseemly and harmful things have taken place therein, some hasty and unwarranted conclusions have been drawn. Professor Pratt argues that when one appeals to the emotions at a time when only reason and evidence are really relevant, he builds on a foundation of sand. But there are no vital interests in life, no really live situations, in which only reason and evidence are relevant. Kant wrote concerning "pure reason," but in psychical experience there is no such thing. Evidence always has its emotional bearing. The idea that emotion and the emotional appeal should be left entirely out of religious effort is simply absurd. If that were done, religion would die. It would die just as music or art would die without an emotional appeal. The revival should have its appeals proportioned. Reason and emotion and action should be correlated. An

extreme religious organism is to be decried; but it is to be hoped that we shall never get beyond rising tides of spiritual interest, and even spiritual enthusiasm, either for the individual or the community. Moreover, it is my conviction that we are not beyond the need of efforts to produce at intervals such tides of spiritual interest and enthusiasm.

We may legitimately employ in religious effort all the arts that anywhere might be employed in the interest of the true, the good, and the beautiful. The minister may properly make use of suggestion to induce faith or to help a struggling soul to exercise an acceptance of divine forgiveness. He may enlist suggestion as an aid to faith. He may legitimately and wisely cultivate all the arts of persuasion. Any personal magnetism or prestige of office may be used within the limits of wisdom and ethical propriety. Of course, no man has the right to intentionally deceive by the arts of suggestion, nor has he a right to transmit ideas that he believes cannot be supported by logical reasoning. If he uses his psychic powers unwisely and unethically, he will likely be punished by seeing the results of his work speedily perish. Spiritual effort ought as far as is possible to be grounded on rational foundations. The critical process that so often follows the reception of ideas by suggestion will likely come along and sweep away the ideas that are not thus grounded.

"THE LAW OF REVERSED EFFORT."—In view of the amount of consideration the subject has recently received and the importance given it by the writers who deal with the New Psychology, a discussion on suggestion ought not to fail to take some account of Baudouin's and Coué's so-called "Law of Reversed Effort." I am putting it in as a sort of appendix. It

is substantially stated by Coué in the following terms: (1) "When the imagination and the will come into conflict, the imagination always wins out. (2) The strength of the imagination is proportional to the square of the strength of the will."

This law proceeds on the assumption of Baudouin that the subconscious may realize ideas more effectively than they can be realized by conscious effort. Take for example the recalling of a name. The effort to recall it seems to impede its recall. But if we give up the effort and allow ourselves to drift into passivity or reverie when the mind is in a sort of calm that Baudouin calls "contention," the subconscious mind right away throws the name out into consciousness. We reverse the effort, or rather give up the effort, and the desired result is obtained.

I venture to criticize this much heralded "Law of Reversed Effort." I do so with the admission that the facts with which it is premised are incontestable. It is the statement of the case that fails to be scientific. In the first place, the terms are loosely used. The will and the imagination are treated as if they were separate mental entities engaged in a struggle. They are not. Volition is merely one aspect of the mind's activity, and imagination is another. In the second place, there is no conflict between will and imagination. There is all the while the will to recall the name. Recollection is thwarted by the counter-suggestion that you will fail. The mind in its confusion between the suggestions reaches a "dead center." Then it quietly resolves the tension caused by the conflicting suggestions that have driven it into equilibrium by a sort of panicky fear. Relaxation ensues and the imagination, acting in harmony with the impulse of will, lifts the

name into the field of conscious attention. There is no reverse effort. The will to recall the name is acting in the unconscious as well as in the conscious phase of the recall.

The condition of quietude, which I have attributed to a relaxation while a conflict between suggestions is untangled and an emotional panic is dissipated, corresponds to what Baudouin calls "contention," described as a psychological equivalent of *attention*, minus effort. Concerning it he says:

Our perceptions tell us nothing, or almost nothing. The mind remains inert, contemplating these dumb perceptions, failing to grasp the identity of things, for there are no associations to set it in motion along the time-worn paths. A single mental state, or it may be a small group of mental states, rises in the mental void and seems to occupy the entire field of consciousness. The mind is like a stagnant pool; in the absence of images and ideas, it tends to remain stable.⁵

SUGGESTION AND MYSTICISM.—This it seems to me is a valid description of an actual mental state that one may experience. Cyril E. Hudson has very aptly pointed out the correspondence between this condition of mind and the condition of mind in which mystical experiences are found to occur. This may fairly describe the normal mental mood of the mystic. He quotes from St. Teresa's *Way of Perfection* to show the correspondence between the psychologist of the condition of "contention" and her description of a mystical state:

⁵ *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 141.

This true orison of quiet . . . is a sort of peace in which the soul establishes herself, or rather in which God establishes the soul. All her powers are at rest. . . . It seems that she wants nothing more; the faculties which are at rest would like always to remain still, for the least of their movements is able to trouble or prevent her love. Those who are in this orison wish their bodies to remain motionless, for it seems to them that at the least movement they will lose this sweet peace. . . . They are in the palace close to the King, and they see that He begins to give them His kingdom. It seems to them that they are no longer in the world, and they wish neither to hear nor to see it, but only God. . . . There is this difference between the orison of quiet and that in which the whole soul is united to God, that in this last the soul has not to absorb the Divine Food; God deposits with her, she knows not how. The orison of quiet, on the other hand, demands, it seems to me, a slight effort, but it is accompanied by so much sweetness that one hardly feels it.*

Behold the similarity between the great mystic's "orison of quiet" and the psychologist's condition of "contention." It is very probable that Baudouin has struck a rich mine here. He declares that this condition of contention is the state supremely adapted to suggestion. Perhaps, therefore, a vast amount of mystical experience may be explained in terms of suggestion. Such an explanation would not destroy the values of mysticism, but would put into human hands an excellent instrument for testing them.

* *Recent Psychology and the Christian Religion*, p. 91.

BEHAVIORISM AND RELIGION.—While, as suggested in the beginning of this chapter, the term New Psychology has been used to cover the psychology of the unconscious⁷ as taught by the Freudians, and also to cover the various theories of suggestion that have had recent currency, Professor J. B. Watson, in an article in *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1926, comes forward with the contention that behaviorism is the newest psychology. He claims that Freudianism is a passing fad and that behaviorism is an increasingly successful contender for the field of psychology. This is in accord with the observation of Professor W. P. Montague, of Columbia University, that every man thinks the whole world has been busy all the while just working up to his view. Professor Watson is credited, and perhaps rightly so, with being the founder of the behavioristic school of psychological method.

Behaviorism refuses to take account of consciousness or mind in its study of human experience, but limits itself arbitrarily to a study of behavior. Professor Watson claims that the observation and classification of external data is the sum and substance of all science. Upon the basis of such study the effort is made to describe phenomena, then predict, and finally to control. I am not at all sure that all orthodox scientists would go so far in the externalizing of science. As a matter of fact, there could be no observation of the facts of behavior without an awareness of the facts. Observation implies consciousness. He speaks of science as making observations as if science were some personal agency endowed with the capacity for observing. And the assumption that science is altogether or mainly the mere observation of external details is an

⁷ A conception probably first stated by Frederick Myers.

unwarranted assumption. Science involves comparisons of facts and reasoned conclusions concerning observations. And the latter are internal mental processes, the activities of conscious mind. Indeed, scientific investigation has proceeded only a little way as a matter of pure observation of what happens in the universe. Most scientific results have followed from the testing of hypotheses projected from the inner mind of the scientist or of someone else. Life may be treated from the standpoint of the organism in adjustment to environment. No one can seriously question that. But if the activity has significance, that significance is resident in the mind of the agent and in the mind of the one who studies the behavior as well as in the minds of the unnumbered multitudes that may be affected by the behavior. The attempt to establish a science without minds for whom scientific facts have significance is sheer nonsense. A science of behavior, for example, is an organized collection of mental cogitations concerning behavior.

Professor Watson says in his article that philosophy is passing—or has passed. The truth in that statement is simply in the fact that his type of behaviorist has “passed up” philosophy. Of course there can be no philosophy of mind or of anything else if we accept the positivistic limitation of the extreme behaviorist that we are shut up to a consideration of observed external activities. Thought is thereby reduced to “motor settings” and “latent courses of action.” On the same basis science has also passed, but its passing has not been discovered. It seems to have passed in a fog. As for religion, it becomes reduced to behavior without any meaning whatever, since the realm of the spiritual is internal and beyond apprehension through the five

senses. There can be no religious consciousness considered by a psychology that will not allow the study of consciousness of any kind. Nothing can be studied but practices, and to a certain group of these we may prefix the adjective "religious." But since experience is treated as response to external stimulus, and the stimuli of religion are confessedly mainly internal, the greater portion of religious experience must be ruled out as not coming within the province of such psychology. The great trouble with behaviorism is that it has sought to build its system on bare experience as activity without an adequate account of the agent having the experience. It has sought to make sense out of predicates that have no subject. The task is exceedingly difficult.

But the saving grace in behavioristic psychology is the fact that the behaviorist has gone on using the mind that he would not recognize and employing the consciousness that he had set out to disregard while he has given wholesome emphasis to thought as dynamic and to life as active, bringing clear by his extreme emphasis the truth that knowing is not the mere passive reception of impressions, that "to be conscious of objects does not mean to possess their psychological equivalents," that life participates in the processes of the world. These are wholesome truths for religion that ought to make it more dynamic, more vital, and undergird it with a deeper, clearer sense of reality.

THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STIMULUS-RESPONSE IDEA.—In modern psychology the human organism is regarded as a response organism. Professor Woodworth even says that he thinks that "Stimulus-Response" might well be placed over the door of every psychological laboratory. It keeps psychology on the earth and in line with scientific

method. According to this view the brain and other organs of the nervous system are response organs. They do not act independently of their responsive relation to environment. This does not mean that the mind and brain are passive. An organ could not be at all responsive if it were completely passive. It means that the mind, in order to function, must carry on its activities in an active universe that will furnish stimuli for its functioning. The activities of the human organism are responses; but a response, once it has been aroused, may give rise to other responses. The studies of Professor Thorndike are frankly studies of response, learned and unlearned response.

If the brain is an organ of response, and life is a responsive process, then the inevitable conclusion is that life is all the while lived with respect to the environment and that the generating conditions of the activities of an organism lie outside the organism. The human individual cannot be thought of as getting started in life without an impulse, or impetus, of a cosmic character. Man should never be abstracted from his environment, and the fact that man's life is secondary and dependent should not be overlooked.

All this leads us to a conclusion that runs counter to much psychological theory in the field of religion. Religion is not a self-generated type of experience. Its activities are responses. And it may be assumed that they are responses to the stimulus of "a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness." The religious life is a life of response. The assumption that they are responses to a divine initiative is not illogical. The assumption has as much scientific ground to stand on as any other. Man did not invent God or generate religious aspirations from within. The human organism

does not secrete the religious tendencies or evolve them spontaneously, but the religious life is the answer of man to the pull of divine reality, the tug of God at his soul. Jesus was in possession of this profound truth centuries ago when He stated that no man could come to Him except the Heavenly Father draw him.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ACHIEVED EXPERIENCE

THE ULTIMATE QUESTION.—A few years ago, when the Methodist Centenary campaign was under way, there was a dinner given in Detroit in the interest of the movement. Speeches were being given with fervor and eloquence and high-pressure propaganda was under way all over America. But the project was not by any means clear to all those who were being campaigned. During the progress of the dinner, preliminary to the speech making, a hard-headed business man leaned over to a bishop and asked, "Bishop, what is it all about?" That was a practical and significant question. It is suggestive for the discussion that we have been carrying on. We have been considering mind and consciousness and types and motivation and processes. We have been considering also some of the various psychological theories and their religious implications. "What is it all about?" Whither are we tending? What ultimate discovery do we expect to make? Of course, if we stick tight to the strictly subjective field of psychology, we are excluded from finalities. But if we recognize and admit the departure we are about to make, perhaps we can reach some practical conclusions without getting too far afield. Perhaps this chapter may not be strictly scientific. Very well, let it be a bit philosophical if it may be religiously helpful.

THE WAY TO THE INNER MEANING OF RELIGION.—In a sense everybody is religious, but in many people religious experience is largely potential. They know neither the end nor the way. They are bewildered with the opinions about religion and religious experience. Making religion intelligible is difficult. Vast utterances are made concerning religion, but when its meaning is asked for the fluency of discourse is immediately diminished. What does it mean to be religious? The question is staggering, but I sometimes think we make the answer more difficult than it is by trying to make it profound.

What is the essential meaning of religion? Is it a matter of belief? Religion involves belief. It makes use of creeds and formulas. But religion is more than belief. Theology is a formulation of religious belief, but theology is clearly not religion. Theology consists of a set of interpretations of religious experience, but it is not the experience itself. Is religion a matter of cult? Religion employs cult. It makes use of institutions, symbols, devices, forms and ceremonies. But those are the instruments by which religion expresses itself. Is religion a matter of morality? Matthew Arnold seemed to think so. Edward Scribner Ames seems to think so. The advanced religions are ethical. They make such of conduct. Also the major relationships of the higher religions are moral. But religion has a content that does not coincide completely with morality. There are super-moral elements in religion and there are values entirely distinct from moral values.

Religion is a living relation to the power regarded as divine. Religion must be lived to be known. Its utmost meanings do not appear in definition. No vital

meanings ever appear in definitions. One cannot get the meaning of friendship or marriage by definition. In the same way, one cannot get the meaning of religion unless he enters into the religious life and experience. One must live certain relations to get their significance. One cannot remain out of the sphere of religious endeavor and ever get into the vital significance of religion. The man who undertakes it as a way of life may make blunders and miss much, but he will get a vastly better understanding of religious meanings than he can ever get by an attempt at a disinterested study. He must take it as an adventure. He enters in, not knowing whither he is going. But, after all, this is the way of all discovery. It is not a peculiarity of religious experience.

AN ESSENTIAL SUBJECTIVITY.—The above statement is just a little more positive way of saying what I said at the outset of this whole discussion, that a man who undertakes to discuss religious experience without having a religious experience of his own is seriously handicapped. Therefore it follows that any statement of the normal results of religious experience must draw heavily on personal sources, with the assumption also that the writer's experience is normal. The latter part of the procedure, at least, is not difficult. We are all biased in favor of the assumption that we are normal, none more so than those who are abnormal.

GOD-CONSCIOUSNESS.—It may be asserted that a religious experience is possible without a belief in God. I shall not here question this assertion, but I do take the position that religion involves the recognition of a spiritual world order, a realm of being beyond the immediate and matter of fact. Every normal religious experience in our familiar world of modern life

involves the recognition of a divine reality, somehow conceived.

Professor Pratt, in his interesting book, *The Religious Consciousness*, makes an important distinction between what he calls subjective worship and objective worship. He regards objective worship as an attitude, or set of attitudes, taken toward a power external to the worshiper. All the exercises of that sort of worship are directed toward a divine object. Subjective worship he regards as the worship that aims at benefits to the worshiper.¹ Without criticizing Professor Pratt's view, I wish to use it as an approach to a discussion of the consciousness of God as I seem to find it in my own experience and as it appears to me to exist in the experience of others. Dr. Pratt uses the mass as an illustration of objective worship that produces subjective effects. To the earnest Roman Catholic worshiper God is located on the altar. The altar is for him a point of manifestation of divine reality. I feel sure that for all genuine and sincere religious attitudes, there must exist a point of divine manifestation somewhere, either in the external conditions of environment or within the mysterious inner realm of a man's own soul. Dr. Richard L. Swain, in his *What and Where is God*, tells the story of a minister's wife who confesses lack of contact with God, due to the fact that God has become so spiritualized and attenuated that she has lost the sense of his presence and reality. She has lost the point of manifestation of divine life. That woman may have a rational theory about God, but she cannot recover her sense of divine reality until she can locate somewhere a point of manifestation of divine life and power. A young man said to me recently, "I

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, Chapter XIV.

have a logically reasoned belief in God, but I have no emotional attitude toward a divine person." He has the same trouble.

Returning to a consideration of the idea that a point of manifestation may be either external or internal, I must take the position that in the sense in which Dr. Pratt uses the word, the internal location of the point of divine manifestation is not necessarily subjective. By the mystery of self-consciousness the things psychologically located in the inner soul may become objective; indeed, the mind itself may become its own object. Then God may be regarded as immanently manifesting Himself in the inner domain of the soul, while at the same time the worshiper may conceive the manifestation as belonging to a power not himself. That seems to be just what occurs in the Old Testament incident of Elijah on Mount Horeb. There is the earthquake, there the wood, there the fire; but Elijah finds God in none of these things. Perhaps Moses would have located Him in the fire, as he did at the burning bush. Many men and women have found points of divine manifestation in the phenomena of nature. But Elijah apparently discovers God in a still small voice, whispering within.

Also I am convinced that much confusion concerning the possibility of *knowing* God has arisen somewhere in the neighborhood of this vital point in consciousness. The reasoning of agnosticism may take the course of argument that God is beyond human comprehension, therefore unknowable. But in that sense nothing is knowable. I do not know a single one of my friends comprehensively. What I have done in my cognitive relationship to them has been to build up a fund of experience and judgment out of contacts with

them. The points of contact are points of manifestation. The powers and qualities of these individuals have been manifested in action, and I have formed character judgment concerning them upon the basis of the effects produced on me. It does not follow that, because they have not been fully manifested, I have known nothing at all about them. My enlarging fund of experience due to continued contact with them constantly changes and enlarges my conception of them, but there is no implication that my first ideas of them may not be correct and valid as far as they go. In the same way we get a knowledge of God and our conception of God constantly undergoes revision. In fact, I am ready to assert that the knowledge of God on the basis of the interpretation of points of divine manifestation in experience has as good scientific standing as any knowledge. I mean by this statement that the scientific possibility of the knowledge of God through religious experience is fully established.

But at this point I wish to call attention to the fact that there is a vital psychological distinction between an experience of God and a belief about God, just as there is a distinction between *knowledge of acquaintance* and *knowledge about*. In the former one is sure that he has been in contact with divine reality and logical argument cannot shake his conviction. Neither could logical argument bring him to such a sense of certainty as such as experience will afford.

But what is the experience like? In giving any sort of an answer to this question, I must, of course, speak in terms of my own peculiar experience. And I recognize limitations in doing that. Some of the vividness and details are gone; and, besides, it is impossible ever to put all of experience into descriptive terms. But

some things stand out clearly. One of these is that the experience of God is unpicturable. It is a matter of intuition—or something like it—of felt significance, of unutterable meaning. One seems to have arrived at the edge of the universe and to be on the brink of another world of illimitable possibilities. A Presence undergirds it all. A sense of the goodness of the universe and of life arises in one and the awareness that the world has a soul of intelligence and goodness and life and power seems to dawn as naturally as one awakes from a dream. The sense of the reality of these things is overwhelming. It needs no proof. It is self-evident. We do not understand it, but we are confident of its genuineness. This is frankly subjective and mystical. Let it be so. It is what it is, and I am not seeking to impose it upon others as an essential condition of religious life.

THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF GOD-CONSCIOUSNESS.—Perhaps the outstanding immediate effect of such an experience is the sense of an enhanced significance for life. Even the physical universe seems to be transformed. The skies are bluer; the flowers are more beautiful; the birds sing more sweetly; the sunshine is brighter; all music seems more divine and beautiful. Life seems more intensified, more satisfying, more abundant. It takes on something of the timeless. The world becomes, for a time at least, an enchanted garden of love in which one feels a satisfying friendliness toward all men and all things.

There is something practically profound and profoundly practical in these experiences of God-consciousness. It means that life is more substantial to the man with such a religious experience. It has values that are not otherwise attained. Men who have not

been able to believe in the objective reality of God and a spiritual world have been able to appreciate the significance and value of such an experience. Professor Santayana, for example, seeks to appropriate religious psychological benefits without entertaining its assumptions concerning objective reality. But the man who has not been able to enter with all sincerity and earnestness into such an experience has certainly missed something vast and valuable out of life.

Previously I have suggested that there is something exceedingly sacred and solemn in the religious consciousness. One cannot stand on the threshold of the eternities and face to face with the supreme realities without the emotion of awe and a sense of the solemnity of life. Dr. Pratt makes another significant suggestion. He says that the religious value of the funeral has been largely overlooked. The funeral is a solemn and serious occasion, not only because of the presence of human sorrow but because it brings people face to face with the supreme realities. "For in the presence of Death we find ourselves face to face with the dreadful and silent forces which lie beyond our control—the Cosmic Reality, our conscious relation to it—which is religion. Here we stand on the very edge of the mystery. The curtain for the moment is partly drawn and we get a glimpse of the cosmic process."² I daresay that these statements are applicable to a large number of experiences, perhaps to the majority, but certainly not to all. To a great many people death does not furnish the conditions for inspiration, enhanced insight into cosmic reality, or an enlarged appreciation of the fact of eternity and its possibilities. Death seems to come into their world as a depressing challenge. It suggests

² *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 304.

that cruel indifference of a silent, impersonal cosmos which throws a black mantle of futility over all human endeavor. I must confess to being in this multitude. I do not mean that I believe that death ends all. When I am not with it, I can take a rather composed attitude toward it. I do mean that the presence of death makes faith more difficult for me rather than easier. The unspeakable tragedy overwhelms me. And I have held a great many funerals. I have been told that I was a sympathetic and consoling minister on these occasions. I have in no instance had it hinted to me that the emotional struggle against doubt had communicated itself to anyone, but it draws heavy drafts on my strength and forces me to summon all my resources of faith. Perhaps in that way it may prove an indirect spiritual dynamic. It forces me to meet the challenge of death with a faith born out of struggle.

As for the approach of one's own dissolution, I am not at all sure that it is generally conducive to a normal and reliable religious consciousness. Values are pretty apt to be distorted and things in general out of perspective. There are exceptions and the testimony from these sources has value. Perhaps death does not ordinarily change character or its approach produce a state of experience that may be taken as a reliable and trustworthy example of religious consciousness.

But I am sure that the presence of death can have no greater power to produce awe and solemnity along with cosmic consciousness than the high and exalted experiences which bring us to an unusual appreciation of the significance of *life* in its fullness. For, after all, the supreme mystery, the enigma of all the ages, is life rather than death. There are other conditions than death or danger when the curtain is drawn partly aside

so that the bigger realities are discerned. Sometimes it takes place when we stand looking up into the measureless, starlit spaces of heaven. Sometimes we feel it when the glory of some great mountain peak suddenly bursts upon us. Sometimes we are aware of it when we stand by the seaside sensing the surging, resistless power of the mighty deep. But we get it, whatever the condition, most completely and satisfactorily when we have a definite sense of a divine presence and feel that we are face to face with manifestations of divine power. Not only are solemnity and mystery present but humility. Human limitation shows up against divine grandeur. When Isaiah has his vision of Jehovah, the cry breaks from his lips, "O God, I am a man of unclean lips!" When Peter comes face to face with that power of his Master in directing the net to the multitude of fishes and recognizes that power as divine, he drops on his knees and exclaims, "Depart from me, O Lord, for I am a sinful man!" There are contradictory elements in the complex emotions of such experiences. The three disciples of Jesus are afraid in the experience of the transfiguration, but they do not seem to desire it discontinued.

THE MORE REMOTE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS.—I have been stressing the immediate effects, one might well say the accompaniments, of the mystical experience of God-consciousness. I desire now briefly to consider the wider and more enduring results of such an experience.

In the first place, it brings a unified life. The widened significance of life due to cosmic consciousness and the more immediate adjustment to the supreme factors in the universal process have been touched upon. But the life is put into a continued process of

integration with these higher realities. After they have become evident to consciousness. The subsequent behavior is related to this central core of experience which has become dominant in the life. Life is lived with reference to it. There may be minor uncertainty and incidental perplexity in the future; but, unless these effective religious experiences come to be repudiated, there will be no genuine disorganization and demoralization. Life becomes oriented to fundamental certainties. Poise, peace, and serenity are achieved.

The second more remote, but inevitable, consequence that I wish to discuss is the working out of a practical philosophy of life. Everybody must have a philosophy, a practical set of working theories upon which life proceeds. This is different from a detached speculative interpretation of the universe which deals largely with matters remote from the daily content of life rather than those within it. But when religious consciousness enters in to give a sense of reality to ultimate factors in the universe, the more immediate factors become vitally related to the ultimate factors.

This philosophy of life will consist, first of all, in a body of belief. The experiences of life, especially those outstanding experiences which I have been discussing, must undergo rational interpretation. A belief in God is worked out with some elaboration with reference to such experiences. But into this belief may go not merely the contributions of personal experience, but also ideas gathered from various sources. A distinction between a belief in God and an experience of God has been noted. Of course, in the strictest reasoning, an experience of God involves a belief in God, for the facts of the experience must be accepted both as divine and as real. But the experience has a definite psychological

content in time and is not merely a set of distinctions in thought. But experiences may modify and determine beliefs.

As a matter of illustration, I present my own practical, everyday religious philosophy with its beliefs and assumptions. I believe in God as a personal being. Just as my own mind ensouls my body and completes its life—perfects its life, as Aristotle would say—giving it meaning and movement, so God is the Cosmic Mind that ensouls the universe and gives it meaning and movement. And just as mind transcends body in the reaches of thought and the flights of imagination, giving us a realization of a deeper reality than physiological functioning, or even organic adaptation, so God transcends the sensible universe, giving it deeper significance than its own plain matter-of-factness. I believe that God is living and responsive, as well as initially active, and adequate for all my religious needs. My conception of God is otherwise changing and enlarging as my experience enlarges. I am not greatly interested in the attributes that the theologians have assigned the orthodox God; and absolutist philosophy, with its closed systems and assumptions of the illusory character of plain experience, makes little appeal to me. I am willing to leave a great deal of the Divine Being unanalyzed and undissected if I can keep the sense of His reality. As for God's moral character, the life of Jesus Christ is quite sufficient for me. I find myself unable to get a clear idea of the goodness and love of God, and other ethical aspects of His life, without reference to the life of Christ. I use the life of Christ as the concrete material out of which I am constructing my ideas of God.

The above is my working theory of God. It is the

practical philosophy of God according to which I live my life, but it is not to be identified with my unchanging, fundamental sureness of God's objective reality. Upon the basis of both my sureness of God and my belief about God, I have developed a belief in a hereafter. It is not a belief in the essential indestructibility of the human soul. I am simply unable to grasp the fact of a rational God's laboring through the long processes of human development to bring the human organism toward perfection and then snuffing out the product of his labor unfinished as one would destroy a figure in the sand. That would seem to me to be a futile occupation for God. I have worked out no detailed belief as to the character of the hereafter. I am quite content to leave that with God.

For this present world, I find no higher principles of conduct than those expressed in the teachings of Jesus Christ and lived out in his life. "I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark of the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." I believe in taking Jesus Christ quite literally and undertaking to meet life with His spirit and His principles of social and personal conduct. And His way more and more appears to me as practical and wise rather than fanciful and chimerical. I agree with Bernard Shaw that Jesus Christ was the only man who came through the late World War with an enhanced reputation for common sense.

I find myself conscious, not only that life has an enhanced significance, but that it has a new scale of values. My consciousness has become predominantly a value consciousness. Life cannot any longer be lived

on the basis of impulse and with reference to sheer facts as they appear. It is lived with respect to values, all the values of life as they seem to stand in relation to those values that have become supreme.

I have stated in bare outline my own religious philosophy. It seems to me that some such philosophy must be the rational consequence of any experience that includes a pronounced sense of divine reality.

EXPERIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS.—I hope I have not made it appear that I regard experience and consciousness as entirely synonymous. If I have, I certainly desire to get away from such confusion. All consciousness is experience, but experience is more than consciousness. Experience is life from the standpoint of the one who lives it. It is action and it is undergoing; it is both conscious and all that life beyond the field of conscious attention may hold.

There are religious experiences that are dominantly rational or dominantly actional. They have some mysticism, some sense of divine reality, but they are based largely on sheer rational belief, or even on hope. There are religious people who do not have a rich sense of God's reality, who are determined upon the basis of rational principle to live as though God were real. As Donald Hankey puts it, they are betting their lives that there is a God. Mystical experiences of the presence of God are assuring, comforting, sustaining; but as a clear thinker has recently suggested, they are something given to us and not something required of us.³

³ John Baillie, *The Roots of Religion in the Human Soul*.

Indeed, there is something heroic about the man who, without much assurance and with little light, makes up his mind to be loyal to high ideas and ideals, regardless of consequences. The three young Hebrews are represented in the Book of Daniel as resolving to go into the

fiery furnace in fidelity to their principles, expressing the hope that their God might deliver them but resolving to go in anyway. The inner consciousness of all such heroic souls holds something of pathos and something of grandeur. It is very well expressed in the closing words of a quotation from Fitz James Stephen with which William James concludes his essay on "The Will to Believe":

We stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. If we stand still, we shall be frozen to death. If we take the wrong road, we shall be dashed to pieces. We do not certainly know whether there is any right one. What must we do? "Be strong and of good courage." Act for the best, hope for the best and take what comes. If death ends all, we cannot meet death better.*

Here is a faith before which I take off my hat in reverence. It is the high faith of adventure that does not demand assurance but faces life with undaunted courage and sheer loyalty to the best.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.—The attempt of this book has been to study, not religion and psychology as such and as mutually related, but the normal human being as a religious mind, the subject of religious experience, his behavior and his consciousness. The observation has been made that this religious mind is the resultant of a course of experience in the life of an organism in adjustment to environment, the total environment, physical, social and spiritual. Various lines of experience are open to individuals, but in the end the types of religious experience are determined by

* *The Will to Believe and Other Essays.*

the conditioning peculiarities of individuality and by modifying surroundings, by both and not by one alone. Religion is both personal and social because the persons having religious experience have a private life and a social nature. Human life has that double aspect. Religious behavior is motivated, not by one specific instinct, but by a multitude of factors both in the life of the individual and in his environment. Religion is a matter of attitudes taken by the whole man and not a particular structural tendency. Any attempt to explain religion by referring it to any specific reaction tendency or line of organic functioning is a case of oversimplification. Religion is an aspiration and its efforts at expression have given rise to some significant institutions and ways of living. The religious experience may develop by the orderly processes of growth from the beginning of individual existence and culminate in the recognition of a spiritual world order and an acceptance of a harmonious relationship thereto, or it may represent the reorganization of personality along religious lines in the more drastic processes of conversion. Religious education is directed development in religious experience. The normal result of religious experience is a life more or less happily adjusted to its world. The most vital thing about religion is that it makes a difference for life. The religious mind may be defined, therefore, as a mind that functions with regard to a set of values considered supreme and, in vital religion, objectively real.

I have sought to relate to these considerations some of the conclusions of recent psychology. Whether I have succeeded in my main purpose or made any worth-while contribution to this field of human science, I shall leave to the judgment of those who have had the patience to read the foregoing pages.

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